Preamble

The House met at Half past Two o'Clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

DEATH OF A MEMBER

Mr. Speaker: I regret to have to inform the House of the death of Richard Ewart, Esquire, Member for Sunderland, South, and I desire on behalf of the House to express our sense of the loss we have sustained and our sympathy with the relatives of the honourable Member.

PRIVATE BUSINESS

RHOANGLO GROUP BILL

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON BILL

As amended, considered; to be read the Third time.

BRITISH TRANSPORT COMMISSION BILL (by Order)

Second Reading deferred till Wednesday, at Seven o'clock.

Oral Answers to Questions — MARSHAL TITO (VISIT TO UNITED KINGDOM)

Mr. Teeling: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what groups in opposition to the Government of Marshal Tito he saw officially on his recent visit to Yugoslavia; whether he can now state the programme of the Marshal's coming visit to this country; and what time will be left for him to meet, officially, any groups, Parliamentary or other, in opposition to Her Majesty's Government.

The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Anthony Nutting): The answer to the first part of the Question is "None, Sir." As regards the second and third parts of the Question, I have nothing to add to my right hon. Friend's answer to my hon. Friend on 23rd February, except that the dates of

the visit have now been advanced at Marshal Tito's request. He will now be in this country from 16th to 21st March.

Mr. Teeling: While noting my hon. Friend's remarks regarding the Foreign Secretary's visit to Yugoslavia and the possibility that Marshal Tito may, on the other hand, see representatives of various bodies in this country, may I ask why the visit of Marshal Tito has been put forward a week and whether, before this visit takes place, anybody is going to be informed officially of its programme?

Mr. Nutting: With regard to the reasons for advancing the date, I have already said that that has been done at the request of Marshal Tito. It will not escape my hon. Friend's attention that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has important engagements connected with O.E.E.C. in Paris in the week following that in which the Marshal will be here. Arrangements have been made with regard to the programme—this is additional to what has already been announced—for the Yugoslav Foreign Minister to address a meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Union on 19th March.

Mr. Younger: Will the hon. Gentleman impress upon some of his hon. Friends that much the best way to encourage the sort of tendencies we wish to see in Yugoslavia is to welcome Marshal Tito not only as one of our most gallant allies in the war, but also as the only head of a Communist regime who has shown independence of spirit, and to make this visit a thorough success?

Mr. Nutting: I see no reason to challenge the supplementary of the right hon. Gentleman. That was, of course, one of the purposes we had in mind in issuing the invitation.

Oral Answers to Questions — N.A.T.O.

Progress Reports

Mr. Tilney: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, in view of the fact that the Governments of member States have assumed the responsibility for the activities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Information Service in their respective countries, he will consider the publication of a periodical progress report for Parliament


on the measures taken to implement the North Atlantic Treaty in all its aspects, including Article 2.

Mr. Nutting: It is already the practice for Her Majesty's Government to report to the House on the progress of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation after important Ministerial meetings of the North Atlantic Council. A reference document entitled "Britain and the North Atlantic Treaty" is already being produced every two months by the Central Office of Information. I shall be glad to make copies available in the Library of the House.

Visa Abolition Agreements

Mr. Tilney: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, in order to increase the solidarity of the Atlantic community, he will consider proposing, on a basis of reciprocity, to other member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation the mutual abolition of visas.

Mr. Nutting: I would refer my hon. Friend to the replies I gave to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Belfast, North (Lieut.-Colonel Hyde) on 29th October last, and to my hon. Friend the Member for Wembley, South (Mr. Russell) on 12th November and 17th November last. From these answers, he will see that visa abolition agreements already exist with all North Atlantic Treaty Organisation countries except Greece, Portugal and the United States.

Mr. Tilney: Does not my hon. Friend agree that if the Atlantic community is to grow and to expand, a further step, such as the abolition of visas, is necessary?

Mr. Nutting: I entirely agree, and we are doing our best to get visa abolition agreements wherever it lies within our power, that is, between Her Majesty's Government and the Governments of member countries. We are discussing the matter with Greece, though no agreement has yet been concluded. As regards Portugal, the position is as stated in my answer of 12th November. As regards the United States, my hon. Friend will be aware that the American immigration laws do not permit that country to enter into any kind of visa abolition agreement.

Leaflet

Mr. Tilney: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, in view of the fact that the Governments of member States have assumed the responsibility for the activities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Information Service in their respective countries, he will consider the preparation by his Department, for publication by Her Majesty's Stationery Office, of a simple folder or pamphlet for wide distribution describing in non-technical terms the objects and character of the North Atlantic Treaty, the necessity for it, and the principal measures taken by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to achieve the purpose of the Treaty.

Mr. Nutting: Yes, Sir. Such a leaflet is being produced for distribution in this country in connection with the fourth anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4th April. I have arranged for copies to be placed in the Library of the House.

Mr. Tilney: Is my hon. Friend aware that this news will receive great attention by all those who believe in the Atlantic community?

COUNCIL OF EUROPE (BRITISH DELEGATION)

Mr. H. Hynd: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs how British representatives to the Assembly of the Council of Europe will be elected or appointed this year.

Mr. Nutting: As in previous years, our delegation will be appointed by the Prime Minister, the appointment of Labour and Liberal representatives being made on the basis of nominations by the leaders of those parties.

Mr. Hynd: Is the Minister aware of Article 25, which states that representatives should be elected by the respective Parliaments or appointed in a way decided by those Parliaments? Will he try to arrange in future that the appointments are made in accordance with the Statute?

Mr. Nutting: I see nothing in the present system of British representation at the Council of Europe which is in any way in conflict with the Statute. This


system was adopted by the late Government. It seemed to work very well in their time, and it certainly works well now. As regards appointments of Liberal and Labour representatives, these are made on the recommendations of the leaders of those parties.

Sir H. Williams: Is it not absurd that the persons who purport to represent this body should not be chosen by this body? Why cannot they be elected in the same way as members of Select Committees?

Mr. Hynd: Were they elected or appointed by Parliament in accordance with the Statute?

Mr. Nutting: They are appointed by the Prime Minister on the basis of recommendations made to him by the leaders of the Labour and Liberal parties. They are, of course, appointed by the Prime Minister himself in the case of the Conservative Party.

Oral Answers to Questions — UNITED NATIONS

Technical Assistance (British Contribution)

Mrs. Castle: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what announcement Her Majesty's Government's representative made at the United Nations Technical Assistance Conference on 27th February last about the financial contribution which this country is to make for technical assistance in the coming year.

Mr. Nutting: The United Kingdom representative announced Her Majesty's Government's intention to increase the British contribution to the Expanded Programme for Technical Assistance to £500,000.

Mrs. Castle: Is it not a fact that this so-called increase is still less than the sum which we were contributing before last year's cut? Ought we not to be increasing the amount we spent last year in view of rising costs throughout the world which are de-valuing money?

Mr. Nutting: I do not agree that our next contribution will be less than the contribution which was made at the time preceding the cut. The hon. Lady will remember that although the contribution at that time was £760,000, it covered a period of 18 months and not 12 months, as does the £500,000.

Sir R. Acland: Would not the hon. Gentleman agree that, as the work gets gradually into its stride, as we ought to be contributing substantially more per month than we were in the early weeks of the work?

Mr. Nutting: We are already the second largest contributors——

Sir R. Acland: No, the smallest per capita.

Mr. Nutting: We are already the second largest contributors to this organisation, as indeed to all these Specialised Agencies of the United Nations; and, as regards the general aspect of contributions to United Nations Specialised Agencies, we contribute even more per capita than do the United States.

Mr. Noel-Baker: In view of the very great interest we have in the satisfactory development of this work, will the hon. Gentleman bear in mind that if the work of the Technical Assistance Board develops materially this year, as we think, we should make a further contribution and that the Government should ask for a Supplementary Estimate?

Mr. Nutting: I will certainly bear that in mind, but I ask the House to recall the enormous commitments this country has to technical assistance under such schemes as the Colombo Plan, which does not figure in United Nations Technical Assistance Agencies, and also for colonial development. The pledges now contemplated by countries may fall short of the target of 25 million dollars voted by the United Nations Assembly, but nevertheless they will be sufficient to enable them to get on with a considerable amount of work in this field.

Mrs. Castle: Is it not unsatisfactory that the contribution for 1953 should only be voted in February of the year concerned? Would it not be a sensible thing for the business-like running of a programme that there should be a longer-term grant, or that the grant should be made further ahead of the need?

Mr. Nutting: The hon. Lady will understand that I do not set the dates for budgeting but am inevitably regulated by a system, followed for centuries in this Parliament, of presenting the Estimates for the following year.

China

Mr. A. J. Irvine: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what provision of the Charter of the United Nations is regarded by Her Majesty's Government as making it impossible to declare the Chinese seat on the Security Council vacant.

Mr. Nutting: Articles 23 (i) and 28 (i) of the United Nations Charter and Rules 16 and 17 of the Rules of Procedure of the Security Council.

Mr. Irvine: Is it not desirable that if permanent members of the Security Council recognise a different Government in another member State, the place of that State should be declared vacant, and if the Minister's interpretation of the Charter is correct, will the Government consider taking steps under Articles 108 and 109 of the Charter to amend the Charter accordingly?

Mr. Nutting: No, Sir, we do not consider it to be necessary or desirable. So far as the existing Charter is concerned, I would remind the hon. Gentleman that Article 23 (i) provides that the Republic of China shall be a permanent member of the Security Council and Article 28 (i) provides that the Security Council shall function continuously and that each member shall be represented at all times at the seat of the United Nations. Having regard to those limiting factors, I see no opportunity, still less desirability, of raising this matter in the manner suggested by the hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Donnelly: Is it not implied in my hon. Friend's question that this whole matter was not considered when the United Nations Charter was drafted, and does it not show that there was some oversight in the drafting of the Charter? Is there not, therefore, some reason for amending the Charter?

Mr. Nutting: No, Sir. I have already said that the Government do not consider it practicable, possible or desirable.

Mr. Younger: Since numerous bodies of the United Nations have, in the past, rejected the claim of the Chinese Communist Government to be the correct representatives of China in the United Nations, must it not follow that it is

legally competent for them also to reject the credentials of any other applicant who claims to represent the Republic of China, and might that not conceivably, on the facts, legally cover an application by the Nationalists?

Mr. Nutting: That might be so, but I would make two points in answer to the right hon. Gentleman. In the first place, nobody, so far as I am aware, has moved that the representative of the Nationalist Government should not sit on the Security Council, and in the second place we are bound by Articles 23 (i) and 28 (i) which provide that China shall be a permanent member of the Security Council. In those circumstances, I see no possibility of amending the Charter.

FORMOSA (MUTUAL SECURITY AGENCY CARGOES)

Mrs. Castle: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he was consulted by the United States Government about the restrictions recently imposed by the Mutual Security Agency on the carriage of goods to Formosa in British ships also carrying goods to China; and if he can give an estimate of what effect this is likely to have on British trade with China.

Mr. Nutting: No, Sir. I am advised that these Mutual Security Agency regulations apply to ships of all flags carrying Mutual Security Agency cargoes to Formosa. Such regulations are entirely within the competence of the United States Government, and there is no reason why Her Majesty's Government or any other Government should have been consulted. I am advised that the effect of this instruction on British trade with China is likely to be slight, since few British ships carry Mutual Security Agency cargoes to Formosa.

Mrs. Castle: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that this ban does not apply to strategic war materials but applies to any cargoes to China, even such peaceful cargoes as fertilisers or wool tops, and prevents such cargoes from being carried in ships which are carrying goods financed by the Mutual Security Agency? In view of the fact that the Foreign Secretary has just accepted further restrictions on shipping relating to strategic goods,


might not a quid pro quo be asked for at the same time with regard to this ban on normal trading?

Mr. Nutting: No, Sir. This is a restriction imposed by the United States on ships carrying cargo——

Mrs. Castle: Of any kind.

Mr. Nutting: —carrying cargo to Formosa of any kind—but cargoes to which the Mutual Security Agency of the United States, in other words the United States taxpayer, has subscribed money. I do not consider it unreasonable that they should make such a demand that the ships carrying these cargoes and earning freight charges from the Mutual Security Agency should be debarred from carrying on trade with Communist China.

Mr. Donnelly: In view of the statement issued yesterday on the agreement between the Foreign Secretary and the American Government, has the hon. Gentleman any further information to give to the House? Is he aware that, on the face of it, what it appears we have achieved is the maximum political harm with the minimum strategic gain?

Mr. Nutting: The hon. Member is asking a rather wider supplementary question, but he will recall that on 18th May, 1951, the United Nations General Assembly, by a resolution, applied an embargo on the export of goods of direct strategic value to the Chinese war effort. The agreement now reached between the Foreign Secretary and the United States Government is designed to tighten the measures taken to apply that United Nations embargo and to carry out the spirit as well as the letter of the United Nations Resolution.

SUDAN (SELF-GOVERNMENT STATUTE)

Mr. E. Wakefield: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what progress has been made in completing arrangements for elections in the Sudan; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Rhodes: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what progress the Electoral Commission has made in the Sudan; and when he expects that the elections will be held.

Mr. Nutting: I understand that the Sudan Government are proceeding with arrangements for the elections in accordance with the self-government statute as amended by the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 12th February with the intention of holding them at the earliest possible moment. Under the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, these arrangements are subject to the approval of the Electoral Commission. Nominations of the three Sudanese members of this Commission have not yet been made, as their appointment is dependent upon the approval of the Governor-General's Commission, which has not yet been set up, pending the appointment of its own Sudanese members. Nominations for the other members of the Electoral Commission have already been made by Her Majesty's Government, and by the Egyptian and Indian Governments, and all three members are already in Khartoum. We hope that nomination of the United States member will be made in the immediate future, and that the remaining nominations to both of these Commissions will be made as soon as possible.

Mr. Wakefield: Could my hon. Friend say more specifically exactly where the delay arose in appointing the remaining members of the Governor-General's Commission?

Mr. Nutting: The main delay is in the appointment of the Pakistan chairman, but we are in discussion with the Governments concerned and hope that the appointment will be made shortly.

Mr. Rhodes: Are the Government aware that this delay is most serious and that the elections cannot be held with any sense of fairness if another month goes by, owing to the fact that these nomadic tribes will be leaving the Nile? Is he aware that the elections will be a farce unless they take place within the next three weeks?

Mr. Nutting: I am perfectly well aware of the hon. Gentleman's point and I see no reason to quarrel with any of it. Because of the factors mentioned by the hon. Gentleman, Her Majesty's Government are doing all within their power to get this Commission set up and the elections held. As the hon. Gentleman will have noticed from my answer, there has been no delay on the part of Her Majesty's Government. The delay is on


the part of other Governments, and we are doing our best to resolve it.

Mr. Mott-Radclyffe: What is the latest date on which my hon. Friend thinks the elections must take place if, for the reasons mentioned, they are not to be postponed until October?

Mr. Nutting: I understand that the latest date is the end of May, owing to the beginning of the rainy season early in the month of June.

GERMANY (REFUGEES)

Mr. Hamilton: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he is satisfied with the screening arrangements made in connection with the refugees from Eastern Germany; and how many such refugees have failed to satisfy the screening personnel in the last two months.

Mr. Nutting: The activities of the Commission screening refugees from Eastern Germany are entirely the responsibility of the German authorities. It would, therefore, be improper for me to comment upon the arrangements made or the results achieved.

Mr. Hamilton: Does that answer mean that our Government have no control whatever over the people who are now coming into the Western zone? Can the hon. Gentleman indicate whether there has been any increase at all in the screening personnel to deal with the increased numbers of refugees who are now coming across?

Mr. Nutting: My answer means that the responsibility for the admission of refugees to the Federal Republic was handed over by the High Commission to the Federal Government on 2nd December, 1949. The High Commission can, of course, intervene if necessary and if they consider that the arrangements are not sufficient to safeguard the security of Her Majesty's Forces.

Mr. Hamilton: How many refugees have failed to satisfy the screening authorities?

Mr. Nutting: While making it perfectly plain that it is not a British responsibility, I understand that in January about 5,500 refugees failed to satisfy the screening out of about 17,000 who applied. Comparable figures for February were roughly 5,000 out of 21,600.

Mr. E. Fletcher: What happens to those who fail to satisfy the screening authorities?

Mr. Nutting: They remain in Berlin.

S.-E. ASIA (DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER'S STATEMENT)

Sir R. Acland: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will make a further statement about the speech of Sir John Sterndale Bennett at the Economic Co-operation, Asia and Far East, Conference at Bandung, in view of the fact that the full text of his speech shows that he did warn South-East Asian countries that they might have to make cuts in their development programmes, and that they should cut out those items not likely to increase production within the next few years, and that they should try to finance remaining items out of restriction in consumption.

Mr. Nutting: The hon. Baronet's summary of this speech is slightly misleading. Sir John Sterndale Bennett suggested that the reduction of some programmes might be necessary, but he did not suggest that all development should be financed by restriction in consumption. Such a measure was advocated as a preferable alternative to deficit financing, or, in other words, inflation.

Sir R. Acland: I appreciate that in the early part of his speech Sir John paid tribute to the importance of development, but surely the Minister will agree that in the operative part of his speech, which was reported with dead accuracy in the "Observer," and not misreported, as I was told a fortnight ago, he was in fact suggesting a combined policy of reducing the development programmes and paying in part by a cut in consumption, which in fact means abandoning the objective of the Colombo Plan?

Mr. Nutting: I do not agree with the hon. Baronet that Sir John Sterndale Bennett merely paid tribute to the importance of continuing with the development programmes. What he said at the beginning of his speech was:
My delegation feels that the really important thing for each country is to make every effort to carry out its development programme.


That is a statement of Her Majesty's Government policy and in my view it goes a lot further than merely paying tribute to the importance of development.

INDO-CHINA (BRITISH FORCES)

Mr. Donnelly: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what consultations have taken place between the British and United States Governments regarding the future use of British Forces in Indo-China.

Mr. Nutting: None, Sir.

Mr. Donnelly: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that there were rumours to the contrary two weeks ago? Would he give an assurance that such use of British Forces has never been contemplated on any occasion?

Mr. Nutting: I think my answer was sufficiently comprehensive and comprehensible.

GREECE (EXPROPRIATED COMPANY'S PROPERTY)

Mr. Mott-Radclyffe: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what information he has regarding the result of the appeal lodged before the Greek Council of State by the British-owned Lake Copais Company against the validity of the Greek Government's expropriation decree in respect of the property.

Mr. Nutting: The Greek Council of State, in a decision given on 1st March, has upheld the validity of the Greek Government's decree expropriating the Lake Copais Company's property in Greece.

Mr. Mott-Radclyffe: Would my hon. Friend agree that the original land reclamation and the subsequent food production was a remarkable example of British enterprise and that the whole layout of the estate is totally unfitted to small-scale holding, which I understand is the reason the Greek Government propose to expropriate the property?

Mr. Nutting: I would agree broadly with my hon. Friend's supplementary question, but it is not for me to comment on the actions of a friendly Govern-

ment. What we are now concerned with, now that the Greek Council of State has given its decision, is to ensure that satisfactory negotiations take place to settle the figure for compensation. Those negotions are going on, and I hope that a satisfactory solution will shortly emerge.

PERSIA (ARRESTED BRITISH SUBJECT)

Mr. Mott-Radclyffe: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether any Swiss diplomatic or consular representative in charge of British interests in Persia has yet been allowed to visit Captain Navarra, a British subject arrested by the Persian authorities on 12th November, 1952, and arrange for such legal assistance as he may require when brought before a Persian court.

Mr. Nutting: No Swiss representative has so far been allowed to visit Mr. Navarra, the Persian authorities having continued to refuse permission on the ground that the preliminary investigation has not yet been completed. Her Majesty's Government have requested the Swiss Legation at Tehran to provide Mr. Navarra with legal assistance. This is being done.

Mr. Mott-Radclyffe: Do I understand that there is no date yet fixed for Captain Navarra to be brought to trial?

Mr. Nutting: No date has yet been fixed.

Oral Answers to Questions — MINISTRY OF FOOD

Food Prices

Miss Burton: asked the Minister of Food the increased cost per person, per week, for rationed and other subsidised foods since 10th March, 1952, to the latest convenient date; and whether he will name any foods rationed or subsidised on the first-named date which are not included in the final estimate of increase.

The Minister of Food (Major Lloyd George): About 1s. 31½d., excluding tea and gammon, on ration levels at 22nd February, 1953.

Miss Burton: If those two exceptions were added to the estimate, would they not bring the estimated increase above


1s. 6d. per person per week? Secondly, does not the Minister's answer make absolute rubbish of the statement by the Government that the cost of living has remained stable for the past few months?

Major Lloyd George: The cost-of-living indices, including the increases in the cost of food, have been announced publicly. If the tea and gammon which were on ration on that date were added, the figure would come to just over 1s. 5d.

Mrs. Mann: Can the Minister give the increase per person consequent on the withdrawal of the subsidies, apart from rationed goods?

Major Lloyd George: I have answered the Question on the Order Paper. If the hon. Lady wants further information, I shall be very glad to let her have it.

Meat Price Tickets (Display)

Mr. Chapman: asked the Minister of Food how far butchers in the Birmingham area have responded to his scheme for voluntary display of price labels on meat.

Miss Burton: asked the Minister of Food what results were obtained in the Midlands and, in particular, in Coventry from the survey covering the proposal that butchers should use price tickets.

Major Lloyd George: In the Midland area as a whole, price tickets were displayed on meat in some 38 per cent. of the butchers' shops visited. For Birmingham and Coventry the figures were about 33 per cent. and 54 per cent., respectively.

Mr. Chapman: Is the Minister satisfied with that response to the voluntary scheme, and what is he going to do about the butchers who virtually refuse to carry it out?

Major Lloyd George: There has been a remarkable improvement in the period of a month. The first survey was taken in December, 1952, and at that time the figures were 20 per cent. for Birmingham and 30 per cent. for Coventry. A second survey took place a month later, and I think the hon. Gentleman will agree that the increase in Coventry from 30 per cent. to 54 per cent. is remarkable.

Miss Burton: I am very glad that there is an increase in the number of price tickets shown in Coventry, but could the

Minister go further in securing that the remainder of the butchers show them, because many housewives complain about this? With regard to the last part of his answer, is it not true that, when the Government cited the cost of living as remaining steady, they excepted food prices from that statement?

Major Lloyd George: We have made it perfectly plain. We have given the figures as they are with regard to the cost of living, and the all-items index includes the cost of food.

Cheese Ration

Dr. Stross: asked the Minister of Food whether he will be able to increase the cheese ration during this year.

Major Lloyd George: It is too early to say.

Dr. Stross: Would it not, however, be helpful if the Minister could give an assurance to New Zealand in connection with their request that we should take up all their dairy produce for the next 15 years? If he could do that, it would help.

Major Lloyd George: As a matter of fact, under the existing agreement with New Zealand we do undertake to take all the exportable surplus of their dairy products, with the exception of certain specified exports to other countries.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: In view of the fact that liquid milk sales to the public have declined considerably, what will happen to the millions of gallons of milk not now being sold? Cannot they be transferred to the manufacture of cheese?

Major Lloyd George: We are making more cheese than we did last year.

Mr. Willey: Has the right hon. and gallant Gentleman considered giving a reply to the Prime Minister of New Zealand in connection with his complaint about the lack of assurances on the part of the Government?

Major Lloyd George: There is a Question later on about that.

Foodstuffs (Albumen)

Dr. Stross: asked the Minister of Food whether he will forbid the use of albumen manufactured from fish or slaughterhouse blood in the preparation


of cakes and any foodstuffs for human use, unless the foodstuff is so labelled that the source of the albumen is clearly apparent.

Major Lloyd George: No, Sir. I do not think it would be appropriate to try to impose any special restrictions on the use of such harmless and useful supplement to our supplies of egg albumen.

Dr. Stross: Has the Minister not considered the fact that the use of albumen made out of blood may be nauseating to certain sections of the public, including vegetarians, Hindus, Mohammedans and Jews? Is the only advice he can give them that they must never eat any confections made with albumen from blood? If that is the view he takes, will he bear in mind that the next stage will be to produce albumen from the excretions of diseased cattle and human beings?

Major Lloyd George: I am surprised that the hon. Gentleman made that last observation. With regard to albumen itself, it is virtually indistinguishable as between animal and egg. I shall do what I can to help anybody with religious opposition to this product. I do not think it would be impossible for them to obtain their egg albumen if they made inquiries.

Mr. Nicholson: Is not this a case where ignorance is bliss and it is folly to be wise?

Branded Margarine

Mr. Willey: asked the Minister of Food whether he now intends to allow the production of branded margarine; and if he will make a statement.

Major Lloyd George: I cannot add to the reply I gave to the hon. Member on 27th January.

Mr. Willey: Is the Minister aware that, whilst there is a good deal to be said for encouraging the improved quality of margarine, we do not want him to use this as a smoke-screen in removing the subsidy and putting up the price.

Major Lloyd George: I do not use a smoke-screen as a rule.

American Butter

Mr. Willey: asked the Minister of Food what offer he has made to purchase any of the large surplus supplies of butter

now being accumulated in the United States of America.

Major Lloyd George: None, Sir.

Mr. Willey: Has the right hon. and gallant Gentleman seen the report that the United States Administration is storing surplus butter now at the rate of 1 million pounds a week? We might point out that we would like butter as well as guns.

Major Lloyd George: There are lots of other things we could buy, such as cheese. As a matter of fact, much of the United States butter normally exceeds the 16 per cent. allowed over here.

Subsidies

Mr. Willey: asked the Minister of Food the current annual rate of the food subsidies at the latest available date.

Major Lloyd George: For the year 1952–53, as stated in the recent Supplementary Estimate for my Department, £331·6 million.

Mr. Wiley: Does the right hon. and gallant Gentleman appreciate that that is not the question I put? I asked him the current annual rate. He gave it on the wireless in a very misleading broadcast. Can he now repeat it for the benefit of the House?

Major Lloyd George: That is the cost of the subsidies this year. I cannot add to what my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer said, that the aim was to adjust the subsidy to the rate of £250 million at the end of the financial year.

Mr. Willey: That is the question I asked—whether it is at that rate.

Mr. Robson Brown: asked the Minister of Food (1) the present approximate total cost of all food subsidies; and what are the various items, together with their approximate cost;
(2) what items, with approximate values, are included in the Agricultural Vote, but whose cost falls on the food subsidies.

Major Lloyd George: As indicated in my Department's Supplementary Estimate for 1952–53, food subsidies will cost in total £331·6 million this year. As the


reply to the remaining parts of the Questions contains a number of figures, I will, with permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Mr. Robson Brown: I am grateful to the Minister for the figures which he will circulate in the OFFICIAL REPORT. Could I ask him if he agrees that the provision of milk to school children and expectant mothers, provided for under the subsidies, has been largely contributory to the good health of the children?

Major Lloyd George: Yes.

Following is the information:


FOOD SUBSIDIES, 1952–53


The table below sets out the amount of subsidy for each subsidised foodstuff estimated for the purpose of the Supplementary Estimate for the Ministry of Food, recently published (H.C. 89).



£ million


Bacon
22·0


Bread
41·3


Flour (other than for bread)
13·3


Shell eggs
22·2


Meat (carcase)
25·6


Milk (liquid)
39·8


Butter
20·0


Cheese
2·1


Margarine (domestic)
13·0


Lard and cooking fat (domestic)
4·5


Sugar (domestic)
10·2


Miscellaneous
6·9


Welfare and Milk in Schools Schemes
46·5


Animal Feeding Stuffs
30·0


Total Subsidies Administered by Ministry of Food
297·4




SUBSIDIES ADMINISTERED BY THE AGRICULTURAL DEPARTMENTS




£ million



Attested Herds Scheme
…
9·7



Fertiliser Subsidy
…
11·0



White Fish Subsidy
…
1·8



Ploughing Grants
…
6·3



Calf Subsidy
…
5·4






34·2


Total Food Subsidies
…
…
331·6

New Zealand Dairy Produce

Mr. Lewis: asked the Minister of Food if he will make a statement on the offer made to him by the New Zealand Government to supply butter and cheese for the next 15 years; and what was his reply.

Major Anstruther-Gray: asked the Minister of Food whether he will make a statement regarding the request by New

Zealand for an assurance that no quantitative restriction will be placed upon imports of dairy produce from that Dominion for 15 years.

Major Lloyd George: After careful consideration, I decided that in view of the recent discussions between Commonwealth Prime Ministers and of the further discussions which we shall be having with other countries, this would not be an opportune moment to commit ourselves for so long ahead. Meanwhile, our present contract with New Zealand to take practically all her exportable surplus of butter and cheese continues until 1955.

Mr. Lewis: Has the Minister seen the statement by the New Zealand Prime Minister, making a strong complaint of the attitude of Her Majesty's Government in connection with this matter? Can he say why the Government are afraid to assist both New Zealand and this country by giving the assurance that New Zealand wants?

Major Lloyd George: Of course we are not afraid to assist, and we have an agreement now which runs until 1955. At any time, under that agreement, it is open to either party to open discussions as to the future. I do not accept the fact that Mr Holland complained. We made it perfectly plain that we were sympathetic; we simply said that the time was not opportune.

Mr. Manuel: Have the Government, in view of Question No. 31, now completely removed from their minds their antagonism towards bulk buying?

Commodity Markets

Mr. Russell: asked the Minister of Food what commodity markets which dealt in foodstuffs in pre-war years are still closed; what are the prospects of their being re-opened; and if he will give an estimate of the foreign exchange earned annually by these markets before the war.

Major Lloyd George: The re-opening of terminal or futures markets has to be considered for each commodity in relation to the balance of payments position. Cocoa is at present the only foodstuff for which these specialised trading facilities have been fully restored. In general, progress towards the fuller restoration of


commodity markets in foodstuffs must depend on developments following the return of imports to private trade. As to the last part of the Question, I am not aware of any reliable estimate.

Mr. Russell: Can my right hon. and gallant Friend say roughly how many markets that were operating before the war are still closed?

Major Lloyd George: I should like to have notice of that.

Turkish Trade Mission

Mr. G. Jeger: asked the Minister of Food what foodstuffs are being offered by the Turkish Trade Mission at present in this country; and what he is arranging to buy.

Major Lloyd George: Following negotiations with the Trade Mission, I have bought a further 2,000 tons of Turkish sultanas. My Department has also had discussions with the Mission about wheat, oils and oilseeds, and animal feedingstuffs, and I understand they are interested in selling pulses and hazel nuts which are imported by private traders.

Mr. Jeger: Has the Minister any information about the statement that has been issued that they are offering us foodstuffs cheaper than many of their competitors, while his Department is hesitating somewhat in concluding a purchase?

Major Lloyd George: We are awaiting a firm offer at the moment.

Sugar Ration

Group Captain Wilcock: asked the Minister of Food when he proposes to increase the sugar ration.

Major Lloyd George: I have nothing to add to the answer I gave to the hon. Member for Fife, West (Mr. Hamilton) on 23rd February.

Group Captain Wilcock: Does not the Minister realise that the housewives are getting rather tired of being given bonuses like a lot of children and that what they want is an increase in the ration? Does not the Minister feel that the world sugar situation will now allow a general increase in the basic ration?

Major Lloyd George: I do not know what the hon. and gallant Gentleman

means about bonuses. He had better communicate with some of his hon. Friends. The sugar ration has been higher for a longer time than at any time since 1940. I have made it perfectly plain more than once in the House that the question of buying sugar is purely a question of the availability of dollars.

Mr. Willey: Has the right hon. and gallant Gentleman forgotten that we had 108,000 tons of sugar less for the domestic consumer last year than in the previous year, according to his own figures?

Major Lloyd George: I repeat that for this period this year the sugar ration has been at a higher level for a longer period than at any time since 1940.

Farthings (Supplies)

Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing: asked the Minister of Food whether, in view of the fact that the controlled price of the 1 lb. loaf is 4¼., he will consult with the Chancellor of the Exchequer to ask if more farthings may be minted so that bakers may give their customers the correct change.

Major Lloyd George: I am advised by my right hon. Friend that farthings will be issued by the Mint to the Banks in response to demand. He hopes that the public will do their best to keep farthings in circulation. The demands on the Mint over the past few years suggest that many of them are lost or hoarded.

Mr. Orr-Ewing: Is my right hon. and gallant Friend aware that there is a shortage of farthings in some areas in the country? Could he have another look at this question? Could he tell us what it would cost if the price were rounded off?

Major Lloyd George: I will certainly look at the question of a shortage in certain parts of the country. If the farthing were rounded up—[HON. MEMBERS: "Down."]—it would cost the consumer about £11 million.

Mr. Paget: Is the right hon. and gallant Gentleman aware that a farthing costs about a halfpenny to make? Would it not be better a find a rather cheaper farthing?

Major Lloyd George: I am not sure about that, but of course the £ does not cost £1, either.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Would it not be possible to overcome all these numismatic difficulties by taking steps to induce bakers to produce a loaf costing 4d. and weighing 15·058 oz.?

Major Lloyd George: I think the hon. and gallant Gentleman would have a nice time trying to get bakers to alter the whole of their equipment to do that.

Imported Foods (Duty)

Mr. Holt: asked the Minister of Food what imported foods, on which a subsidy was subsequently paid, bore import duties during the 12 months ended December, 1952; and if he will give the amount of duty paid on each type of food.

Major Lloyd George: I will, with permission, circulate the information in the OFFICIAL REPORT as soon as it can be made available.

Points Rationing

Mrs. Mann: asked the Minister of Food how many items of food were removed from points rationing during 1950, including the different kinds of jams, syrup, tinned fruit, tinned fish, biscuits and cereals.

Major Lloyd George: About 90. I am sending the hon. Member a list, but it does not include jams, as these were removed from points rationing in 1948.

Mrs. Mann: Does the list which the right hon. and gallant Gentleman intends to send me reveal that the Labour Government took almost 90 items outside the ration book? Does not the right hon. and gallant Gentleman think that was a remarkable achievement by the Labour Government?

Major Lloyd George: I would say that was one of the rather bright spots in a rather gloomy picture.

Captain Pilkington: Were not these 90 items removed entirely as a result of Conservative pressure?

Canadian Beef

Mrs. Mann: asked the Minister of Food why he allowed 25,000 tons of New Zealand beef, sold to Britain, to be diverted to Ohio, United States of America; and how much Canadian beef was imported into the United Kingdom.

Major Lloyd George: Because of an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in Saskatchewan a year ago, the movement of Canadian livestock and meat to their usual market in the United States of America was stopped. To help Canada we agreed to take the resulting surplus in place of an equivalent quantity of beef from New Zealand to be shipped to the United States. Up to the end of February, 1953, we have received about 30,000 tons of Canadian beef.

Mrs. Mann: Is the right hon. and gallant Gentleman aware that this New York paper states that when Canadian meat was barred because of foot-and-mouth disease, it was taken by Britain? Is not that rather astonishing? Is that the kind of "red meat" we have been promised?

Major Lloyd George: I am surprised that the hon. Lady does not know the regulations about foot-and-mouth disease, which are the same in Canada as in this country. We can take meat in this country from non-affected areas. All the meat we got from Canada came from non-affected areas.

Mrs. Mann: Why was it refused by other countries?

Major Lloyd George: It was refused in the United States because they have different regulations. If there is foot-and-mouth disease, no cattle can cross into the United States from any part of a country in which the disease exists.

Dried Fruits

Mrs. Mann: asked the Minister of Food what dried fruits, apart from currants, raisins and sultanas, have been imported to Britain in 1952; and what dried fruits, apart from currants, raisins and sultanas, will be available for 1953.

Major Lloyd George: Apart from about 40,000 tons of dates and figs imported on private account, my Department imported about 9,000 tons of muscatels, prunes, dried apricots and dried peaches during 1952. Dates and figs can be freely imported this year. Some dried apricots have already been purchased by my Department, but I cannot yet say what other fruit will be available.

Mrs. Mann: To whom did the right hon. and gallant Gentleman distribute the dried prunes and dried apricots? There


is a strong feeling among housewives that the caterers got them. Is he aware that we have not seen any dried prunes or apricots for over a year?

Major Lloyd George: I could not, without notice, tell the hon. Lady where the dried fruits went, but I can say that the distribution of dried fruits was much greater last year than it had been for a very long time. I hope that this year it will be greater still.

Oral Answers to Questions — TRANSPORT

Bus Fares, Glasgow

Mr. Bence: asked the Minister of Transport if he is aware of the anomalies which exist in the omnibus fares in the environs of Glasgow and which operate to the disadvantage of the residents of Kirkintilloch; and, when considering the application made to him by the Glasgow Corporation to adjust these omnibus fares, if he will ensure that such anomalies are eliminated.

The Minister of Transport (Mr. Alan Lennox-Boyd): I explained the position in regard to the fares on omnibuses serving Kirkintilloch in the letter which I sent to the hon. Member on 8th January. The passenger transport services operated by the Glasgow Corporation do not serve Kirkintilloch, and no fares to or from that burgh were included in the corporation's recent application to me for authority to increase their scale of maximum fares.

Mr. Bence: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in the Kirkintilloch area, where these anomalies have existed for many years and where, having spent considerable sums of money in making appeals—after a tribunal had decided—the people are convinced that it is very much like two brothers who quarrelled over a cow which, while the solicitors tried to solve the problem, was killed——

Hon. Members: Speech.

Mr. Speaker: Mr. Vane.

Mr. Bence: On a point of order. This is a very serious matter for the people of Kirkintilloch, and I wanted to come to this point——

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman is going on much too long If he

wants to address these considerations to the Minister, he should do so on the Adjournment or some other occasion, not at Question time.

Mr. Bence: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give notice that I will raise the matter on the Adjournment.

Channel Tunnel

Mr. Teeling: asked the Minister of Transport whether he will take steps to ensure that his representatives at the forthcoming conference about the better co-ordination of European transport under the auspices of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation will be supplied with the latest technical information about the feasibility of linking British and European road and rail systems by means of a Channel tunnel.

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: The purpose of the conference is to study the organisation and regulation of international inland transport. The feasibility of a Channel tunnel is not likely to be discussed.

Mr. Teeling: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the project has been discussed quite recently in Paris, that the French Government are extremely interested in it, that in the last Parliament no fewer than 200 M.P.s put down a Motion to discuss it and that the last time a vote was taken upon it the present Prime Minister voted in favour of it?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: While I have every sympathy with the intentions of my hon. Friend and other hon. Members, if there is a sufficient sum of money available even to contemplate this project, I can think of more worthwhile projects on British roads to which I should like to devote it.

Freight Charges (Scottish Timber)

Mr. Spence: asked the Minister of Transport whether he will give a direction to the British Transport Commission under Section 4 of the Transport Act, 1947, to introduce a flat rate for the carriage of timber in Scotland as an emergency measure for one year.

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I regard this as a matter for the British Transport Commission and not one in which I should exercise any compulsory powers which I


may have under the Transport Act. Discussions are going on between the Commission and other interested parties, and I have asked the Chairman of the Commission to inform my hon. Friend of the results.

Mr. Spence: Does the Minister not agree that in the light of the disaster which Scotland has suffered over this blown timber, the question of a flat rate is one for discussion at Cabinet level? Has he had discussions with his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Scotland on this matter?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I certainly had discussions with him, as a result of which my right hon. Friend made his statement in the House on 19th February.

Mr. Manuel: Would the Minister recognise that this proposed flat rate would, in the main, help the middle man in the timber industry in Scotland? I have every reason to believe that profits are already very good indeed. If a flat rate is to be considered in Scotland, should it not be introduced for the transport of food and feedingstuffs to the Highlands and not for timber?

Mr. Spence: Does the Minister realise that it is the grower who would benefit from the flat rate, since the main desire is to ship timber in the bulk to the saw mills of the South of Scotland.

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: That may well be, and there is no reason why a flat rate should not be considered, but it is also my duty and the duty of the Commission to see that the whole financial burden is not placed on the railways. This matter is being profitably discussed between the Forestry Commission and the British Transport Commission.

Abnormal Loads

Mr. Vane: asked the Minister of Transport whether his attention has been drawn to the recent transport by road of a 30-ton tank-landing craft for 440 miles from Ayr to Chatham at 2 m.p.h. until it collided with a double-decker omnibus in Railway Street, Chatham; and what action he proposes to take to prevent obstruction of traffic and danger to other road users by loads of this sort.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport (Mr. Gurney Braithwaite): I understand that the craft concerned was despatched to meet an urgent request for rescue work in the Thames and Medway areas during the recent floods. The movement of specially bulky or heavy loads is governed by the Motor Vehicles (Authorisation of Special Types) General Order, 1952, which, in the interests of road safety, requires notice to be given to highway and police authorities and other safeguards. I consider that the requirements of the Order, which were complied with in this instance provide reasonable safeguards for other road users.

Mr. Vane: Will my hon. Friend look again into his "reasonable safeguards," because seven people were injured when this vehicle collided with the double-decker bus? Will he look again at the Motor Vehicles (Authorisation of Special Types) General Order to see whether it is really wise, at a time when our roads are rapidly deteriorating, to allow ever increasing numbers of heavier and heavier vehicles?

Mr. Braithwaite: This craft was required for rescue work, and it was important to get her through as soon as possible.

Mr. Bottomley: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that in the last recorded 13-week period five people were killed and 207 injured in the Medway towns? Does this not emphasise the need for the Rochester by-pass road?

Mr. Braithwaite: That is an entirely different question.

Oral Answers to Questions — ROADS

Lune Valley Road

Mr. Vane: asked the Minister of Transport whether he will give an assurance that the far-reaching plan of building a new road up the Lune Valley, and damaging some of the best food-producing land from more than 100 farms, has now been dropped.

Mr. Braithwaite: The proposal has not been dropped, but when the statutory draft scheme is published, which I hope will be in the course of this year, there will be ample opportunity for consideration of any representations, if necessary at


a public inquiry. Any interference with agriculture will certainly be reduced to a minimum.

Mr. Vane: Is there any reason to publish this draft scheme at all? It is planned on the most unnecessarily extravagant use of agricultural land, and, in addition, as long as the proposal remains alive it is very discouraging to the farmers all along this line who have just been asked to increase their production?

Mr. Braithwaite: My hon. Friend may not be aware that the line of the proposed road has been agreed after consultation between my right hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture and the Minister of Housing and Local Government. It has already been amended to avoid some of the better agricultural land. A lot of the road is over fell country which is of no value except for grazing purposes.

Mr. Vane: Will my hon. Friend look into this question again, in spite of the agreement to which he refers? Will he not see whether he cannot improve the existing road at a figure of £150,000 or so and no loss of good agricultural land, instead of this absurdly extravagant project involving millions?

Mr. J. T. Price: Does the Minister not agree that the project to build an alternative road via the Lune Valley is ultimately for strategic reasons, because if the A.6 road to Scotland were blocked at either Preston or Lancaster there would be no alternative road available to the North? This project is to meet that difficulty.

Mr. Braithwaite: Certainly the road is desirable, but we are anxious to interfere as little is possible with agriculture.

Colonel Gomme-Duncan: Is my hon. Friend aware that successive Ministers have said that the needs of agriculture would be fully considered, but that the result has been that 50,000 acres per year of good agricultural land have "gone west" for a large number of years?

Mr. Braithwaite: My hon. and gallant Friend will find that that has not happened in this case.

Lossiemouth-Hopeman Road

Mr. Spence: asked the Minister of Transport when his decision as to the route to be followed by the proposed new

road between Lossiemouth and Hopeman will be announced.

Mr. Braithwaite: My right hon. Friend has received the inspector's report of the inquiry held on 2nd February and hopes soon to be able to announce the action he will take upon it.

Mr. Spence: Can the Minister say whether, after he has made his decision, it has to be submitted for approval by his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Scotland?

Mr. Braithwaite: Discussions are going on at the moment with the Health Department of Scotland and with the Admiralty. I cannot anticipate the statement which my right hon. Friend will make.

Mr. Spence: Can my hon. Friend say whether planning permission has to be given by the Secretary of State for Scotland?

Mr. Braithwaite: I think not. Obviously full consultations have to take place.

Colonel Gomme-Duncan: Can my hon. Friend say whether the Department of Agriculture for Scotland have been consulted in the matter?

Fencing (Scottish Timber)

Mr. Spence: asked the Minister of Transport whether he will recommend the maximum possible use of Scottish homegrown timber, this year, for purposes of road fencing; and whether he will recommend a policy of stockpiling for this purpose where prices and specifications are suitable.

Mr. Braithwaite: The extent to which we or local highway authorities buy timber for roadside fencing is extremely limited since such fencing is mainly put up by the owners of the adjacent land. I understand that consultations are in progress between the Departments concerned and the trade as to the disposal of Scottish blown timber.

Mr. Spence: Has a general direction been given to the various Departments within my hon. Friend's Ministry that full consideration should be given to the buying of Scottish timber in the light of all the damage which has been suffered?

Mr. Braithwaite: As I have said, our requirements are very small, but we certainly desire to take that matter into consideration.

Sir R. Glyn: In view of my hon. Friend's answer, will he consider approaching the Transport Commission about the erection of a kiln drying plant in that district and a creosoting plant so that the timber can be used for fencing on the railway?

Mr. Braithwaite: I will certainly pass the hon. Baronet's suggestion to the Commission.

Improvement Scheme, Parkstone

Captain Pilkington: asked the Minister of Transport whether he is now able to grant permission for improvements to be carried out in Commercial Road, Parkstone.

Mr. Braithwaite: My right hon. Friend is not in a position to make a grant towards this improvement until the highway authority provide an estimate of the cost of the land required.

Reflector Studs

Mr. J. Hynd: asked the Minister of Transport whether he will consider recommending the use of reflector studs on road sides as an aid to motorists in fog.

Mr. Braithwaite: No, Sir. I consider that in general it is unnecessary to mark the sides of the road as well as the traffic lanes by reflectors; and of the two methods I prefer the normal use of reflectors to define the traffic lanes.

Mr. Hynd: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the reflector studs are the only things visible in thick fog, and that under present arrangements motorists on both sides of the road hug the top of the road in order to see the studs? Will he not seriously consider having some reflector studs on the sides of the roads in the worst parts?

Mr. Braithwaite: Yes, Sir, but the difficulty about studs in the verges and gutters is that they collect mud and are very difficult to keep clean, whereas studs in the centre of the road are generally kept clean by the traffic.

Mr. J. T. Price: Has the hon. Gentleman taken any action to dissuade county councils and other authorities from removing the studs now on the roads? Is he aware that they are being removed to a great extent, much to the regret of the motoring public?

Mr. Braithwaite: That, of course, is another question, but we keep these matters constantly in mind.

Mr. Manuel: Then they must have a lot in their heads.

Widening Scheme, Deritend

Mr. Wyatt: asked the Minister of Transport why he has refused permission to the Birmingham City Council to proceed with the widening and reconstruction of Digbeth and High Street, Deritend, in accordance with the scheme for which powers were secured in a corporation Act in 1935.

Mr. Braithwaite: The refusal was consequent on the restrictions on major road improvements which are necessary in present economic circumstances.

Mr. Wyatt: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that in Birmingham the Minister is regarded so far as having treated the Lord Mayor, who wished to bring a deputation to see him, with grave discourtesy, in having refused to see the deputation, first of all, and then in having agreed only with very great reluctance to meet them? Is he aware that in Birmingham it is strongly felt that major road improvements are allowed only in the London area and that this one in Birmingham was not allowed only because it happened not to be in the London area?

Mr. Braithwaite: The first part of the hon. Gentleman's supplementary question is based on a totally inaccurate supposition. My right hon. Friend is receiving a deputation from the City of Birmingham next week. So far as the second part of it is concerned, there have been practically no major road improvements in the London area in the past 12 months.

Hon. Members: Why not?

Oral Answers to Questions — BEACHES (OIL POLLUTION)

Mr. R. Robinson: asked the Minister of Transport whether he has now received the report of the Committee appointed to consider what practical measures can be taken to prevent oil pollution of coastal waters; and whether he will publish this report.

Sir T. Moore: asked the Minister of Transport if he is yet in a position to state the result of his inquiries and discussions with the various interests concerned on the subject of oil pollution around our coasts.

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: The Committee have not yet reported and until they do so there is no statement that I can usefully make on their inquiries. I sympathise with my hon. Friend's impatience; but this is a most complex and difficult problem. We all want a comprehensive solution, and I am convinced it is worth waiting for rather than rushing to produce something that might not be satisfactory. The committee are working hard and are fully seized of the urgency of the subject. I intend to publish the report.

Mr. Robinson: Will my right hon. Friend do all he can to expedite this report in the hope that the beaches at our British holiday resorts will not be polluted during the coming summer?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I hope some advance steps will be taken. I hope it will be possible, but I think I should be misleading the House if I did not stress the difficulties of this problem.

Mr. G. R. Howard: Will my right hon. Friend give as much publicity as possible to the fact that aircraft have been asked to look for offenders around our coasts, as in the case I have communicated to him, as I think that will be a help?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: Certainly.

Oral Answers to Questions — TRANSPORT BILL (CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE)

The following Question stood upon the Order Paper:

Mr. D. JONES: To ask the Minister of Transport, whether, in view of the public interest shown in the matter, he

will publish the report which he has received from the Central Transport Consultative Committee, dated 30th January, 1953.

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I will, with permission, now answer Question No. 68.
I do not think that it would be proper to publish the document to which the hon. Member refers. It has not been submitted to me as a report, and in any case I am advised that the submission of any general report on the Bill is outside the competence of the Consultative Committee, as defined in Section 6 of the Transport Act, 1947. When visiting the Committee last autumn I did verbally express my willingness to consider comments from them on the Bill, but what I had in mind was to invite their views on Clause 27 which relates to their activities.
I have informed the Committee of my view about the limitations on matters on which it is proper for them to report, and this is, I understand, shared by some members of the Committee itself, and I have no doubt that the point will be considered by the Committee at their next meeting. In the meantime I cannot take cognisance of a document which has not been formally submitted to me as a report.

Mr. Jones: Will the right hon. Gentleman deny that on 14th October, according to Minute 242 of the Central Consultative Committee, he said he would be pleased to consider any suggestions the Committee wished to make on the provisions of the new Bill? Why did it take him all this time to find out about the report which was submitted to him on 7th February, signed by the Secretary of the Committee on 30th January, indicating their views about the Transport Bill? Have their views on the disposal of the road haulage undertakings and its consequences for the trade and industry of this country anything to do with his refusal to publish the report?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I made it quite plain when I met the Committee for the first time officially that I was anxious that they should have the opportunity to let me have any comments they might wish to make on the Clauses in the Bill relating to their own activities. Some doubt arose on the Committee whether I meant this to embrace the Bill as a whole. The Chairman of the Committee wrote to me to ask


if this was so. I wrote to him, without any delay, on 5th February to say that was not so, and I was advised that it was not within their competence to comment on the Bill as a whole, their business being clearly with services provided by the Commission under such powers that they had for the time being.

Several Hon. Members: rose——

Mr. Speaker: The Prime Minister.

Mr. Manuel: On a point of order. You have allowed only one supplementary question, Mr. Speaker, on this Question, although four other hon. Members rose in their places. The matter is of sufficient importance to many of us to feel that another supplementary might have been allowed. Could I appeal to you to consider that?

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member appears to be challenging my decision in the matter. The supplementary question which was asked by the hon. Member who put down the Question seemed a long one, and there was a long answer to it, and it seems to me that, if a matter of this sort is of the importance that the hon. Gentleman says it is, it should be raised at some other time, for it is not a proper question to be debated at Question time.

Mr. Manuel: Further to that point of order——

Mr. Speaker: Order. We cannot debate that now.

Mr. Manuel: I should like your guidance, Sir. You have indicated that the matter could be raised on some other occasion. Could I have your guidance as to how I could raise it and when I could raise it?

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member is well enough versed in the proceedings of the House to know when he can get an opportunity for himself.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE (SUPPLY)

Ordered,
That this day the Business of Supply may be taken after Ten o'clock and shall be exempted from the provisions of Standing Order No. 1 (Sittings of the House).—[Mr. Crookshank.]

Orders of the Day — SUPPLY

[7TH ALLOTTED DAY]

Army Estimates, 1953–54

Order for Committee read.

MR. HEAD'S STATEMENT

3.35 p.m.

The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Antony Head): I beg to move, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
The total of the Army Estimates for the year 1953 to 1954 is for £526 million and for 554,000 all ranks. That sum of money is rather less than it would have been had the planned expansion of the £4,700 million programme been continued. The total of manpower of all ranks at 554,000 has now reached the peak. In the future, as far as manpower is concerned, we shall have to expect a gradual decrease. I shall refer later in my speech to the reasons for the decrease in manpower and to the methods whereby we have made the decrease in money.
Although the sum of money is less than it would have been, it is an extremely large sum of money, and imposed at a time when the nation can least afford to spare it. I am very conscious of my own responsibility both to this House and to the taxpayers for seeing that these large demands for money and men on the nation are not wasted, that the methods by which they are spent are justified, and that the nation is given value for money. I think I shall be meeting the wishes of the House if I dwell particularly on that aspect of the matter today, because the House will, I think, wish to satisfy itself about the reasons for the expenditure and about the way in which the money, and particularly the manpower, our most precious asset of all, are being expended.
I had the advantage on Thursday of being able to listen to the defence debate. In that debate there were two matters that, I think, attracted particular interest in the House. First, it seemed to me that there was a feeling that at the present time our overseas commitments are too big—that they are, perhaps, beyond our resources, and that we should make every possible attempt to reduce them; although I think it is fair to say


that, apart from the mention of the Middle East, there was little specific recommendation as to how they could be reduced.
The second matter that, I think, particularly drew the interest of the House was the use of manpower—whether or not it was used economically; whether or not, by some more ingenious methods, we could achieve economy sufficient, perhaps, for an eventual reduction of National Service; and there was general feeling that, maybe, some form of inquiry into the whole manpower question was justified. I think I shall meet the wishes of the House if I go into those matters rather more fully from the Army's point of view than was done in the defence debate.
I do not propose in any way to conceal the problems which now confront the Army, and will confront it in the future. Indeed, I propose rather to concentrate on them. Because of this general trend of my remarks I do not want to give in any way a false impression about the Army. I would at the outset say that I think we have every reason to think that at the present time we have got the best equipped, best trained and best prepared Army we have ever had in peace. I would not suggest for a moment taking the credit for that. The credit started with right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite, and a great deal of the credit goes to the soldiers. In that connection, I think the House would wish me to express the debt that the Army owes to a very wise man and very great general, Field Marshal Slim, who, for four years, gave the Army leadership and accomplished a good deal of progress in many ways.
The Army, at the present time, is at the size or equivalent of 11⅓ divisions. I sense many hon. Members saying, "Why is it particularly that size; must it be that size; is it that size purely because of our overseas commitments, or why?" I think the answer is that it is our opinion that at present an Army of 11⅓ divisions is the biggest Army, as a fighting unit, which we can create with the present manpower which we have. By recruiting the maximum number of Regulars and by taking all the National Service men we can get from the allocations, we reckon that we can create and hold an Army of about that size.
But the fact remains that with our overseas commitments as they are at present, an Army of the equivalent of 11⅓ divisions is just too small for the job. At the moment, 80 per cent. of our fighting units are overseas and the Army is unduly stretched and strained in meeting our overseas commitments. That brings me at once to the question which was discussed in the defence debate of our overseas commitments.
I think that we can divide them into three categories. The first is our imperial and strategic garrisons which have been reduced to the minimum. In the Mediterranean and elsewhere there has been scope for reduction, but I do not think that there is any more scope for reduction. It was said in the defence debate that there might well be hope for some reduction from our garrisons in the Middle East, but I suggest that, if and when that is the position, our object must be to create a strategic reserve in this country, if possible with aircraft transport, which is the only way in a cold war in which we can have the ability to deliver the stitch in time which so often saves nine.
I do not think that there is much scope for reduction in the imperial and strategic garrisons unless there is an end to the cold war in Malaya, Korea, Kenya and elsewhere. Although it may be argued that one or other of those commitments will be cleared up, it is a bold man who says that nowhere else will this cold war crop up. I believe that the policy in the cold war will be to stir up trouble as often and wherever it can be contrived. With this problem which confronts us, frankly I do not see any large relief in our commitments which are consequent on the cold war and are the second category.
Lastly, our commitments take the form of those set aside for N.A.T.O. I have heard it suggested, although not by many hon. Members, but in the Press and sometimes in this House, that we should withdraw our Forces from Europe. I believe that that would be the most disastrous policy we could adopt. Quite apart from the effect on the unity of the West and N.A.T.O. as a whole, I think, looking at this entirely from the point of view of self-interest, that the defence of this country is inexplicably connected with the defence of Western Europe.


These are the three main categories of our commitments, and I hope I have done something to convince the House that at the moment there is no great prospect, with one exception, of achieving any marked saving of manpower. Hon. Members may well say, "Maybe the commitments are there, but we may have too many Forces here or too many there." I have no doubt that that could be argued, but I think that hon. Members will agree that it is difficult to argue in this House. Logically, we could do so, if we could have a large map of the world, marked with pins to show all our garrisons, world wide, brought into the Chamber.
Presumably, Mr. Speaker, that would be out of order and hardly acceptable to
the House. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why not?"] I believe that if hon. Members were to look at that board they would experience great difficulty in pulling out many pins. I have no doubt that the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) would have six out before one could say "Jack Robinson," and he might put them sharp end up on the Government Front Bench, for all I know. But I do not believe that if we are to meet our commitments at the present time there is any great scope for reductions there.
If hon. Members would accept what I have attempted to argue so far, which is that, for the time being and it may be for some months, unless something good happens, we look like having to retain an Army of the equivalent of 11⅓ divisions. We in the War Office are then at once confronted with the problem of keeping up the strength of the Army to that size, because we have calculated that by 1955 we shall be 15,000 men down on our personnel strength.
Hon. Members may think that a very curious statement in view of the increased figures of Regular recruiting. I would not like to go into the very intricate manpower calculations on which that is based, but it is really the result of the freezing of Regulars in 1950 by the late Government and now the unfreezing of Regulars which will be completed by September, 1953. The present Government had five call-ups in 1952, so we had a bumper year. There will only be four call-ups in the future and thus large numbers will be going out in 1954. The

extra three year recruits do not start to benefit the Army in terms of manpower until the end of 1954, because the majority of them would have been included in any case as National Service men when they were called up.
Thus we have worked out an estimate, which I believe to be correct, that by 1955 we shall be some 15,000 men down and, in addition, many units in the Army are now under-posted. It is against this background there come the suggestions and proposals that National Service should be reduced. That was gone into in considerable detail in the defence debate, and my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister deployed the argument, I think very clearly and convincingly, as to why we could not now, for the time being, have it reduced. It was my impression that the majority of the House were convinced by those arguments. After the fulminations and the thunderings of the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) on this subject, I think, if I may say so, that his speech on defence on Thursday became something of a hiccough. Maybe he has been eating too many of his own words.
I must not let the right hon. Gentleman get in my way of stating facts, but I would suggest that, from the point of view of National Service, the attitude in which both young men and their parents accept it is largely dependent on their conviction that it is absolutely necessary. I believe that anyone who undermines that conviction is carrying out an act which has a very big bearing on the general attitude towards this unwelcome imposition. I hope that we have seen the last of that particular theory, which I think was very regrettable, in view of the great tenacity and courage of the right hon. Gentleman when he himself was in office.

Mr. George Wigg: Before the right hon. Gentleman leaves the question of the reduction of the establishments, would he explain why he has re-formed seven battalions, if so many units are under-established?

Mr. Head: I said that they were under-posted in theory. These under-posted units are restricted mostly to this country and to certain less essential stations. but all those in Korea and Malaya are at full establishment. [An HON. MEMBER: "And the Middle East?"] I cannot


answer that off hand, but I do not think they are far under strength. I will let the hon. Gentleman have the figures later.
There is one thing that I want to add about National Service. Naturally, speaker after speaker in the defence debate stated how unwelcome National Service was and what a burden it was and how we should all like to get rid of the necessity for it. In their correspondence and contacts, hon. Members are very much concerned with those who have had the least fortunate experiences in National Service, for they are the ones who write to hon. Members. We are sometimes apt to forget that, as we have to have National Service, there is also a credit side to it.
I am not now talking about the very bright young men or the skilled apprentices. Many average or somewhat below average young men have joined the Army with a very low educational standard, with under-developed physique, with very little religious instruction, many of them not having been confirmed, and with a very low degree of independence and ability to look after themselves. I am not criticising; I am stating facts. A lot of that may be due to the fact that the boy who is now 18 was six in 1940 and had to grow up during the war.
When these young men join the Army they work hard to get their third-class certificate of education because it affects their pay, and they play games, and they get much fitter and they develop physically in an astonishing way. It might interest hon. Members to know that 60 per cent. of the young men who join the Army gain 4 lb. or more in weight in the first 10 weeks and 20 per cent. gain 10 lb. That is a remarkable fact on the physical side.
These young men meet the padres, and many of them become confirmed and go to church voluntarily. The Chaplain General, the Bishop of Croydon and the Church Houses have done great work in that respect. This situation gives the churches an opportunity at the present time. Apart from that, the young men learn to look after themselves, and they gain in independence. The House should not overlook the fact that a large number of young men annually leave the Army fittter, better educated and more God-fearing citizens than when they entered it.
It was said during the defence debate on Thursday, and I am sure it will be said again today, that there is a lot of waste of manpower in the Army. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger)—I hope I am not misquoting him—said that if we could economise in manpower and step up Regular recruiting, we should have a chance to reduce the National Service demand.

Mr. F. J. Bellenger: No, that was not my argument. My argument related to a change in the defence picture in Europe and the coming into operation of the German forces.

Mr. Head: I am sorry; I did not want to put the wrong words into the right hon. Gentleman's mouth, but suggestions were made that by a more ingenious and economical use of manpower we might be able to lighten the burden of National Service. I do not deny that there is scope, and I believe there always will be scope, for economy in the use of manpower, but it is my experience that although we get a very large number of suggestions and criticisms, we do not get anything concrete in substantiation of the suggestions.
I asked a very distinguished officer, "Where do we waste manpower?" The officer replied, "I will tell you where you can start. You have four men looking after the apes in Gibraltar." I sent a signal and found that this was the part-time job of one very-long-service gunner. I am not criticising anybody about this, but that is an example of some of the suggestions for economies that we get. An hon. Gentleman opposite had an anonymous giant who, he suggested, could provide many suggestions, but I have been unable to obtain them.
I am not attempting to say that there is nothing that can be done, but I would remind hon. Members that there has been progress in this field. In January, 1950. there were 373,500 men and the equivalent of 7⅓ divisions in the Army. If we take that in a slice, it gives a figure of 51,200 men. Today, the Army has 437,500 men and the equivalent of 11⅓ divisions, and that gives a slice of 38,700 men. That is a reduction of 13,000 men per slice. Some hon. Members live in glass houses when they throw stones at me about this. I cannot remember who was Secretary of State for War in 1950, but he must be in the Crystal Palace.


Last year we saved 10,000 men and seven new battalions were formed, and we cut the War Office by 10 per cent. The figure for the strength of the War Office was 7,734 in 1952 and that in these Estimates is 7,013. Thus, we have cut off 721. I admit that we are 50 behind, but that will come; that delay is partly due to some increase for the Coronation. During the year we have also cut the divisional and brigade headquarters, in the case of the armoured formations by about 16 per cent. and in the case of the infantry by about 9 per cent.

Mr. Woodrow Wyatt: Has the right hon. Gentleman cut the number of officers at brigade headquarters?

Mr. Head: The percentage runs throughout the whole strength of the headquarters. I do not know the exact number of officers off-hand, but no doubt we can ascertain that before the end of the debate.
I know that there is more that could be done. I have now started four investigations. One of these is being made into our workshops, ordnance stores, engineer stores and supply depots and it is being carried out by Sir James Reid Young, who is the joint managing director of Vickers, Limited, to whom I am grateful for lending him to us. His job is to carry out a general survey of the organisation and administrative methods employed by these establishments and to report whether they are being run on efficient and economical lines.
We have also asked General Kirkman, who carried out a most effective reduction of costs in Germany on behalf of the Foreign Office, to examine the whole of the command and district organisation in this country and to see whether he can, by reorganisation and reductions, make economies in that field. I hope and believe that there is scope there. There has been no change in the general structure of district headquarters since 1945; in fact, they remain as they were before the war.
We have also a working party which is attempting to reduce the number of non-effectives, that is, people in the pipelines and elsewhere, which is particularly the result of so much movement. In addition, General Callender, who had a

very successful hunt round after General Templar had finished a similar task, is looking into the schools and training establishments.

Mr. Joseph T. Price: Will the right hon. Gentleman look closely at the Pay Corps with a view to seeing how many of its duties could be performed by civilian labour?

Mr. Head: I am betwixt the devil and the deep blue sea about this. Suggestions are made by some hon. Members for the use of more civilians, and there are also the fulminations coming from my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon, East (Sir H. Williams) about the use of too many civilians. We have to some extent increased the civilian labour, but I do not know what the result will be.
Whatever we do, there is one point which I must stress. An hon. Member asked me a Question which covered practically the whole of the Army Estimates. He asked when I was going to do something about doing away with non-essential administrative units. We have not got many non-essential administrative units in the Army. It is an immense job to look after the Army overseas, with such large numbers at such great distances. The Army's tail has a most alarming load to bear, if I may be forgiven for that metaphor. We cannot hold large stocks of stores without having men to look after them and account for them.
The engineer stores alone hold 750,000 tons, covering a whole range of things from a pocket electric bulb to a 48-ton stone crusher. There are 750,000 different items in ordnance stores alone and that adds up in manpower. The Army eats 550 tons of food a year——

Mr. R. T. Paget: That is for a week.

Mr. Head: It serves 12 million meals a week. No, it is 550 tons a year.

Mr. John Strachey: It is not enough.

Mr. Head: I will check the figure before the end of the debate, but I can tell the right hon. Gentleman why it is right. I am informed that 550 tons is sufficient to feed Greater London for six weeks. Yes, I think I will have to add some noughts there. I think I had better check that up.

Mr. E. Shinwell: The right hon. Gentleman is not only eating his own words now; he is eating his figures as well.

Mr. Head: I find that the correct figure is 550,000 tons, and I apologise to the House. I am only too glad to eat my figures on this occasion, and I hope that both the right hon. Gentlemen the Member for Easington and I will keep down the words and the figures that we have to eat in future.

Mr. Shinwell: As long as the right hon. Gentleman does not get indigestion.

Mr. Head: An hon. Member speaking in the defence debate the other day complained that the cost for feeding a soldier was so much more than for feeding a sailor or an airman. His figure was obtained by dividing the wrong number into the wrong quantity of food, a thing very easy to do in the Army Estimates. In fact, the cost of feeding a soldier is £67·3 a year and for a sailor and airman £67, so the extra is very slight and is largely due to the fact that the bulk of the Army is overseas.
I hope the House will acquit the "tail" of being the thing which the Army keeps in order to put people in "cushy" jobs and so waste manpower. It is, I believe —and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) will agree with me—a vital part of a modern Army. I am not saying that modern armies do not grow big tails. There was a young subaltern who wrote very well about the tail and its importance when he said:
The eye is fixed on the fighting brigades as they move amid the smoke; on the swarming figures of the enemy; on the general, serene and determined, mounted in the middle of his staff. The long trailing line of communications is unnoticed. The fierce glory that plays on red, triumphant bayonets dazzles the observer; nor does he care to look behind to where, along a thousand miles of rail, road and river, the convoys are crawling to the front in uninterrupted succession. Victory is the beautiful, bright-coloured flower. Transport is the stem without which it could never have blossomed.
The fact that the subaltern grew up to become Prime Minister does not affect the validity of those words.
On the question of manpower I think I ought to touch first on the question of apprentices. There is considerable anxiety among many hon. Members on

both sides of the House that we are wasting skilled apprentices. I should like at the start to say that part of the reason for some of the feeling is because there are two kinds of apprentices coming into the Army, those who are really qualified and those who are not apprentices. The latter come largely from men who have a very poor acquaintance with the trade they claim to be apprenticed to. For instance, a man may say that he is an apprentice plumber, but he has a very poor knowledge of plumbing. Of the skilled qualified apprentices, the vast majority are put into qualified trades in the Army. There are more vacancies in the Army than there are qualified apprentices for them, and we have a close liaison with the Ministry of Labour to see that they all go into the right place.
There is also a great diversification of trades and they range from fitters and radio mechanics to chiropodists, tunnellers, navigators—seamen, and so on. The only apprentices who do not get fitted into the right jobs now are usually those with very rare trades. I looked at the list only the other day. I find that we have people who as apprentices are qualified as piano manufacturers, chicken sexers, rhododendron grafters, jockeys and all kinds of trades which have no equivalent in the Army.

Mr. F. Beswick: Is the right hon. Gentleman dealing now with the National Service man as well as the Regular recruit?

Mr. Head: I am referring only to the National Service man. I will admit that where a recruit claims he is an apprentice but is really a non-qualified man, he sometimes does not go to the equivalent trade. In many cases where such people write to hon. Members and say, "I am an apprentice to such and such a trade, but I have been put to do something else," it is found, when one goes into the circumstances, that the man in question has no claim to be an apprentice to that special trade.
I hope I have done something to show —I have no doubt that it is not sufficient to please all hon. Members—that we are doing what we can to economise in manpower, and that progress has been made in this field. Before I leave the question of manpower—and I have taken rather a long time over it, because a great deal


of interest was evinced in it in the defence debate last week—I think I should say something about the Regulars, particularly the question of recruiting and of keeping men in the Army.
Last year I told the House that we were starting to overhaul the whole of our recruiting machinery, and that was largely due to the work of Major-General Whitfield, who went on a world-wide tour to study the problem. The machine for recruiting has been improved, and in this field both the London and the provincial Press, have been very helpful. I should like to take this opportunity of thanking them. The figures, as hon. Members know, are encouraging in so far as in 1951 they were 23,000, and in 1952 they were 49,000. But as the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), who is not here at the moment, so rightly said the other day, we must treat those figures with caution, not because the men are not in but because there is no guarantee about their staying.
I thought it might be of interest to the House if I were to say what we estimate were the number of men we should like to stay in the Army if we are to get the kind of age structure that we want. We should be all right if 33 per cent. of the three-year men stayed for six years, and if something like 50 per cent. of those who stayed on extended for nine years. That would give us an adequate, regular basis for the Army as it is organised at the present time. The problem is how to do it, and will they stay on? That at the moment is the query, and it would be impossible for us to say whether or not that will happen.
We introduced the 22 years' career engagement so that a man could stay on by right whereas in the old days, having done five or seven years, the Army finished with him except for special occasions. Of the recruits joining today 40 per cent. joined for the 22 years' engagement, which is quite good, but it is not binding. They can, of course, opt out, but it is a question of the psychological advantage. If they join for 22 years, they have got to contract out instead of contract in. Hon. Members opposite know the advantage of that particular situation. Only the future can show whether the system will work, but the main enemy

to the scheme is the cold war and the percentage of the Army that is overseas.
What worries me and the War Office, and I think, many hon. Members interested in the Army, is the fact that recently re-engagements and extensions of service have gone down. As a result only 10 per cent. of the Regulars in the Army now have over six years' service. We estimate that for the position to be satisfactory we want about 20 per cent. That means that one has to diagnose very carefully the reasons why re-engagements and extensions are going down.

Mr. Bellenger: Will the right hon. Gentleman try to give a comparison between the present continuous length of overseas service, which is now three years, and the pre-war period?

Mr. Head: One of the factors is that Germany now counts as home service, and another is the ending of the Cardwell system which existed before the war—for every battalion in this country there was another overseas. Now, with 80 per cent. of the fighting units overseas, the proportion of overseas service is very much greater than it was before the war.
We believe, from an examination of the figures—and I think it is the right diagnosis—that one of the main reasons for the downward trend in re-engagements and extensions of service is the separation of families. Out of 80 per cent. of the married men overseas no fewer than 66 per cent. are separated from their families. Our great difficulty is in providing married quarters due especially to such factors as political uncertainty.
It would be very unwise at the moment to build a lot of married quarters in the Middle East, and there are great difficulties in providing an adequate scale of married quarters. We have considered this matter extremely carefully, and although nothing is as good as the united family or the married quarter, we felt that something must be done. After working at it for some time, we are bringing in a new measure. At the present moment, a married man draws the marriage allowance whether separated from his wife or not, but the married man overseas who is separated from his wife is at a considerable disadvantage especially in areas where living is expensive. Therefore, we are bringing in a special rate of local overseas allowance.


At the moment, a man separated from his wife draws only the single rate of L.O.A. We are bringing in a married rate which will mean that a man unaccompanied by his wife will draw this rate. It is being worked out for 50 areas, and it will mean that a captain in, say, Egypt will get about £100 a year extra tax free, which is not a negligible amount. A sergeant in Egypt will get about £55 a year tax free.
I am not suggesting that this solves the problem—the best thing, of course, is a united family—but it is an earnest of the fact that we understand the men's difficulties and are trying to do what we can to help. The best solution of all is to have a higher percentage of the British Army back in this country as a strategic reserve.

Mr. Wigg: Would the right hon. Gentleman be good enough to give the figures asked for by my hon. Friend? Could he give us the figures for the Royal Artillery and for the R.A.C. before the end of this debate? It would help considerably to have those figures.

Mr. Head: I will certainly try to give those figures.

Major H. Legge-Bourke: With regard to this very good news about the increased local overseas allowance, can my right hon. Friend say whether that also includes those officers and men who have their wives in overseas stations in which they were previously serving? I quite see that it is a great benefit where the family is at home and the man is overseas, but there are, as my right hon. Friend knows, quite a number of cases where both the wife and the husband are overseas, but not in the same foreign station.

Mr. Head: I never like making absolutely categorical statements in case I am wrong on the Regulations, but I am fairly sure—and I would bet a heavy shade of odds on it being a fact— that if, say, a wife is in Cyprus and her husband is in, say, Fayid or Kenya, he would qualify for this unaccompanied rate of local overseas allowance.
I have talked about the married men, and this is perhaps an opportunity to say a word or two about bachelors. The point I particularly wish to refer to is the question of barrack accommodation

in this country. That matter gives me cause for very great concern indeed, as I am sure it did to both right hon. Gentlemen who were at the War Office before me. At present, two-thirds of the Army in Britain are in huts which were built either before the 1939 war or, in some cases, even before the 1914 war, and most of them on a 10-year basis. The remaining one-third of the British Army are in barracks, of which 44 per cent. were built before 1900 and some even before the Crimean war.
That is a very serious situation because unless something is done reasonably soon, the Army will become a Service of slum dwellers. I am well aware of the difficulties in the way of getting any large measure of Service building at a time when there is such an immense need of housing by the civil population, but we are rapidly approaching a stage where if something is not done these huts will fall down and we shall be in serious trouble. I hope in the course of the coming year to get plans laid and to make a start in dealing with this problem. I wish to pay a tribute to the useful report made by the Holland Committee under the guidance of the right hon. Member for Easington. It is the first time that there has been a policy on this matter.
I do not think that the House would wish me to make no mention of the problem of officers. I told the House last year that we were about 10 per cent. down in officers. During the last 12 months we have made a little progress, although it might well have been more. We had 440 more officers last year than in the year before, or, to be exact, 441, because the Army was much gratified by the fact that the Duke of Edinburgh was made a field-marshal. I think the Army will benefit a great deal from his interest and very keen knowledge of technical subjects.
The position as regards officers is not one for complacency, but it is not as serious at the moment as the position with regard to n.c.o.s and warrant officers. We have done quite a lot in respect of cadets, visits of schoolmasters, and so forth, to stimulate officer recruiting. We have liaison officers in all the Commands. I have been very struck by the fact that many schoolmasters are absolutely convinced that the Army is a career for the stupid. But I have been equally impressed by the fact that when some


schoolmasters visit Sandhurst or the Staff College they are surprised at the standards which obtain in those places. I have heard many expressions almost of amazement from schoolmasters who have made such visits.
I do not know why there should be this strong prejudice among schools, and it is a big stumbling block in recruiting. I am sure hon. Members opposite will agree that the Army officer of today who has a responsible job to do is far from being a stupid individual. We find Army officers running all sorts of things, such as the B.B.C. and goodness knows what all over the country. Perhaps in saying that I have said something which is ill-advised.
Last year I mentioned two projects which I hoped would become realities. One of them was the Military College of Science at Shrivenham, which will take boys straight from their National Service or school. They will go there for a B.Sc. course of from two to three years and will then go direct to the Army. It is an alternative method to Sandhurst. It starts in September, 1953. I hope and believe that it will be a success.
I look upon it as important because science and the technical side will have an increasingly important influence on the Army and Shrivenham has not been popular in the past. We have sent 20 good regimental officers there on a six months' course. If it is a good one, and they go back and say they have enjoyed it, science may become more fashionable in the Army. Our aim is to get 10 per cent. of the interest which was once devoted to the horse to be devoted to science. If we can get only that, we shall have made a good start.
We have also introduced an extended service commission which is open to all those who have done a short service commission. The initial tenure is for five years, nine in the R.A.S.C. and R.E.M.E. We have made careful selection and it is an opportunity for a good, promising officer on a short service commission to serve longer than he can at present.
In September, 1953, we shall be opening the school at Welbeck for grammar and secondary school boys, which was a project in the last Estimates. I am sorry that more boys did not apply from the

North—they represented 30 per cent. of 200 which is—[An HON. MEMBER: "Sixty."] I am much obliged to the hon. Gentleman, my mathematics have not been a strong point in this speech so far. Although that percentage is not altogether disappointing, I wish it had been more. However the applicants, at any rate on paper, look as if they are of a good standard.
I shall not leave the Regular Army without mentioning one valuable addition and that is the Women's Royal Army Corps. I told the House last year that the Army was keen to make itself more attractive as a career to women, and the figures this year suggest that we have been successful. During the year we have taken a number of new steps. In the old days a girl had to join before she could ask for the job she wanted, which was much less satisfactory. Now she can get a direct short service commission, if she qualifies, for certain corps and staff appointments. We are starting an experiment in Scotland whereby girls live at home and work locally with no further commitment and they cannot be posted away. If that experiment is a success, we want to extend it. We have also extended the range and number of vacancies in the technical arms.
One way and another the results have been good. In 1951, 2,402 joined and, in 1952, 3,234. That was quite a good increase and I am delighted to say that for the first time the recruiting figures for the Army have passed those of the W.R.A.F., which is something of an achievement. There is no doubt that the Army offers good opportunities for girls at the present time. Incidentally, as before, it offers equally good opportunities for matrimony, which remains our main source of wastage.
We have discussed the commitments and, in the light of those commitments, our ability to maintain the Regular Army. In view of our present overseas commitments the necessity of having a well prepared Reserve Army is as important as ever it was. The Territorial Army is growing, inevitably from the intake of National Service, and it now consists of 6,900 Regulars as a cadre, 135,000 National Service men part-time and 67,000 volunteers who have no National Service commitment. It now totals


209,000 and by July, 1954, it will have reached its full strength.
The future of the Territorial Army has a good deal in common with the future of the Regular Army in this respect: Will the National Service part-time man volunteer to go on after he has finished his part-time service? If he does, it will work very well; if he does not, it will be difficult. In the meantime, 28 per cent, of National Service men are volunteers, which is quite a satisfactory figure. I suggest to the House that we owe an immense debt of gratitude to the 67,000 volunteers in the Territorial Army with no National Service commitment, many of them getting older, who have worked extraordinarily hard since 1945, particularly during this last year or two when the Army has been expanding. I hope very much that the majority will stay on until the National Service part-time men have grown old enough and experienced enough to take over their jobs.
The other aspect of the Territorial Army which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee, West rightly stressed was the importance of trying to increase the state of preparedness and the rapidity with which the Army can mobilise for overseas. I am at one with the right hon. Gentleman in that, but progress in this field is limited by the fact that we have only two weeks' training a year. If we had four, the Army would be more prepared; if we had six, the Army would be even more prepared. With two weeks, although all of that training must be worth while, any marked increase is hard to achieve.
There is, however, a good deal of formation training going on in the Territorial Army now and this year, on Salisbury Plain, there will be three divisions and three brigades training at staggered intervals. That form of training is extremely popular with the Territorial Army and gives a great deal of experience to staffs and others who do not normally train with the Territorial Army. As the right hon. Gentleman knows, the Territorial Army now trains on a three-year cycle.
I am speaking a great deal longer than I had thought I should and I apologise to the House for detaining it so long.

Before leaving the general subject of manpower, I must mention the Colonial Army. I do not believe that the hon. Member for Dudley would wish me to leave this subject without some mention of that. At present, there are 35 equivalent battalions of the Colonial Army which are at the disposal of the Colonial Governments but have co-operated, both in war and in cold war, most helpfully in assisting us in various tasks.
I told the House last year that in conjunction with the Colonial Office we had plans to form five new battalions and those have been formed by the Colonial Governments. In addition, they have formed a labour force of 7,000 men. The plans for 1953–55 are to form eight equivalent regular Colonial battalions —and six volunteer battalions—that is 14 —making a total in the three-year cycle of 19 new Colonial battalions. I would point out to the hon. Member for Dudley that in the equivalent period before the Government were in office none was formed and 19 in three years is not bad progress. I suggest that the hon. Gentleman should take note of that and perhaps exploit it——

Mr. Wigg: Where have they been formed? Also, I think the right hon. Gentleman is wrong in his mathematics because he told us eight, six and 19.

Mr. Head: No, I am not wrong. I said that five battalions were formed this year and that we are to form eight Regular and six volunteer. That makes a total of 19.

Mr. Wigg: In what Colonies have they been formed?

Mr. Head: I can give the hon. Gentleman a complete list if it is within the security provisions, as I think it is, but I have not got it with me. I can assure the hon. Gentleman that he has no reason to doubt it, and I am sorry that he does not look more pleased.

Mr. Wigg: I am extremely pleased if they are real battalions, up to establishment, but not if they have just one colonel and an adjutant.

Mr. Head: I told the hon. Gentleman quite clearly that 14 of them have not yet been formed. Five were formed last year and 14 remain to be formed.

Mr. Wyatt: We have had for a long time the phrase "the equivalent division," which we can understand. Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us what an equivalent battalion is the equivalent of?

Mr. Head: Yes, I can tell the hon. Gentleman exactly. What happens in many of these forces is that certain of them have companies in an area and so somebody forms one company here and another somewhere else. If we get enough of them together, they are turned into a battalion. I could instead have spoken in terms of companies. I assure the hon. Gentleman that there is nothing bogus about it. [Interruption.] The right hon. Member for Easington is doubtful. Last year our project was for five battalions. and we have made it five, and I see no reason to think that we will not stick to that rather successful yet unprecedented method of increasing the Colonial Army. I should like to pay a tribute to the help which the Colonial Forces have given in Malaya, where the Fiji Battalion and the King's African Rifles have put in excellent work.
I must say a word about the question of production and rearmament. I said at the start that the total of money that we have this year is less than it would have been had the planned expansion to —4,700 million been maintained. I also said that I would say how we had met the reduction. With the Army remaining at the same size, it is patently impossible to meet a financial reduction in what might be called the essential hard core expenditure—that is to say, feeding, clothing, paying, transport, and so forth. Therefore, most of this cut has fallen on production, which, I think, is inevitable. [Interruption.] I welcome the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes); I was feeling quite lost without him.
The Army's requirements from production are, first, to replace worn out stores, material and weapons; secondly, to issue new stores and weapons; and thirdly, to create war reserves. Most of the reductions which we have had financially have been taken in the field of new stores and equipment and the creation of war reserves. We cannot cut very strongly on the replacement of worn out stores, materials and weapons.
With few exceptions, the cut has been taken not by abandoning orders and by

forgoing weapons; it has been taken by deferment in time. If, for instance, one had a rearmament programme with, say, a production side of £104 million a year, or £2 million a week, it might be said that if it was cut by £10 million, that would be a five weeks' deferment in time. That is to say, if we postpone it into the next year, we would have accepted the cut on the present year's Estimates. Of course, it is in fact nothing like as simple as that, and the transaction does not go so neatly into one period of time. By and large, however, the reduction has been met by deferment in time, and not by the abandonment of any particular weapons.
I referred in the White Paper to the main points on the issue of new weapons to the Army; to the good family of antitank weapons which we are now getting, and which are excellent; and to the Centurion tank, for which production figures are very good, and in respect of which sales are good, both for my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer and for the Army. We are not cutting down on numbers for the Army. The Army is adequately supplied with Centurion tanks, but by keeping production going and having sales we ensure a potential against hot war if it should come. That is an immense asset.

Mr. Paget: Is the Army now fully equipped with the new anti-tank weapon?

Mr. Head: No. We are not fully equipped with the recoilless gun; it has not yet come to everyone. It is going first to Germany, but we are not fully equipped. In addition to the Centurion, the new heavy gun tank will be in the hands of troops for use at trials this year. This is a very powerful tank and is a remarkable example of British skill in the engineering field.
I cannot help feeling that we must be getting near the end of the development of the tank when we get sizes of this kind. This tank, however, will be complementary to, and not a substitute for, the Centurion. Probably it will be the most powerful tank in the world. To what extent this field of development will continue, I do not pretend to know, but my own feeling is that I cannot escape expecting developments in some other field, in another technique, which will eventually, as has so often happened, replace the tank by something else.


The Army badly wants a new rifle. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] Nobody is more aware of that than I am. As hon. Members know too well, there was a great deal of difficulty about selecting a bore which was acceptable to all. The problem of selecting a bore upon which all agree has, curiously enough. been referred to the B.B.C.—in this case the British, Belgian and Canadian Technical Committee—who have made good progress and, I think, are well on the way to getting an agreed solution. Without being over-optimistic, one can say that there is a good chance that we shall be able to start production before the end of the year. There is a good chance that the new agreed rifle with its modifications will retain most of the advantages and performance of the old. 280.

Mr. Shinwell: The "old.280"?

Mr. Head: I should have said "the.280." The adjective "old" should never be used loosely.
We are also concentrating a great deal on building up our ammunition stocks. This is a difficult and long problem, and one of the features of war, both at the end of the 1939 war and in Korea, has been the very high rate of ammunition expenditure. To build up ammunition stocks is a very considerable problem, which places a heavy strain also upon my right hon. Friend the Minister of Supply.
The G.S. range of "B" vehicles—lorries, and so on—started to come out in considerable numbers last year, and now the combat range of this type of vehicle is also starting to come out. The combat range is the very high standard performance vehicle which is very good across country, and its issue is largely restricted to fighting troops for transporting troops and towing weapons. I must admit that I was not entirely satisfied that we could afford all the very high specifications which were combined in the combat range, and I appointed a committee who went into the question to see what reductions could be made without sacrificing essential performance and strength.
So far, they have done this with the one-ton vehicle and they have saved £250 on each one-tonner. They are now going to do the three-tonner, and I propose to extend this examination to other fields of

equipment such as radar and other expensive items, because I believe that provided we have adequate performance and serviceability, we cannot in these days afford those additional but less essential requirements which have so often been characteristic of British equipment in the past. I believe it to be essential to get rid of frills wherever we can.
I assure the House that we are paying close attention to future trends and developments. The effects of atomic weapons have been studied in conjunction with the Americans. They are being studied during training, both technically and strategically, together with the best methods of neutralising the effect of such weapons. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff this year, in August, is to carry out a study to examine the effect of atomic weapons on tactical doctrine in various phases of war.
The guided missile, too, has made progress and shows great promise. It is not for me to give the House a report on this subject, nor indeed would the House expect me to go into great detail because it is obviously secret, but I can say that future developments in this field and kindred developments are of immense significance to the Army. I believe in the future we shall have certain new weapons and techniques which will have a very big effect on our Army and its future.

Mr. Bellenger: Cannot the right hon. Gentleman say anything about out antiaircraft defence, which is probably one of the largest demands on the Army?

Mr. Head: Yes. I should have said at the beginning of my speech that I have had to be very selective in choosing subjects to talk about. I would have wearied the House very much if I had attempted to speak on all of them. If the right hon. Gentleman wishes to raise such matters, we shall have an opportunity tonight to go on as long as we wish.

Mr. Bellenger: I did not propose to speak in this debate, but I did specifically mention this subject in the presence of the right hon. Gentleman in the defence debate and so far no answer has been forthcoming as to the state of our anti-aircraft defence, which, I believe, is lamentable.

Mr. Head: I would not say that it is lamentable at all; in fact, a great deal of progress has been made. This is a matter about which we used to talk quite a lot when we were on the other side of the House. I am well aware of the difficulties in training men, going ahead with replacements, conversion of guns, and so forth, but I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that a great deal of progress has been made. I can furnish him with more particulars privately if he would like to know more about it. I am not trying to dodge the question.

Mr. Wigg: My right hon. Friend made a very serious charge in the defence debate and I am surprised that it was not dealt with by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence. My right hon. Friend said that the situation regarding anti-aircraft defence was worse than in 1938 when the Minister of Supply risked his reputation in that office by drawing attention to the matter. Is that so or not?

Mr. Head: I think I had better get on; I could talk for a long time about" ack-ack"—I am not ignorant of the problem——

Mr. Shinwell: Mr. Shinwellrose——

Mr. Head: I am sorry, I cannot give way——

Mr. Shinwell: I can help the right hon. Gentleman. I think that in the interests of accuracy it should be said—although I am well aware that for security reasons we cannot disclose all the facts—that it is obvious to those of us who know something about this matter that the state of our anti-aircraft defences, although far from adequate, is far better than it has been for many years.

Mr. Head: I am much obliged to the right hon. Member——

Mr. Shinwell: Why did not the right hon. Gentleman let me get up and say it before?

Mr. Head: The right hon. Member has not always set entirely fortunate precedents by his interventions; I am, none the less, much obliged to him.
We have now placed orders for body armour. It is a new feature which has been tried out in Korea. It does not

give anything like universal protection, but it gives a certain degree of protection which, we think, justifies the placing of orders. I do not know what the future will be and a great many problems will be posed for commanders as to on which occasions it should be used and such questions. In case hon. Members would like to see it, I have arranged for a body armour waistcoat to be placed in the Library and hon. Members can put it on. It is armoured back and front.
There has been great progress in the design and performance of aircraft. That, I think, is of great significance to the Army. I entirely agree with what the right hon. Member for Dundee, West said the other day, that a strategic reserve which can be flown rapidly to the set of difficulty or trouble is the aim we must have and try to achieve as soon as possible in the cold war. That is our aim and it is also our aim to do it as soon as possible. But the right hon. Gentleman will appreciate that the best types of aircraft to carry out this role are extremely expensive and, in many cases, there is a large waiting list for them.
Nevertheless, I am glad to have the opportunity of saying how pleased and grateful the Army are to the Air Ministry, who have already ordered a considerable number of the Blackburn freighter on our behalf. That is a great asset as it is a very fine, large freighter with great carrying performance. It can take 40 men with their kit and six jeeps, or one could drive a whole char-a-banc into it.

Brigadier O.L. Prior-Palmer: In the defence debate I asked whether there was any possibility of quick adaptation of civilian aircraft for the carriage of troops. If that is so, it seems a pity not to make use of it.

Mr. Head: Civilian aircraft are excellent for transporting troops and their kit, either for ordinary peace-time movements, or in emergency in war, but where one has jeeps, guns, and so forth, conversion is in most cases very difficult. That is the particular asset of the Blackburn freighter, which is a specialist aircraft with specialist loading for that particular purpose.

Sir Peter Macdonald: Does my right hon. Friend consider the use of flying-boats and their adaptation


as troop carriers? Three Princess flying-boats have been built, and are awaiting engines, which are admirably suited for this purpose.

Mr. Head: I can assure my hon. Friend that that has been considered.
I apologise to the House for going on for a longer time than I anticipated, but there are still other points I could make. That, I feel, would be trespassing too much on the time of the House. I have tried to lay out as fully as possible in the Memorandum the operational side of what the Army are doing. I have tried, in the Memorandum, to make specific statements about various other problems on which I have not touched today.
The time has now come when I should submit the Estimate and myself to the criticism and the searching examination of the House. That is as it should be and there will be many hon. Members who will not agree with my proposals and who will not share my opinions. That, also, is to be expected, but I think there is perhaps one opinion, which I hold very strongly, with which many hon. Members will agree. It is that today, possibly more than ever before—at least in peace-time—we have cause to be intensely proud of the personnel of the British Army. They are spread all over the world, many of their jobs are difficult, arduous and dangerous, and in all cases they have done them supremely well. I should like to conclude my speech by expressing, jointly, our gratitude and admiration for what all those in the Army have done.

4.49 p.m.

Mr. John Strachey: The Secretary of State, in moving these Estimates, has concentrated his attention largely on two fields, that of the commitments of the Army—the enormous world-wide commitments under which they labour today—and the use of manpower. I will endeavour to follow the right hon. Gentleman in discussing those two matters.
Before doing so, there are one or two separate questions, some of which the right hon. Gentleman has touched on, which I should like to get out of the way first. There is first, the quite separate question of the 280 rifle. Neither from paragraph 84 of the Memorandum nor the remarks which the right hon. Gentleman has just made, am I quite clear

about what is the position in regard to that rifle today. Do we understand that a new rifle is being designed round new ammunition, because we were always led to believe by the small arms experts that the.280 rifle was built round the ammunition, round the calibre?

Mr. Head: I believe I can help the right hon. Gentleman. The new rifle is being built round the cartridge case. The main difference in the round is the length of the cartridge case, which affects the breech. If there is a standard-size cartridge case, the size of the round may be altered without altering the breech. But if the barrel is altered the cartridge case itself must be altered.

Mr. Strachey: It is not necessarily a new and larger calibre?

Mr. Head: It could be.

Mr. Strachey: It could be, but is it?

Mr. Head: That is not settled.

Mr. Strachey: As we understood, the very essence of the new automatic weapon was the small calibre, for various reasons. The most obvious reason was that an automatic, or a semi-automatic weapon, needed a large supply of ammunition, which meant the carrying of a greater weight, unless that was compensated for by a lighter round and a lighter rifle. If we go back to the.303 bore or any higher calibre, all that will be sacrificed. That seems alarming when we remember that the main objection to this weapon from the Americans was its small calibre. It is difficult to see how those objections are to be met without increasing the calibre again.
I hope the prediction of the right hon. Gentleman that the delay—it is now a delay of nearly two years—will come to an end this summer. But have we any real assurance that the new round, and the new weapon which will be built round it, will meet with favour in America? And what do we do if that does not happen? Do we again scrap this weapon and retain our existing 50-year-old rifle? It would appear to me that we are in an alarming position. I deeply regret the decision taken by this Government—it was one of their first decisions—not to proceed with the.280 rifle.
One cannot burke the fact that the British infantry could have had what I do not hesitate to call a magnificent new


weapon put into their hands this coming summer. That was the expectation held out to us. But the manufacture has not even begun, and I understand that it will be at least two years after manufacture begins before this weapon reaches the units. I ask the Under-Secretary for an assurance that the new cartridge and the weapon will on this occasion be proceeded with, if it satisfies our experts, whether it satisfies everyone else or not.
We cannot wait on standardisation for ever. The Americans are in quite a different position. They already have an automatic rifle. We have a rifle, a magnificent weapon of its period, but frankly that period was 1900, the Boer War period. We cannot go on waiting. Standardisation is a most useful thing, but allies have fought every war hitherto without standardising their small arms. I cannot believe that for the sake of the ideal of standardisation, we should any longer deny an automatic weapon to the British infantry. We on this side of the House feel strongly that it was a lamentable decision on the part of the Government, and one which should be reversed and retrieved as far as possible this summer.
I should like to know what has happened to the cotton battledress which was being designed two years ago. At that time it was held up because of a shortage of cotton. That shortage has not continued. The battledress contained a large quantity of cotton but there was also rayon and other materials in its composition. I hope that the evolution of what seemed to me a promising battle-dress is going forward.
There is mention in the Memorandum of covered stores. In paragraph 90 we are told that good progress is being made. There were formerly difficulties about the provision of covered stores because of the steel shortage, which is now largely overcome. I hope we can be assured that as our new weapons come off the production line in increasing numbers, we shall be able to provide covered storage for them. During my period of office we were haunted by the fear that covered storage might not be available by the time the new weapons were produced.
I come now to the serious points about welfare raised by the Secretary of State, and the question of married quarters. The right hon. Gentleman referred to

them with some feeling, which showed he has realised the importance of the matter. There is the problem of living accommodation, whether for the married or single men, and the question of overseas service, with the additional hardships caused by the greater degree of overseas service today. The right hon. Gentleman announced a welcome financial concession in the shape of an increase in the L.O.A. But, as he said, no financial concession, however welcome, can meet the situation, because it is a question of families being united.
I would emphasise that the question of welfare is not merely a matter of philanthropy. It is a question on which indirectly the whole efficiency of the Army depends. It determines whether the middle-piece officers and N.C.O.s are retained. These people are the backbone of the Army, and unless the welfare problems are solved, sooner rather than later, that backbone begins to weaken. There are alarming statements on that subject in the Memorandum. In paragraph 7 it is stated:
Inevitably such a situation causes strain and this is felt most strongly among the middle-piece officers and non-commissioned officers who are married.
In paragraph 8 it is stated:
There has been some tendency during the past year for regular married non-commissioned officers to leave the Army. We are doing everything possible to reduce and limit the causes of this trend, but it is largely the consequence of the shortage of married quarters and the many unpredictable moves caused by the cold war.
In other words, all these are symptoms of what we discussed last week when we talked about the over-extension of the Army.
Some more important words are in paragraph 49. They are ominous words. The Memorandum says:
We are having more and more difficulty in finding long-service warrant officers and senior non-commissioned officers. We want men to stay in the Army and are trying hard to improve conditions of service so that they do stay.
I do not doubt that the Secretary of State for War, the Under-Secretary and all the members of the Army Council are doing their utmost to improve conditions. I do not blame them for the difficulties. The difficulties do not arise from any detail. They arise from the general disposition of the Army today and from the


fact that they are spread out in an unprecedented manner, with every active division overseas. All these details, even those in the welfare field which at first sight seem unrelated, show the grave situation which the Army get into from every point of view—not only the fighting point of view but from that of its longterm interests—by having to be disposed all over the world as they are today.
Paragraph 77 is one which I wish to stress. It states:
The bare maintenance costs of the Army (pay, pensions, rations, accommodation, transport, and the like) necessarily absorb the greater part of the funds allotted to the Army. We cannot appreciably reduce these maintenance costs without either an adverse effect on the conditions of service or a diminution in the size of the Army. The reduction in our planned defence expenditure has had to be effected without any reduction in commitments, and hence the size of the Army has had to be maintained. It follows that the rate at which new equipment can be provided and reserves built up has had to be slowed down.
We see the most striking confirmation of that in the Estimates. I take it that everybody would agree that Vote 1 is essentially the maintenance Vote, the one in which the size of the Army is reflected, and that Vote 7 is the Vote in which re-equipment, rearmament in the narrow sense of the word, is reflected. I recognise that this year the Estimates do not show that while the maintenance Vote is going up the other Vote is going down. It looks like that at first sight, but that is not so.
The maintenance Vote has increased by £16 million, and it looks as if Vote 7 has gone down by £10 million. But that is not so. The expenditure under Vote 7 has gone up by £10 million. There is a most significant explanation. The expenditure under Vote 7 has gone up by £10 million only because the appropriation-in-aid, which is in this case American defence aid, has increased by £20 million. Our domestic expenditure on rearmament in the narrower sense in the Army field has gone down by £10 million, but we are to get £10 million more of equipment because we have got £20 million more help from America.
The figures reveal that the condition of the Army is such that only by increasing American help is the actual amount of new equipment increasing. So far as our domestic funds are concerned, and if it were not for the American help,

we should have reached the point where, in the words of the Secretary of State, more and more was having to be spent on the mere maintenance of the Army and less was being left for the new requirements of the Army, such as new weapons.
Surely, that is in two ways a most unsatisfactory situation. No one in the House can like the situation which is revealed. It shows a greater and greater dependence on American finance for the actual process of arming. On the other hand, if it were not for that we should be in the even worse situation of having a larger and larger and weaker and weaker Army. We could get into that position. Out of any given total we should find that if we had to spend more and more on pay and allowances, maintenance, and the rest, then there would be less and less left for rearmament—for the weapons to put in the men's hands.
Therefore, we see revealed in these figures the inevitable effect upon the Army of attempting to maintain commitments on this scale. Everything comes back to that. We shall more and more have to focus our attention upon that factor. It is the only one in which the reality of the matter arises.
If that is true of material, it is even more true of manpower. It is even more true on the vexed question of the period of National Service. The Secretary of State mentioned the advantages to the nation of National Service. Of course, there are such advantages. I think that we have all recognised them. My right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) has certainly recognised them. What is in question here is not National Service as such but the two-year period of National Service. Though National Service in the present world situation would certainly be necessary, in my judgment at any rate, even if we had not these enormous overseas commitments, a two-year period would not be necessary. That is the essence of the matter as we see it from this side of the House: not the Service itself, but the length of the period.
The Secretary of State spoke of the use of manpower. Other speakers from this side of the House will probably follow him in detail in that aspect. I make only one or two comments. I do not think that the right hon. Gentleman


was being quite fair when he spoke of the reduction in the divisional slice from 51,000 in 1950 to 38,000 today. It is a fact that as the manpower of the Army as a whole increases—and it has done so considerably in the period —then the basic overheads, the great training establishments and the like, remain more or less the same.
At any rate, they do not increase in proportion, and we can use a considerably larger proportion of extra men to form new divisions. The general overheads, or plant, remain much the same in scale and a much larger proportion of the new recruits can go to make up new formations. Therefore, I do not think that the right hon. Gentleman was being fair to the record of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Easington when he made that comparison.
In the rest of his speech, the Secretary of State was dealing with the subject of the tail, and he quoted from the early works of the Prime Minister to show that at that time the Prime Minister took a brighter view of the tail than he used to do in our day; and, apparently, he has come back to that view now. Of course, the tail is an easy target, but in a modern army it will require the utmost efforts in the economic use of manpower to keep the tail from growing bigger and bigger in proportion as the teeth of the army become more and more mechanised, because the inevitable tendency is for each man in the front line to demand more and more men in the background for his maintenance.
Therefore, I do not myself believe that we shall find very dramatic economies from combing the tail, but it is an absolutely necessary process, and we are glad that the Secretary of State is going on steadily appointing further committees to look into still further aspects of that matter. It is absolutely right and necessary, but I think we should delude ourselves if we thought that dramatic gains of manpower or large economies by dispensing with large numbers of men would be found that way.
That brings us back again to the old theme of commitments. The Secretary of State said much the same as was said last week by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence in summing up the defence debate. He said that we

all make these complaints about commitments, that we all point to them as the real cause of our difficulties, but we do not point to any particular or definite form of relief. Obviously, that is a perfectly fair point if we do not do so, but I would claim that at all events I and others of my hon. Friends have in previous debates pointed, and will point again in this debate, to one possible major relief, and I think we ought to look at it in this debate from the Army's point of view.
I have in mind the Middle East, because that has not only a most important defence aspect in general, but also a most important aspect in regard to the actual welfare of the Army, the dispositions of the Army and the future tasks of the Army. The more I study these Estimates, the more I become convinced that some major step in the direction which we advocated in the defence debate is absolutely indispensable for the Army itself. I got the impression from the response to certain of my remarks in the defence debate that some hon. Gentlemen opposite could not believe and do not believe that I really meant what I said about the Middle East.
I did mean it when I said that, in my opinion, and speaking, I hope, with all the responsibility which we all ought to use at this moment on that subject, our aim in the coming negotiations with the Egyptian Government should be evacuation of the Canal Zone. By evacuation, I meant evacuation, and not the postponement of evacuation.
Of course, I must repeat that nobody suggests that we ought to walk out of the Canal Zone in Egypt without some arrangement with the Egyptian Government as to what part of the vast installations we take with us, what part we leave behind and how the part that is left behind is to be maintained. It is necessary to have a business-like agreement of that sort with the Egyptian Government, and, after all, an agreement of that sort was obtained in 1946, and it broke down, not on these considerations, but because of the Sudan, which we now trust and believe is an obstacle that is at last out of the way.
Before I continue on that point, I should like to call attention to two paragraphs in the Secretary of State's


Memorandum which deal with this matter. They are paragraphs 32 and 33, and they bring out extremely clearly the effect of the present situation in the Canal Zone on the Army:
The large number of troops in the Canal Zone has raised an extremely difficult accommodation problem… As a result of the troubles of last winter married quarters outside the protected areas of camps have had to be given up. Meanwhile the military population of the Canal Zone has been doubled. The discomfort and difficulties under which our garrison lives have thereby been greatly increased.
I read, from Paragraph 33:
Since the major clash with the Egyptian police in Ismailia in January, 1952, the dull routine of internal security work has largely been unrelieved. Much time has been spent in tedious guard duties and the patrolling of our installations. Constant vigilance has been necessary to safeguard our stores from pilfering.
There is a frank and clear picture—and I am indebted to the Secretary of State for it—of the situation our troops have to endure and the conditions under which they have to live in the Canal Zone, and one can easily see the burden which it places on the Army and on those of their formations which happen to be there—and a not inconsiderable part of the Army are there today.
I can perfectly understand people disagreeing with the view which I have twice ventured to put before the House in regard to this matter. The hon. Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery) strongly disagreed with my view, and evidently disagrees with the proposal for evacuation. I think he was wrong there, but I could understand that view; what I could not understand or follow was that he seemed to me to be quite unable to see what were the real alternatives in the situation.
As he saw it—I have his words here—the alternatives were an agreement with the Egyptian Government or a failure to reach agreement with them. Assuming that we had failed to agree with them, the hon. Gentleman considered that we should go on much as we were now, but, if we got agreement with them, we should evacuate some troops and leave a small garrison in the Canal Zone. I do not think I am misrepresenting what the hon. Gentleman said. Here are his actual words:
Present conditions in the base are not satisfactory. This is because they are temporary. If the Egyptians continue to refuse

agreement with us, then we must make these conditions permanent and satisfactory. That could be done …If, on the other hand, we can get a reasonable agreement with the Egyptians, then there is no reason why we should keep the reserve, as distinct from the troops, needed to maintain and defend the base, in the base itself. After all, we maintained order in the area before the war with a few battalions."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 5th March, 1953; Vol. 512, c. 643–4.]
With great respect, whatever else can happen, I do not believe either of these alternatives can happen. I do not believe they can be the alternatives before us, and, if the hon. Gentleman will forgive my saying so, I think that that viewpoint reveals an entirely unrealistic living-in-the-past attitude. I do not believe that any agreement with the Egyptian Government for partial evacuation is even conceivable.
The hon. Gentleman went on to state four conditions for agreement with the Egyptian Government, which seem to me to be totally unrealistic.

Mr. Anthony Fell: Does the right hon. Gentleman really think that the speech he is making helps in any way to make agreement more possible?

Mr. Strachey: Yes, I certainly do. By facing the elementary facts of the situation we make agreement possible. To enter into negotiation without facing the elementary realities of the situation—I do not think Her Majesty's Government would do so—gives no hope of agreement at all.
I want to put to the House the real alternatives. We could have an agreement in which there was a businesslike arrangement for the maintenance of our installations much on the lines of the 1946 Treaty. I have no reason to suppose that it is impossible. I have in mind the Treaty which was negotiated in 1946, and which broke down on the question of the Sudan.

Mr. Julian Amery: Would the right hon. Gentleman amplify a little what he calls a "businesslike arrangement"? Would there be any non-Egyptian technicians or non-Egyptian guards in the base, and would there be an airfield?

Mr. Strachey: It is not for me to attempt to lay down specific conditions of that type. I do not think I have the right to do that. I can define what I mean most easily by saying that it would be


an agreement comparable to that which was negotiated successfully on those issues in 1946, and which provided for general evacuation of the Zone by our fighting troops. That does not exclude some of the points which have been made in this debate.
If we are not to make an agreement of the sort which in 1946 proved possible —I am glad that the Sudan difficulty seems to have been, or is in the course of being removed—what is the alternative? I do not believe that "No agreement" means that we can leave things as they are, or still less that we can reduce our Forces to a few battalions. The real alternative surely is that there would be a great extension of our commitments and it would mean, in fact, the re-occupation of Cairo and of the whole country.

Mr. Peter Remnant: No.

Mr. Strachey: If hon. Gentlemen opposite who disagree speak later, they can say why that is not so. If no agreement is come to with the Egyptian Government, we shall certainly have to crush Egyptian resistance. I am not suggesting that that is militarily impossible, and I should have thought it is something which quite easily—or perhaps not quite easily—could be done. It would, however, mean not only the maintenance of the present commitments but their enormous extension. Our present troops there would all be needed, for the operation itself and any reserves which we kept in the Zone would have to be additional to them.
This is an example of the fact that either we attempt to move on the lines which I proposed last week, and which I am still proposing here, of reducing our world-wide commitments, or we have vastly to increase them. It is impossible not to move in one direction or the other. In the conditions of the Middle East today those seem to me to be the alternatives, and I would ask hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite to face them as the real alternatives.

Mr. C. E. Mott-Radclyffe: Unless the right hon. Gentleman explains more precisely what he means by a "businesslike agreement" he gets us nowhere—unless he is telling us that the solution in the Middle East as a whole is the creation of a vacuum.

Mr. Strachey: I shall have a word or two to say on that point in a moment. What I am not willing to do is to go in precise detail into what would be or would not be acceptable to Her Majesty's Government in the maintenance of installations which are left behind. That is a highly technical problem about which no one not in the Government can express a clear-cut view.
It proved possible to reach an agreement in 1946—the hon. Gentleman shakes his head, but it did—on those factors. On the defence of the Middle East as a whole, I will say a word, because that is a fair point. What I am saying is that while the re-occupation of Egypt is no doubt possible from a military point of view, the moment we look at it from a wider political point of view it becomes completely unrealistic.

Mr. J. Amery: Why does the right hon. Gentleman think that re-occupation of the whole of Egypt is the inevitable alternative to the breakdown of negotiations? Should it not be possible to isolate the Canal Zone?

Mr. Strachey: It might be possible to build a great barbed wire fence and sit permanently besieged in the Canal Zone, but I should have thought that to be an even more fantastic possibility.
Any Egyptian Government, and certainly the present one, which fails to come to an agreement with us will have to attempt a trial of strength by withdrawal of labour and all the other methods which successive Egyptian Governments have adopted from time to time, and which culminated in the Ismailia incidents about a year ago. In that trial of strength the military factors would be in our favour, but they would mean not just sitting on the defensive but something like the reoccupation of Egypt, if the base is to be of any use to us. If we sat in the base and defied a hostile population to turn us out, as no doubt we could, the base would be of no use to us. We should not have labour to work it and our troops would be——

Mr. Amery: After the incidents at Ismailia last year there has been quiet, more or less, in the Canal Zone and we have been able to use the base pretty effectively for reinforcing Kenya and


operations of that kind. Would it not be possible to silence any outbreak of terrorism in the same way?

Mr. Strachey: I am glad of that interjection because it brings out clearly the differences between us. I believe that possibility to be completely unrealistic once matters have reached their present point. After Ismailia incidents, and after the emergence of a military dictatorship pledged to achieve a solution of these questions, it is unrealistic to think that matters will go on much as usual. That is the real difference between us, and I wanted to bring it out clearly.
I should like to say one thing in connection with wider considerations. We on this side of the House are very often accused of being anti-American; therefore, it is very nice to have an opportunity today of saying that in this field, at any rate, I think that the American attitude and policy is considerably in advance of and is more reasonable and sensible than ours. Just as I think that in the Far East our attitude and policy is much more enlightened than theirs, so in the Middle East theirs is more enlightened than ours. Perhaps it is that we each find it easy to be enlightened about the other's interests. It is easier, no doubt.
Nevertheless, in this field it is an important consideration to remember —and the hon. Member for Preston, North brought it out himself —that if we attempted the policy which he advocated, it will bring us into the flattest conflict with the United States——

Mr. F. A. Burden: On a point of order. Are we not going outside the Army Estimates when we are debating our relations with the United Nations and the United States?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Charles MacAndrew): I do not think that we are in the slightest.

Mr. Strachey: I am very grateful to you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, but I do not want to pursue that matter any further because I have made my point.

Mr. Amery: It is an interesting reflection of the attitude of hon. Members opposite and of the right hon. Gentleman himself that he should choose as the one subject on which to take a pro-American

attitude the very subject on which perhaps it might be said that the Americans are pursuing an anti-British policy.

Mr. Strachey: I do not think that it is an anti-British policy at all. I think that it is a policy at least as much in our interest as theirs, and I shall explain why in a moment. I should have thought that their policy in the Far East does conflict with real British interests very severely, whilst their policy in the Middle East is to safeguard their vast investments in the oil in that area, which are just as big as ours, by what I think are far more reasonable and effective means than ours.
I come now to the vital question of the defence of the Middle East. If we take the line of genuine evacuation—which is, after all, doing no more than we say is our aim, and what we have said is our aim for many years—should we, as the hon. Member for Preston. North has put it, be leaving the Middle East defenceless and leaving a vacuum in the Middle East? I put it to the House that on the contrary the only effective defence of the Middle East is a defence pact including not merely ourselves but other N.A.T.O. nations, a defence pact such as was proposed to the Egyptian Government some time ago. Some defence pact or an alliance of the local States, backed by the N.A.T.O. countries, is surely the only real defence of the Middle East. And an agreement with the Egyptian Government, whilst it does not give us that, does open the way to it.
In the event of a hot war, of an invasion by Russia of the whole area, the two British divisions there are not themselves a decisive factor. The decisive factor would be a defence pact for the whole area; and the only method of opening the way to that is to get an agreement with the Egyptian Government. [An HON. MEMBER: "And a base."] Of course there must be a base. I repeat that we must have a business-like agreement with the Egyptian Government for the maintenance of that base, but I suggest that our evacation of our fighting divisions there has become the prerequisite for obtaining it. In the present conditions, and with the attitude of the local population and local labour, that base might well prove as valueless in the hot war as it is in the cold war today.

Colonel Alan Gomme-Duncan: Is it not clear from the trend of what we hear from Egypt that the idea is that we should clear out before any negotiations about the pact or anything else take place? What is to happen in between those events, supposing that those negotiations are very protracted, as such negotiations often are? What is to be done in the vacuum to which my hon. Friend the Member for Preston, North referred, which might exist for a very long period?

Mr. Strachey: The hon. and gallant Member should distinguish between negotiations on the maintenance of the base, including what is to be done with installations left behind—which must of course precede evacuation—and negotiations for a defence pact for the Middle East, which I submit must follow evacuation, because it is quite clear that that cannot be arrived at until evacuation has taken place. We have already proved that. Therefore, the sooner we carry out evacuation the sooner we can obtain a defence pact.
The only thing that is vital is that there should be arrangements for the physical maintenance of the assets there. That, it seems to me, does not permit of an interregnum. The negotiation of a defence pact, as we have now found out, can only take place when evacuation has taken place. The proposals which I have made, like every proposal, have risks attached to them. Certainly what we are doing now has very great risk indeed attached to it. I do not think that one of the risks of evacuation is the silting of the Canal, as the hon. Member for Preston, North put it.
It might be said that we take a risk in contemplating the stability of the Neguib Government in Egypt. I do not pretend to be an expert on that Government. I certainly do not hold any brief for it. It is not the kind of Government with which my hon. Friends are associated. It is a dictatorship of the military Right. But it seems to me questionable whether we are being very clever in making the position of successive Egyptian Governments impossible.
After all, every kind of so-called democratic combination has been tried in Egypt and now a military dictatorship has been tried. A military dictatorship

in that part of the world has not always failed. I suppose that this is a dictatorship broadly comparable to that of Kemal in Turkey. That carried out reforms, and it is possible that the Neguib Government will do the same. I do not know, and I do not pretend to know. But is it very sensible or clever on the part of this country to make impossible the position of yet another type of Egyptian Government and to bring it down and discredit it by making any agreement with it impossible?
After all, if we are to make the position of successive Egyptian Governments of every type impossible one after another, so that the Egyptian people find that none of their problems are solved—neither their internal problem, which I understand is essentially land reform, nor their external problem, which is the not unnatural one of wishing to occupy their own territory—are we not leading them to the conclusion that only complete revolution is any good? And what they would feel is that that would be a Communist revolution. Are we to make them feel that that is the only method by which they can meet any of their problems? Therefore I suggest seriously that to render the position of successive Egyptian Governments, be they good or bad, impossible is not the cleverest line for this country to adopt.
These considerations are surely not very difficult to understand, and I now come to the question why they are, as I knew they would be, so intensely unpalatable to hon. Members opposite. Is not the real reason for this not because they are contrary to the interests of the West, of N.A.T.O. and the like, but because they mean a revision of what I call the traditional British Imperial interests of the old type? We had a very revealing phrase from the hon. Member for Preston, North on this subject. When speaking of the Canal Zone he said:
It is the Clapham Junction of Commonwealth communications, and the keystone of the architecture of Imperial defence. If we pull out of Suez we cut ourselves off from the greater half of the Commonwealth and we abandon our friends in it to face the Soviets alone or to become dependents of the United States."—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 5th March, 1953; Vol. 512, c. 648.]
But that our friends, the Near Eastern Governments, should become inter-dependent with not only the United States


but ourselves and the other N.A.T.O. Governments, is not, to my mind, a bad thing.

Mr. Amery: I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman does not wish to misunderstand what I said. I was not referring to the Governments in the Middle East but to the Governments in the other half of the Commonwealth—in Asia, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.

Mr. Strachey: I think that the argument applies there, too. It is right, necessary and proper for all the countries of the free world to be inter-dependent, certainly in these military matters. It does not seem to me a disaster or a liability that the United States, which now has joint interests with us in the defence of the Middle East, should take a greater share in it. It seems to me an asset. That is the profound difference between us.
Here we find the parting of the ways in the matter of our defence. If we intend to maintain our commitments on the present scale—we see this exemplified in the Canal Zone—we shall have to take on much larger ones still. And we shall attempt to carry this enormous burden ourselves. These Army Estimates have shown us that that is not a practicable policy, and that we must adopt the alternative policy which I attempted to explain last week—a policy not of a "little England" but of abandoning our Imperial pretentions in their old form. That is the factor which we have to face.
In terms of the Army, which is what we are now discussing—[Interruption.] I think that the question of where the Army are disposed in the world is rather important for the Army. Everyone who has participated in this debate has thought so, including the Secretary of State, who agreed that it was the most important matter. It is true that I have concentrated most of my remarks on that subject and on the Middle East because I was quite fairly challenged to give a definite and concrete example of where our commitments could be cut. Therefore, we must go into this subject, because it is the basis of the whole matter which we are discussing. The strain upon the Army—the strain which these Estimates reveal—can only be relieved by a major reconsideration and revision of our commitments. And that should begin

in the Middle East, on the lines and for the reasons which I have put before the House.

5.45 p.m.

Colonel J. H. Harrison: I am sure that the House is grateful to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War not only for his Estimates but for the very fine Memorandum which he produced with them.
I do not propose to follow the right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) in his remarks about the disposition of the Army, particularly in regard to Egypt. One of the greatest factors facing any Secretary of State for War today is the speed with which man can move, the invention of new weapons and the ability to cope with them. The problems of speed for Napoleon 150 years ago were no greater than those for Julius Caesar.
I believe that the Secretary of State for War has met, as far as possible, two of the points which I raised in the debate last year. Therefore, I wish to confine my remarks to two points—manpower and training, and our present employment of civilians in the Army.
We should be extremely grateful that, the Secretary of State, during 1952, was able to bring into being the seven new infantry battalions. I should like to see this followed by all our county regiments, because I believe that in a cold war and at the immediate start of a hot war the infantry battalion is probably the best unit to help us.
We have seen in Malaya the capabilities of our infantry battalions, and, speaking purely as a Territorial soldier, I think it would not be amiss of me to remind the House of the great accomplishments of my own regiment, the Suffolk Regiment, while it was in Malaya. The men in this battalion came from the same villages and homes and were very much the same sort of men as those in the 4th and 5th Battalions who fought there, in shocking conditions, not knowing the terrain they had to fight on, in February, 1942. The point it proves is this: given the right leadership, we have always got the men to carry out the jobs which we want them to do.
In preparing these Estimates, the Secretary of State has not only to bear in mind the cold war but has to be prepared for a hot one, hoping that it will never


come, and he also has to prepare for the possibility of there being no declaration of war and of another attack out-harbouring Pearl Harbour.
We hear so often of the great capabilities of our National Service men and the excellent soldiers they make. I should like to ask the Secretary of State whether the training of our leaders at a higher level is proceeding as well as it might, because the more one studies the history of war the more one is convinced that what matters so much is the leadership of the men who command, given the good material. The right leader inspires his own men to great heights and he also puts fear and terror into the enemy which stops them from taking action. There were many instances in the last war of leaders of that type whose mere reputation stopped the enemy attacking our own troops.
One of the most important points is the training of our leaders down to brigade and battalion levels. We must see that the right men are properly trained. At the beginning of a war we often find that we have a man who is very good at peace-time soldiering, but is no good in war. It is essential that we should cultivate a light infantry spirit or the spirit of the Commandos, acting for themselves. If we are engaged in a war and we are on the retreat we want to have men trained to remain behind to harry the lines of the advancing enemy.
A great deal could have been done on those lines if the men in Malaya in 1941 and 1942 had been properly trained. We do not want a repetition of what happened then, when good battalions were left out there who had never been off the Island of Singapore and had never trained in the jungle and the rubber plantations. We now know that British troops can fight as well under those conditions as any other. I suggest to my right hon. Friend that it is important to see that we are getting the proper leaders, down to battalion level. We want leaders of men who will inspire confidence and we must try to build up their names in a way that the names of Slim, Montgomery and Alexander, inspired terror in the enemy opposing them in the war.
With regard to the question of married quarters, it does not matter whether British families have to live in quarters; they are just as much a home to them.

It is just as important for soldiers and their wives to have their homes as it is for civilians, and I should like to see married quarters being built at the same rate as that of houses for our civilian population.
According to the Estimates we are to spend £11½4 million more on the payment of civilians in 1953–54. I think we agree in principle that it is a good thing to pull a soldier out of a job which can be done by a civilian, so that that soldier can be made an effective fighting man, but we must remember that every time we bring in a civilian for work of this nature within the Army—whether it is to deal with stores or to type in an office—we are increasing the size and the strength of our Army, and we are also taking a man away from our productive and economic effort.
Bearing that fact in mind, we would not be unwise if we asked ourselves whether we are getting the full value for this £60 million that we are now paying to civilians. We could look through these Estimates and see the amounts paid to civilians under different heads and categories. If this large number is to continue to increase, is the old-fashioned set-up really the right one? No one was more delighted than I to hear my right hon. Friend say that he was already bringing in help from outside to see that the arrangement of the set-up was an efficient one.
The training of the fighting soldier does not make him the most capable or most fitted person to judge whether one more civilian typist is needed in one office as, for instance, against a calculating machine. If we are to employ more civilians, perhaps at a higher grade, we must see that they are rightly distributed and that their efforts are not being wasted.
On page 104 of the Estimates I find that we have reduced the number of civil engineers and quantity surveyors by 58, the number of technicians by 250 and the number of architectural draughtsmen by 100. But I find that under that heading the number of typists and clerical staff has gone down only by eight—from 1,800 to 1,792. I should have thought that when some of the professional men at the top were being taken out it would have been more economic to have done the same thing with regard to the clerical and typing staff that goes with them.


We are spending £60 million on wages and we are obviously paying, in addition, for accommodation, heating, furniture and all the equipment that goes with the staffs and the technical men who are employed. I have looked through these Estimates very carefully. I think that any factory, business or nationalised industry employing such a large staff would obviously employ cost accountants—who are becoming extremely fashionable in these days—to see whether they were getting a full return of output for the number of men employed.
As far as I can see there is only one chief cost accountant, with three senior cost accountants, employed in that department of the War Office which comes under my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for War. I do not know whether any more are employed, but I should have thought that throughout our commands and districts it might be wise to employ more men of this calibre or, if we do not want them within the Service, to consult professional firms to see whether we are conducting our civilian affairs within the Army in the most up to date manner and with the most up to date equipment.
How do we know the real cost of many of the weapons of war? We put them into the ordnance depots. They presumably come in at one price and no doubt go out at the same price, as far as the Army are concerned. But if we had a number of cost accountants—whose cost would not be very considerable—we might find that in many of these depots we are storing goods uneconomically and for too long, so that their costs at the end are probably double what we paid for them at the beginning.
There is a great deal of good will towards our Army at the present time. I think it is far greater than we have had since the time of Cromwell. That is because every family has someone in the Army now, so that it has become part and parcel of our daily lives. But we do not like to see instances of waste, particularly on the civilian side. I would always be against bringing in any outside body to examine the actual serving side of the Army. But if we are to spend something like £60 million in pay and £100 million a year for the employment of these civilians the time may well have come to re-examine the whole set-up of civilian employment within the Army and

perhaps its re-establishments on a different basis.
I throw out this suggestion to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War not in the spirit of criticism, but from the point of view that we have reached a time of change. We shall probably continue to employ large numbers of civilians and I should like to know whether we are doing so on the right basis. We must not think that we can continue ad lib to draw on more civilians for the Army. Every civilian we employ costs us about £1,000. we have to pay him and accommodate him within the Army, at a cost of, say, £500 per annum. If he were not there, he would be earning money. He would be making goods on the bench or would be working in an office. He would be making goods for export or for home consumption within our economy. I suggest that each extra man we take into the Army in civilian employment is probably a loss to the country of about £1,000.
I appreciate that my right hon. Friend is like an acrobat on a tight rope, walking slowly along it, trying to balance between the economic needs of the country, on the one hand, and our great defensive need to he ready at any moment, on the other hand. There is the need, too, to be ready in case of any sudden attack. My right hon. Friend cannot tell when the attack is coming.
When we had the defence debate it was stated that legislation would be introduced to extend the time during which a man could be called up in emergency after he had finished his commitments as a National Service man with the Territorial Army for a further five years. I was not clear whether that applied only to those doing their National Service with the Territorial Army but who had not volunteered. Does it apply equally to the 29 per cent. who volunteered? I think it must, because I remember that when the National Service men first joined, and I, as a commanding officer, with others, persuaded them to volunteer, there was no mention of any commitments on the Reserve. It seems, therefore, that the new Act will also include those who are volunteers.
But we have heard today how important it is that a proportion of the 29 per cent., even if it is only a quarter—which will probably be enough—should remain


on as volunteers at the end of their four years' service. It would be disastrous if they found that after they had soldiered on as volunteers, they were then liable to a commitment for a further five years.

Mr. Paget: What does the hon. and gallant Gentleman mean by "commitment"? Does it mean more than having their names on a register and being called up in war-time when those on the register are called up?

Colonel Harrison: We hope that some of the 29 per cent. who volunteered for four years with the Territorial Army—instead of doing 3½ years—will continue to serve even longer, as volunteers. What we do not want is for them to find that if they continue for a further two years they are liable to be caught for another five years. The two years should count against the five years.

Mr. Paget: But these are the people who would want to fight in war-time. If war breaks out they will not object to the fact that their names are on the register.

Colonel Harrison: If they have volunteered for two or four years, why should they then have a further liability to recall which is not shared by the man who has not soldiered on at all?

Mr. Paget: Because they are the most valuable men.

Colonel Harrison: Is it fair that a volunteer should always have more liability than a conscript? I do not think it is.
I was a commanding officer when it was decided that it was a wise thing to get as many as possible of these National Service men to volunteer for four years in the Territorial Army instead of 3½. Many volunteered. The pay terms were rather better. If a quarter of those who soldiered on subsequently volunteered for the Territorial Army after four years, this would be an excellent thing in order to provide the N.C.O.s and officers we need. What I am trying to point out is that if they do that of their own free will, I do not think they should have a further liability, for five years, by comparison with the man who has not volunteered at all. Their circumstances may have changed. They may have married, for

instance. I hope that my right hon. Friend will bear these points in mind when he draws up the legislation.
There are many men who will be very glad that at last they know where they stand about the call-up. Those who are over 45 are no longer to be subject to recall. It is important to remember that these men were 31 or over when the last war broke out. They have probably more to lose from a family point of view than others. Their children were growing up. If they had a business or a shop of their own, they had to leave it and hand it over to someone else. If they were employed, they were at the age when they had had the experience to fit them for promotion to better jobs. As a consequence of the war, they missed those jobs, which often were taken by others. These men are now entering the late forties and are getting going again, and I think they will be grateful for this legislation, which will clear up their position.
In dealing with the Estimates, I should like the Secretary of State, therefore, to examine the question of civilian employment to see whether we are using our manpower wisely at the lower level, and to make certain that the training at the higher level—even although it may involve an additional cost—produces what we need in the event of sudden attack. Then the country will be as safe as we can possibly make it.

6.8 p.m.

Mr. A. Blenkinsop: The hon. and gallant Member for Eye (Colonel J. H. Harrison) has raised certain problems affecting military training and the employment of civilians. I want to carry the point rather further by dealing with the question of education in the Forces, a problem which, to my mind, occurs even before the problem of military training. It will be agreed by everyone that unless we can establish a reasonable level of general education in the Forces, those who are concerned with military training face an even greater problem.
Recently, there has been a tendency to criticise the size and establishment and also the expenditure of the Royal Army Education Corps in dealing with the educational problems of the Army. It seems to me that it would be well worth


while if we could achieve some understanding in the House, and I hope outside, of the type of work which is being done and if we could make an investigation to see whether the work which the Education Corps are tackling is being done with as much vigour as, I am sure, most of us would wish to see.
In the first place, it seems to be held by some critics that the great bulk of the work being done in education in the Forces today is that which was known during the war as "Current Affairs" lectures and similar work. That is far from being the case, and I think that anyone who cares to study the Estimates will find that the bulk of educational expenditure today occurs either in the education of the children of serving men—an expenditure which, I am sure, no one would wish to reduce, and there are many who wonder whether it is sufficient— or in the work done for general education of the Forces, particularly in bringing them up to a reasonable standard so that they may take the first, second and third-class certificates and the General Certificate of Education in the Army.
The amount of expenditure on what some people have called, I think improperly, the frills of Army education is, in fact, very small. The amount available for general lectures and discussions or for correspondence courses for National Service men in the Army represents a very small part of the total expenditure on education.
I want to call the attention of the House to the expenditure on the education of the children of serving men. I think we should all agree that we are faced here with a real problem. It is clear that the proportion of married Service men in the Army has risen very considerably, which has placed a much heavier load on this field of education than has been borne previously. It is also noticeable in these Estimates that the Army Education Corps are taking over the work which was, to some extent, done previously in Germany under the Vote of the Foreign Office. That has had some effect in raising the expenditure shown in the current Estimates.
The point I want to make about the education of the children of serving men concerns secondary rather than primary education. Most of us will agree, I think —certainly those who have looked into

the position at all carefully—that the Army has done a very good job on the whole in its care for the primary education of the children of serving men. There is an even more difficult problem, however, in secondary education. Are we to employ, perhaps rather wastefully, a number of teachers for very small numbers of children of widely varying ages, so as to try to cover their secondary educational needs, or are we to seek to establish main centres, no doubt some considerable distance away from many of the Forces, to which the children can be taken, with the possibility of their returning at holiday times to where their parents are stationed?
I hope that later in the debate it will be possible for the Under-Secretary of State to let us know something about the Army's plan for secondary education and about the progress which has been made in the project for the establishment of secondary school centres for the Army, both in the Middle East and the Far East, where, I believe, it is hoped that it may be possible to achieve some striking developments in the future.
In addition, there is no doubt that a large part of the £3 million expenditure upon Army education which is provided for in the Estimates is devoted to the preparation of men in the Army for the three classes of certificates which are issued. We here face a fairly serious position. When the Minister spoke a little earlier he referred to one of the advantages to the National Service man as the education provided to him in the Forces. We all welcome such education as is provided, but I think we must not exaggerate its quantity or quality. In particular, the right hon. Gentleman said it was a pleasure for him to know that large numbers of National Service men were spending a great deal of time and energy training for these different certificates in order to get the higher rates of pay. I want to find out to what extent this is true. I am very doubtful about the extent to which opportunities are being provided for National Service men to obtain these qualifications.
It is even more important that there should be the fullest possible opportunity for the Regular soldier to take these different examinations to enable him to qualify for both the higher rates of pay and the greater responsibilities which


may come with them. When we find out roughly how many of the Regular Forces have taken these qualifying examinations, we are confronted with a fairly serious position. I think it would be very roughly true to say that three-quarters of the Regular Forces in the country have not even got their third-class certificate, and the third-class certificate is not a certificate of any very great educational standing. I doubt very much—I may be wrong, an should be glad to be corrected— but I doubt whether more than 10 per cent. of the Regular Forces have taken their first-class certificate. I really do think that this is a rather serious matter if we feel, as I hope we do, that it is important to establish a reasonable standard of education throughout the Forces as an essential preliminary to all the modern training that is required.
I question very much whether, in fact, the opportunities are available for men in the Forces today to take these examinations. No doubt I shall be told that it is required of commanding officers to make time available to men under their command to enable them to attend the classes and to take the necessary examinations, but there is this wretched escape clause which appears pretty inevitably in these regulations: "provided the exigencies of the Services permit"— or words to that effect. It seems to me that through that loophole escapes a good deal of the hopes and possibilities of any educational work in the Forces today.
We ought to view with a good deal of alarm the fact that the standard of education in the Army appears at the moment to be as low a these very rough percentages I have mentioned would persuade us to believe. I suggest it is high time that we gave much more priority, much more vigorous support, to this part of the educational work in the Army, and that we do insist in telling the commanding officers generally that this is a part of the concern of the Army to which the Secretary of State himself attaches a great deal of importance, because if matters are allowed to drift as they are today I am afraid the position will be that very large numbers of men who, no doubt, are really quite anxious to take these further qualifications, will be denied the opportunity of taking them. I shall be glad if the Under-Secretary of State can tell us in

detail what steps are being taken to try to improve the position today in the Forces in regard to general education.
I should like to raise only one or two other points for general information. A further field in which a good deal of expenditure is undertaken is with the rather vague group referred to by an hon. Friend of mine in a debate a few days ago—the group of illiterates. There is no doubt that the Army Education Service does a very good job indeed in dealing with illiterates that come within its ken. I know something of the work that it has done in various of its special colleges it has set up.
I know it is a problem whether or not the Army Education Service should regard as its duty not only dealing with the problem of illiteracy amongst the Regulars but also the problem of illiteracy amongst the National Service men. There are some who argue that that ought to be dealt with in the ordinary civilian educational field, and not by the Army; but I think it would be fair to say that, as institutions have been established to deal with this special problem amongst the Regulars, it would be rather foolish to leave out what attention can be given at the same time, possibly without any great extension of staff, to the National Service men, too.
There are other fields to which Army education has turned in the past which are still of real importance, perhaps of greater concern so far as education amongst the National Service men is concerned. An important consideration is that the training the men had been undertaking before coming to the Army should be upset as little as possible by their term of service in the Army. While I know it is a hard row to plough, and that it is a very difficult job to try to encourage those men who come into the Forces for a short time to keep up their educational work, it is of great importance to encourage such work through correspondence courses and the rest, as much as we can, particularly among the National Service men.
Finally, I would refer to the great value of what has been achieved by the Army Education Corps through resettlement courses for Regulars, in particular, before they go out of the Forces, to try to enable them to be prepared for civilian jobs of one kind or another. Again, this is a field


in which no one would wish to deny the value of the expenditure to be undertaken. We only hope that when the Secretary of State is pressed, as, no doubt, he is from time to time, to make economies in this field, and that where his attention is drawn, as, no doubt, it is also from time to time, to the criticisms that appear in the Press and elsewhere of this education service, he will always have in mind the importance that, I hope, the whole House attaches to the work that is being steadily done by the Army Education Corps, and, in particular, what I suggest is the serious position of the general level of education.
Unless the Army is prepared to press on, not necessarily with any new expenditure, but with making full use of the existing staff in order to achieve a higher level of general education, I fear that the further military tranining which we all desire to see carried out will be to that extent less effective. I hope that the Under-Secretary of State will be able to say something to us about the detail of the work that is being done, and say that it has the anxious interest of himself and of his right hon. Friends.

6.22 p.m.

Mr. C. E. Mott-Radclyffe: I hope that the hon. Gentleman the Member for Newcastle-upon Tyne, East (Mr. Blenkinsop) will forgive me if I do not follow him on the subject of education in the Army beyond saying that I entirely agree with him that it is important that the general level of education should be high. I myself was very much reassured by some remarks in this respect made by the Secretary of State himself today.
I turn, first, to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) who, I am sorry to see, is not now in his place. It is, of course, a matter of opinion whether a speech of that kind is likely to be helpful or otherwise to the negotiations which are about to take place between the Government and the Egyptian Government. I myself hold very strong views about that. I think that nothing could be more unwise or more irresponsible than that a former Secretary of State should openly say in an Army Estimates debate that the only alternative to complete evacuation from the Canal Zone would be the re-occupation of the whole of Egypt.
I thought that the right hon. Gentleman was really confusing two issues. While the negotiations are, of course, entirely a matter for Britain and Egypt, because it is the revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 that is at stake, at the same time, the result of the negotiations affects the whole problem of the defence of the Middle East, and that involves not only the Commonwealth but also N.A.T.O., for both Greece and Turkey are now members of N.A.T.O., and each, geographically and strategically, is concerned with the defence of the Middle East.
I wish that the right hon. Gentleman had given us some indication of his view, as to whether we could defend the Middle East without a base in the Canal Zone, and if so, how; and if not, who was to look after the base with its very valuable technical equipment and immense quantity of stores all of British ownership.
What is clear from the speech of my right hon. Friend, indeed, what is clear from the defence debate of last week, is the great difficulty with which we are faced today in the heavy overseas commitments which the Army is now bearing. My right hon. Friend told us that 80 per cent. of the Army is now overseas. No one can regard that figure as anything but a very serious matter. But it seems to me that, when we consider the bigger commitments, it is extremely difficult to see any way in present conditions——

Mr. Shinwell: Is the hon. Gentleman correct in saying 80 per cent. of the Army is overseas? Surely, it cannot be as high a figure as that.

Mr. Mott-Radclyffe: I may have misheard or misunderstood my right hon. Friend, but I think he said that 80 per cent. of the Regular Army was serving overseas. I may have misunderstood.

Mr. Shinwell: The Regular Army. Not the whole Army.

Mr. Mott-Radclyffe: I am so sorry. I meant the Regular Army. I think that is what my right hon. Friend said, though I may have misunderstood. I know that I was myself surprised at that figure. I hope that my hon. Friend will correct me if I am wrong, but if it be the case that 80 per cent. of the Regular Army is stationed overseas, that may give everybody cause seriously to think of the obvious implications.

The Under-Secretary of State for War (Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison): In order that my hon. Friend may continue his speech under no misapprehension or misunderstanding, let me say that if we include Europe as being overseas, though officially it is a home station, it is correct that 80 per cent of the Regular Army is overseas.

Mr. Mott-Radclyffe: I think we have got that cleared up.

Mr. Shinwell: Let us be quite clear about it. The troops in Germany are in what is known as a home command. There are nearly five divisions there.

Mr. Mott-Radclyffe: I do not want to get into a technical argument with the right hon. Gentleman about the geographical position of Germany. My hon. Friend did explain that Germany is regarded as a home station; but we all know that, as a matter of fact, physically it is overseas.
When we come to regard the major overseas commitments one by one, I repeat, it is extremely difficult to see how in present circumstances they can be reduced. No one, I take it, will suggest that at the moment we can reduce our commitments in Korea. I take it that no one would suggest that until we have restored law and order in Malaya we should reduce our commitments there, for Malaya is vital to our economic life, because of the rubber and tin it produces.
Unless we have a satisfactory agreement with Egypt by which we can reduce the number of troops at present in the Canal Zone, I do not think we can conceivably contemplate any alteration in our commitments in the Middle East. So far as Trieste is concerned, that was a commitment entered into with the Americans, and must remain so, until such time as Yugoslavia and Italy come to an agreement about Trieste. So far as the commitments in Austria are concerned, these, again, were entered into with both the United States and France, and British troops will have to remain until the Soviet Union decides that it wishes to sign a treaty with Austria to which we can agree.
We come now to B.A.O.R. Do not let us argue whether it is at home or abroad. It is a part of N.A.T.O. The British armoured divisions in Western Germany

are one of the greatest assets in stimulating morale in Western Europe. I believe that the maintenance of civilian morale amongst our friends and allies in Western Europe is far more important than the maintenance or morale in almost any other part of the world.
We have to recognise the fact that the countries of our allies, notably France, Holland and Belgium, have already been occupied once, and they do not wish to repeat the experience. They are interested in defence, but not in subsequent liberation in the event of a third world war. We cannot defend Western Europe properly without a German contribution, and the sooner we get that contribution the better. That is why I regret delay in ratification of the E.D.C. Treaty.
I am not at all sure, however, that I agree with the right hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellinger) when he said, in the defence debate last Thursday, that if we could get a German contribution we could, to some extent, reduce the number of British troops in Western Germany. I am not so sure that we could. I think that we need to stiffen up the anti-Communist front in Western Europe as soon as possible. I believe that there is no substitute from the point of view of morale for the sight of British, American, French and other troops physically on the ground.

Mr. R. H. S. Crossman: The hon. Gentleman wants a German contribution. Surely he appreciates that directly that contribution comes into being, our Forces there will cost us £130 million more a year, payable in dollars, because the occupation costs will not be paid by the Germans. Is he willing to sustain the economic burden of keeping our troops there at a cost of an extra £130 million per year?

Mr. Mott-Radclyffe: Even when the German contribution has been agreed to, it is going to take some time for the contribution to take physical form. I believe that from that moment we cannot straight away begin to reduce the number of Forces in B.A.O.R. In the long run I hope that we shall be able to, but I am talking about the immediate figure.

Mr. Crossman: That is my point. That means that directly E.D.C. is approved in Germany we become liable for the total cost of our troops in Germany.

Mr. Mott-Radclyffe: indicated dissent.

Mr. Crossman: The hon. Member shakes his head, but it has been stated by the German Finance Minister that Germany will not pay occupation costs. Does he wish to see this country saddled with an extra £130 million a year for these troops?

Mr. Mott-Radclyffe: I disagree with the hon. Gentleman on this matter. If, within the next two months, the E.D.C. Treaty is ratified, and all the E.D.C. countries agree on a German contribution, I do not believe that from that date we can consider an immediate withdrawal of a large number of British troops from Germany. I do not think that we ought to withdraw them until such time as the German contribution takes physical form.
I turn to the question of married quarters. I entirely agree with the terms of the Amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for Dover (Mr. Arbuthnot). It is precisely because the bulk of the Army is overseas that married quarters are so important. The Secretary of State for War was perfectly right when he said, on this question of providing married quarters, particularly overseas, that, although expensive, it has a direct bearing on recruitment for the Regular Army. So long as one has a small chance of spending any proportion of one's service in the Army with one's wife and family, for so long does the Army cease to be an attractive career.
I think my right hon. Friend said that 60 per cent. of those serving overseas at the moment were separated from their wives. That speaks for itself. It is not surprising under those circumstances that the three-year men, when they have completed their period of three years, are not very willing to stay on.

Mr. Wigg: I think that the hon. Gentleman quoted the Secretary of State for War wrongly when he said that 60 per cent. of the men overseas are married. I did not gather that from the right hon. Gentleman's speech. I thought that he meant that of the married men serving overseas 60 per cent. were separated from their families, which is a very different proposition.

Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison: I think that the actual words used were that two-thirds of those married and overseas have not got their families with them.

Mr. Mott-Radclyffe: I think then that is more accurately 66⅔ per cent. So long as 66⅔ per cent. of the married men serving overseas are separated from their families that will have, I repeat, an adverse affect on recruiting for the Regular Army.

Mr. Wigg: What we really ought to know is how many men on three years' service are married. I do not think that a very high proportion of them are married and, therefore, I do not think that it affects the position of these men.

Mr. Mott-Radclyffe: I do not think that the figure of 66⅔ refers exclusively to three-year men, but let us leave that to the Under-Secretary to explain when he winds up the debate.

Mr. Frederick Gough: I think that I can help my hon. Friend with his mathematics. On page 12 of the White Paper on Defence it is stated—and I think that my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State is wrong here—that
two-thirds of the married personnel in the Army are now separated from their families.
That makes it a wider point.

Mr. Mott-Radclyffe: I am very grateful to my hon. Friend.
While I quite understand that in certain parts of the world, because of political uncertainty, it is difficult, if not impossible, to start building married quarters, there are other areas of the world where, I should have thought, we could make good progress in that direction. I would ask the Under-Secretary, when he replies, if he could tell us what the programme is, for example, in Cyprus, in Tripoli and in Cyrenaica. Those are important Middle East bases. There is no political uncertainty about those places. I think that there is no reason why, in the long run, a considerable proportion of the married soldiers serving overseas in those stations should not have reasonable married quarters provided for them.
I apologise for detaining the House so long, but I have had a number of interruptions and difficulties about mathematics. I want to ask the Under-Secretary one further question. That is about the


group system. I can understand the advantages of the group system at present. I agree that under existing circumstances it is probably the only system. At the same time, is there any possibility in the foreseeable future of getting back to the ideal, by which I mean a proper regimental system?
The British Army is built upon the regimental system and that system is itself built upon tradition. Tradition is a very healthy instinct. If a young man wishes to make the Army his career, he ought not in theory only to mind what regiment he goes into, but, in fact, he does. He may have very strong family associations with one regiment or very strong territorial associations with another. If he cannot go into one of the two regiments of his particular choice, the chances are that he probably will not choose the Army as a career. That applies not only to officers but to other ranks who may be considering long service engagements. I believe that to be one of the fundamental psychological problems that we have to face in building up the Regular Army, and I hope that my hon. Friend will be able to say a word about it when he replies.
In conclusion, I would only say that no one reading the Secretary of State's Memorandum could help but be impressed by the very wide and varied services performed by the Army both at home and overseas. It is proof that we in this House ought to be—as we are —proud of the British Army of today.

6.40 p.m.

Mr. James Simmons: I feel more at home after the last two speeches from the back benches opposite. At the beginning of the debate I thought we were entering realms which it was beyond my ability to enter. It is usual for the debates on the Service Estimates to provide a field-day for military experts and subservient disciples of "brass." I am no military expert and my opinion of "brass" could not be expressed in Parliamentary language; what I have heard comrades standing next to me on the barrack square say under their breath must for ever remain behind sealed lips.
During the defence debate and this debate—the same thing will happen during the debates on the Navy and Air Estimates—I have listened with amaze-

ment while hon. Members, who, I presume, held high and important commands, or at least were on the short list for them, have discoursed on troop movements, fire power and strategic reserve. My wonderment may be explained by the fact that I was never one of the movers but always one of the herd being moved. My recollection of experience as one of the reserves is of a funny feeling in the pit of my tummy as we met the stretcher bearers coming out with their tragic loads as we went in to take up position.
So much of our debates on defence and the Service Estimates seem unreal, especially to those who have experienced active service in war-time. Glib talk in technical terms gives no clue to the real cost of war. When we lose ourselves in a mass of technical terms we lose the human side of it. We are voting £526 million on these Army Estimates. We do not bat an eyelid; we do it as a matter of course. We are so used to living in fear of war that swollen Army Estimates become part of our way of life.
I know that we are not allowed to debate the ethical aspects of this development on these Estimates, but as the representatives of the ordinary people we ought at the appropriate time to examine whether the sacrifice of two world wars, ostensibly fought to end war and destroy militarism, has really been worth while. I shall not develop that today. I will content myself with saying that to my simple mind a great deal of our discussion seems to ignore the human side of defence preparations.
I was very pleased by the human note in the Minister's Memorandum. I was especially pleased to note his glowing tribute to the gallantry and endurance of our troops now serving in the many scattered battlefields of the world. It is a timely reminder that behind the cold print and the frightening figures there are young men, flesh of our flesh, blood of our blood, successors to the eternal British Tommy who, in two wars, won through against frightening odds while people were sitting on the sidelines jeering and saying that he was going to lose. It is the people sitting on the sidelines who want to have their own way in everything in the world at the present time. We do not forget that kind of thing.
This record of what our lads are doing on the battlefields is an adequate answer


to the miserable pessimists who are always talking about the degeneracy of modern British youth. Especially gratifying is the reference to the fact that our young National Service men constitute 50 per cent. of our Forces in Korea. It is a shame that they should have to go there, but they are giving a good account of themselves and have earned respect. Our blood tingles with pride when we read in the report that during the past 12 months these Forces, containing 50 per cent. National Service men, have not yielded a single inch of ground while under continuous attack. We are proud that there men are the representatives of this nation.
The fact that we have 23 battalions in Malaya indicates what a great share we are taking in stemming the tide of Communism and also the price that we have to pay for having left such territories so long in the hands of those whose actions and mode of life prepared the soil in which the seeds of Communism germinated so profusely.
I am reluctantly convinced that we must continue to devote men, money and materials in large quantities to defence. It has been a hard mental and spiritual struggle for me to come to this conclusion. After the First World War I was a bitter and disillusioned young man. The things which I had been supposed to be fighting for were non-existent. The homes fit for heroes did not exist, and there was not peace. From that came the feelings with which I entered the House in 1929, and I spoke against, and voted, against the Service Estimates. I was sincere then, and I am sincere today; but I am much less happy today because one always has a mental struggle when one votes money and materials to enable someone else to do a dirty job. If one was doing the job oneself, one would not mind so much, but when one is voting money to enable other people to do the job one goes through a serious mental and spiritual struggle.
When I came out of the Army in 1918 I was opposed to war because I had seen the beastliness, the horror and the rottenness of it. The only reason I support rearmament today is because of some lines by one of my favourite poets, J. G. Whittier:
They enslave their children's children who make compromise with sin.

It is only because we cannot make compromise with the sin of totalitarian Communism which is trying to dominate the world today that I am prepared to support Estimates for the rearmament and defence of our country.
The growing needs for expenditure under the Army Estimates are a measure of our failure to win the war of ideals. Side by side with defence preparations we must continue the war of ideals, because if we despair of ever winning it we might as well put our children in a lethal chamber as let them face the horrors of the years to come. We shall not win the war of ideals by hauling down our "brave tattered banners" and emulating the action of our totalitarian opponents; we shall win it by proving by actions that our way of life is the better way of life. So we come to the position of these Estimates and we ask ourselves whether we can carry the burden of these Estimates and their associated ones without destroying the structure of social security and drastically lowering living standards, for those are the best bulwarks against Communism.
I want to urge that we use the material which is being provided by the Estimates to the best advantage. The British Tommy is the finest soldier in the world, and those who wear the Queen's uniform today are proving themselves worthy of those who won two world wars against tremendous odds. Defence and Service Ministers are usually too prone to accept without question the views of the General Staff or the experts who, so often, prove to be wrong. Certainly, they are more often wrong than right. I do not say that every Minister of Defence comes under that heading, and I look to my left, where sits my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr.Shinwell).
A writer once said that the British Army was composed of lions led by asses. I just murmur "Antwerp, Gallipoli, Passchendaele," and I leave it at that. Of course, the "brass" will take as many men for as long a period as they can get. Make no mistake about that. The surplus men can always be used as officers' batmen, officers' cooks or housemaids in married officers' quarters. Others can be made to polish the inside of the barrack room coal bin, or whitewash—if not the "last post"—stones round the little garden outside the


orderly room. It must be nice to contemplate the garden outside an orderly room while waiting to be marched in to get C.B.
Do we need so many National Service men? Can we train them and keep them all usefully employed for the two-year period? We were told that the idea of increasing the period of service to two years was to build up the reserves. There has been a lot of quibbling this afternoon about figures and I want to be careful, but I will give those figures which I got. These state that the reserves in 1950 were 130,700 and in 1953 they were estimated at 427,000. If my figures are right, and they are not yet challenged, that seems to me to be a fairly good build up. Still the great maw of the military machine is open and still the "brass" keep crying, "Give me more men for the Army."
I think we should have an annual review of the period of National Service because conditions change from year to year and we do not want to have men drafted into the Army to waste their time and their energy. We should have an independent inquiry. I know we have been told by the Secretary of State for War that there are four inquiries going on today, but as far as I can gather only one is under an outside chairman. All the others are Departmental inquiries of a kind, and I do not place much reliance upon those.
I look forward to the day when we shall have so built up our Regular Army that we will be able to do without compulsion, which is so alien to the ideals and principles of this country. That day, alas, is not yet, so all I say on manpower and training is, let us find useful employment for these men while in the Services, send them out of those Services adequately equipped for civilian jobs and retain them in the Services only as long as is consistent with the real needs of national defence. Let us always remember that the National Service men are citizens in uniform. Let us not demoralise them by forcing them to kill their time, making them feel that theirs is a useless kind of existence. They must return to civilian life as good citizens, proud of the service they rendered while in uniform, and anxious to serve their country's need equally well in mufti.
In spite of devilish inventions, the backbone of our defence is still the British Tommy. It is well that in the general debate on the Estimate as a whole we should give careful consideration to the details. Later this evening, or early in the morning I hope to have something to say about the non-effective services for which last year nearly £17 million was provided for in the Estimates. It seems to me an anomaly that something that is non-effective should be included in the Defence Estimates. It gives a false idea of what we are spending on effective defence.
The amalgamation of Ministries is in the air at the moment. There may be a good case on effectiveness, economy and humanity to transfer some of the commitments which are listed under non-effective services to a now threatened Ministry of Pensions. There is much which is now being done at Chelsea and other things which are dealt with under non-effective services which could be more effectively considered by a humane Ministry of Pensions, with that incomparable personal touch which I do not think exists to the same degree in any other Ministry.
There are a few Votes not down for Committee discussions and I presume that they can be raised on this general debate. One is Vote 4, concerning civilians. One notes in the Secretary of State's Memorandum that 12,000 more civilians are now being employed than in 1951–52. The Army has now two tails, the Service tail and the civilian tail. The one tail is being combed, and the other is growing bushier. These civilians are a mixed bag. There seem to be quite a lot of jobs for the old boys and principal, senior, and deputy officers of one kind or another in profusion. The "passed to you" technique has plenty of scope here.
If we look down this Vote for civilians we find there is also a chief motion study officer, senior motion study officers and motion study officers, grades 1 and 2. We are not told whether Mr. Bedeux, beloved of trade unionists, is also on the staff. Then we have a senior principal psychologist with four seniors and four principals to control three common or garden psychologists. I think we had better have a look at that very carefully when we come to the Committee stage, because it is all very well, as the hon. and gallant


Member for Eye (Colonel J. H. Harrison) said when he spoke, to develop the civilian side and release men for the Forces. We do not want increased civilian labour any more than we want to waste the time of the National Service men.
We want to see that the people employed on the civilian side of the Army are usefully employed. I have heard National Service men who had to go into the Army and have served in various parts of the country say, in not very Parliamentary language, what they think about people who sit about all day drinking tea and smoking cigarettes. On the civilian side a good many of the men employed are ex-officers. I do not complain about that, because to look after one's own is quite natural: but that is the position.
On the educational side there seems to be no uniform pattern. We have in different establishments directors of studies, commandants, headmasters, a bursar, and a dean, whose colour is not defined. It is a pity that Vote 4 does not come up during the Committee stage, because it is worthy of detailed discussion. One would like to hear the Minister telling the tale of the wonderful tail as a bedtime story for the children of the "Boys of the Old Brigade."
We all look forward to these annual discussions on the Army Estimates. They may be long and go on into the small hours, but it is a fascinating subject. If we did justice to them we should have a week's discussion, because there is meat in them. Some of it may not be very fresh, but it is meat. We could spend quite a week of Parliamentary time and get down to discussion of the detail of the Estimates. We have no private armies in this country. It is Parliament that votes the men and the money, and before we do so we want to see how the money is being spent and how the men are being used.
Even those of us who are visionary enough to see on the horizon the time when national armies will be things of the past have respect for tradition, admiration for courage and endurance and a determination to see that we carry out our responsibilities to the men who, in this troubled world, wear the uniform of our Queen and bear the burden of the mistakes of our statesmen. Before we part

with these Estimates and whatever our differences may be on one side of the House or the other, our united voice can go out in saluting Tommy Atkins both for the work he has done in the past and the work that his successors are doing on the various battlefields.

Orders of the Day — MARRIED QUARTERS

7.3 p.m.

Mr. John Arbuthnot: I beg to move, to leave out from "That," to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof:
this House, while appreciating the improvements already achieved, regards the provision of adequate accommodation for married officers and other ranks both at home and overseas as requiring action on high priority in the interests of the well-being of the Service, the efficiency of the military machine and consequent promotion of economy.
Many people may wonder how I, who am closely associated with endeavours to encourage economy in the public expenditure, find myself suggesting that more should be spent on married quarters for the Army. The reason is that I believe that we cannot obtain the best and the most efficient service from our officers and other ranks unless we house them properly. So long as married quarters remain inadequate as they are today they will be a source of inefficiency in our Services, and therefore we must do everything we can to put them right.
Great strides have been made in the last two years in this matter and conditions of service generally have been vastly improved under the present Government. The three-years'-engagement plan has been introduced, and so has the full engagement for 22 years with the three years' option. We also have the new continual service beyond the normal period of retirement, and now the latest announcement made by the Secretary of State for War of special local oversea allowances. This is a further step in improving conditions for people in the Services and will be welcomed on all sides of the House.
In spite of that new announcement, the fact remains that separation is the crucial deterrent against men joining the Army. The effect that it has upon the Army has been very marked, and is particularly noticeable in age groups in the late twenties and the early thirties. My right hon. Friend has said that only 8 per cent.


of the Regular non-commissioned officers have more than six years' service. That is a very serious state of affairs and means that it is all the more essential that we should encourage Regulars to take on for a full career. I do not want to enter into the various mathematical arguments that took place, but I understand that the latest position is that two-thirds of the married men in the Regular Army overseas are separated from their families. That is a pretty appalling position from whatever angle one looks at it.
There is a considerable number of what one might call "middle piece" officers who have applied to retire or are considering retiring prematurely. The dreadful thing about it is that they are the most efficient officers and those whom we can least afford to lose. A further point which is worth making is that parents are discouraging children from joining up in the Army because of the prospect of long and frequent separation from their families.
In one of the Sunday newspapers a few weeks ago I read that divorces in relation to the Middle East alone are at the rate of 42 per week. I would ask the Minister whether that figure is true and, if not, what the figure actually is. If the figure is incorrect, it is very important that the facts should be made abundantly clear.
All these things added together make it vital to ensure that married quarters are made available and that where this is not possible, financial hardship does not result. On financial hardship, I would remind the Minister of the question which was asked of him by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for the Isle of Ely (Major Legge-Bourke). Where a man is moved on from one oversea station to another, will he get the special local over-sea allowance which the Secretary of State for War announced this afternoon? That matter is of the very greatest importance.
We all realise that there have been difficulties in providing married quarters. They seem to be divided into two groups. The first is the delay in making long-term plans, particularly between the end of the war and 1950; and the second, the continued unsettled conditions because of the prolongation of the cold war. On the first point, it was difficult to decide upon the established strengths and locations

for post-war garrisons, and for that reason permanent married quarters were built sporadically and very definitely took second place to civilian construction.
By the end of 1948, only 961 married quarters had been built, and it was not until November, 1949, that the late Government brought before this House the Housing Loans Bill, which provided for more houses being built for the Forces. Under that Measure, however, houses could only be built provided they were suitable for selling or letting to civilians should the Army no longer want them. Even under that Measure, therefore, the number of houses likely to be built was limited, because in those areas where the population was not great, or in areas where, for one reason or another, it would be unlikely that the houses would be taken over by civilians if the Army did not require them, those houses came outside the scope of the Measure and still had to be provided out of the normal Army Estimates. Furthermore, the funds from the Housing Loans Act only became available in 1950, so that there had been five years in which very few married quarters had been built. That is one aspect.
At the same time as the Housing Loans Bill was brought before this House, a special Committee was set up in the War Office to study plans for the detailed location and layout of garrisons. The results of that Committee's deliberations were not available until 1951, so that arising from those two factors we have today an appalling leeway to make up.
The continued unsettled conditions due to the cold war are even more serious, and firm planning is not possible even now. For more than half a century we have had India available for our troops where families could be with their men, but today the position is very different.
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War told us that 80 per cent. of the Regular Army was serving overseas. A large proportion of those men are serving in temporary stations or are re-inforcing small garrisons as a temporary measure. Except for one or two small fortress garrisons, such as Gibraltar, there is hardly a single overseas station which, in the long-term picture, is likely to accommodate troops on anything like the present scale. The result is that permanent married quarters are


a rarity today and the family can seldom accompany the husband. Even where the family is permitted to do so, they have to wait until they reach the top of the movement's queue. Considerable improvement has been made in that by flying families overseas, and I want to pay a tribute to my right hon. Friend for what he has done in that direction. None the less, measures to lighten the problem of separation are essential.
I turn now to what has been done. First there has been the reduction to three years in the overseas tour for battalions and regiments of infantry and R.A.C. This means that the tour of the battalion or regiment now more or less coincides with the tour of the individual officer or man. In the past the officer or man would go abroad, do his three years' term of service, then his personal tour would come to an end and he would come home and be transferred to another unit. What happened to his family? They found it extraordinarily difficult to obtain married accommodation in the location of the new unit to which he had been posted. The result was that they were between the devil and the deep blue sea because they had to give up the quarters in the unit from which he had been posted and, in many cases could not find new quarters with the new unit.
With the synchronisation of the tour of the battalion or regiment and the individual accommodation will be much more easy, because the entire regiment will move out together and the quarters will become available for an officer or man as he comes back to his unit's headquarters. As I have said, at present these arrangements are confined to regiments of the infantry and R.A.C. Therefore I ask my hon. Friend if this can be extended to other main arms, particularly the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers?
Much has been done in regard to hiring accommodation, and that has been particularly helpful at home. It has also been done abroad, but to a more limited extent, and expense has been fairly considerable in stations like Hong Kong. Last year, in his speech on the Army Estimates on 10th March, my right hon. Friend said that there were 3,343 married quarters obtained under the hiring system. Did those include the hiring overseas or only at home? That was not clear from

his statement. I also want to ask my right hon. Friend whether the fullest use of the hiring of accommodation system has been made and whether any figures can be given now.
I am afraid that I am putting a series of questions but I want to ask one or two more, particularly in regard to Germany. In view of the number of troops there, can my hon. Friend give an assurance that the need for accommodation is being fully met? And in that connection I want to draw his attention to some of those who are extra-regimentally employed, particularly in stations like Bad Oeynhausen where some people have been since 1945. Is it not time they were moved around to give some of the others a chance? My last question on hiring accommodation is whether my hon. Friend is satisfied that the allocation is fair? I understand that it works on a points system. We should appreciate details as to how that system works.
Now I turn to the question of financial hardship on account of separation. This has been mitigated considerably by the statement made by my right hon. Friend this afternoon. Under the heading of separation is the added expense of running two homes and, in certain stations, there is the increased cost of living. Local oversea allowances, in the past, have varied from station to station in accordance with the cost of living at the station concerned. Is the new local oversea allowance which has been announced to vary in the same way as the old local oversea allowances varied?
Under the old regulations the local married allowance was very much hedged about by rules. For example, the husband must have been posted to the area for 12 months, or longer, before he could get a local married allowance. The family must have received special permission from the command concerned. I take it that under the new proposals all these rules and regulations are being swept away, but I should appreciate an assurance from my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary that that is so.
Another important point that will be uppermost in the minds of the troops is whether the old regulations are still to apply before a man's family can join him overseas. In the past, these regulations have excluded a number of families


who would otherwise have joined their husbands abroad.
The real remedy, however, for all our problems so far as married quarters are concerned is that we should as soon as possible come to a decision as to where the permanent garrisons are to be located. This, of course, is a matter very largely of foreign policy, but once we have come to this decision we should get on with the job of building married quarters as soon as we possibly can.
I understand that considerable progress has been made in Cyprus, and I am wondering whether my hon. Friend can give the figures. The sequence of construction has been altered in that garrison in order to give first priority to married quarters. This should in my view become the rule rather than the exception. What is the position in Cyrenaica? There seems to be considerable doubt about what we are doing there, and if any figures can be given they would be extremely helpful.
One solution might be to establish garrisons from which troops can be flown to potential seats of trouble, and I am wondering what progress has been made in this direction. I should appreciate very much if something more could be said about the Blackburn freighter, for my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War said that it was not really practicable to hire aircraft for moving troops and that we must have our aircraft specifically allotted to that task and adapted to it.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence (Mr. Nigel Birch): The intervening Amendment on the Air Estimates will deal with air trooping. Perhaps it would be better to deal with the question when that Motion arises.

Mr. Arbuthnot: That was the last point that I wanted to make. I conclude, therefore, with the request that the question of married quarters for the Army should be dealt with on the highest possible priority.

7.24 p.m.

Mr. Robert Crouch: I beg to second the Amendment.
My hon. Friend the Member for Dover (Mr. Arbuthnot), who has so ably proposed the Amendment, has given the subject a great deal of attention and has covered a very wide field. My remarks,

therefore, will be rather shorter than his because of the large number of topics with which he has dealt.
The Army of today are essentially a police force, and their being does not intend aggression against other nations. They have helped to maintain justice in those distant lands of our Empire which in return have provided us, at favourable rates, with the materials and minerals which are so essential to our industries and factories and the market for our resultant exports. In this way the Army have played no small part in the economy of this country and have thus affected the standard of living of our people. Today, with the world in its present state, more than ever do we require a large Regular Army for the policing that is necessary, and our failure to raise a sufficiently large Regular Army has made National Service in the Army absolutely necessary.
The National Service man has proved himself, but the Army, like successful business firms, must have the continuity which creates experience. The National Service man does not serve long enough to provide this, and the Army today must be most efficient to meet the many calls that are made upon them. These facts are slowly being recognised by all, and the proof of this is shown in the action to make known that the Army offers a real career to any young man.
My right hon. Friend today has made an announcement which, I feel sure, will make a young man's career in the Army much more attractive. There have been increases in pay and better scales of pensions, but while there is a big increase in the number of three-year Regulars, there is no great increase in the numbers of those engaging for 12 to 22 years—and these really are the people whom we require, Indeed, despite the better pay and pensions that are offered, the Regular Army are still continuing to lose, which they can ill afford to do, many soldiers with five, seven and 12 years' service who give various reasons for not wishing to continue in Her Majesty's Service. One of the main reasons which are given is the fear of separation of husband and wife, of the father and his family and all the worry that is so caused.
I understand that the lack of houses and consequent long separation and financial hardships are some of the causes why men leave the Service. House building


should be spread evenly so that every member of the Forces has at least a chance of having his family with him. I believe it would be better to build quarters in many camps rather than to build the majority of quarters in a few camps.
The average age at which a man marries is today 23 years. In the Army this represents the man with five years' service, the junior n.c.o. or officer, the potential senior warrant officer or major. There is no real reason why he should not expect to be married at about that age, but we know that as Army life means changes of employment and stations, he cannot count upon his family life being uninterrupted, as his civilian brother can do. The serving soldier is quite prepared to go unaccompanied to the operational theatres of war whenever required to do so, but in normal peacetime he sees no reason for this separation. He is essential to the nation; the nation is prepared to provide him with the tools of his profession and to house him, but not his family.
Any good business firms with branches spread abroad give encouragement to see that their married employees are provided with suitable accommodation. They realise only too well that any employee with domestic worries is only 50 per cent. efficient. I believe that the Army are aware of this also. When will the general public become aware of it and see that the Army do not suffer from this trouble, remembering that even in this country a large number of those serving in the Army are separated from their families?
Separation and his mother's influence as a result too often outweigh the wish to remain in the Army, and the good National Service men will not join, nor will the experienced five or seven-year man stay, unless he can be sure of good quarters. We must help these men, and part of the solution to this problem must be the provision of many more suitable quarters to house officers and other ranks with their families at home and especially abroad. The money voted for this purpose must be spent wisely. Every care must be taken in the selection of sites, the design and particularly the sound construction of these houses.
There should be a revision of payment rates for quarters—quarters allotted by

rank and payment fixed by rank. Payment should be for the type of quarters occupied. As it is necessary to save land, flats could be built, with advantage to all. Rents must be fair. I think that the practice of raising the rent of his house when the man receives promotion is unfair. I was talking to a warrant officer recently on this subject. For some years he held the position of second warrant officer and on promotion to first warrant officer he had to pay a substantial increase in rent for the same house that he had been occupying for the last two or three years. That sort of thing tends to make men feel very unkindly disposed to my right hon. Friend and Her Majesty's Army.
No longer should the Army be left in the position of the "poor relation" among their own and other European peoples abroad. The soldier should not, as so often happens, have to pay very high rents for poor accommodation in bad areas. Stations recognised as family stations must have adequate and good accommodation provided that will enable his family to be accommodated with him, or at least not have to wait six months or more before they can rejoin him each time he is moved.
The provision of funds for work on 974 new houses in Home Command in 1953, and for further work on 2,461 married quarters started before 1st April, 1953, will help to relieve some personnel serving at home from the fear of separation, but more quarters are still required to encourage more Regular engagements The provision of funds under Vote 8 to provide abroad 258 additional quarters to be started in 1953–54 and for the completion of work on 207 under construction before 1st April this year can safely be said to be inadequate, especially since the fear of overseas separation is greater than that of separation at home. The majority of our Regular Army are overseas today and I fear that that will be so for many years ahead.
A great deal has been done to improve the situation, but a tremendous amount has still to be done in that respect, involving much more expenditure before the Army as a career attracts and keeps the number of men of the right type required to complete long-term engagements. Action must be taken quickly in this direction if the well-being of the


Army, their efficiency and long-term economy in the cost of their upkeep as a result are to be ensured. Are the moneys at present involved being wisely spent? In any case these are far from adequate. We have always been justly proud of our Army; they are truly a faithful servant and, like the other Services, they have never failed the nation and never will. The nation must not fail the Army, that guardian of peace who, when ordered, will proceed at once to any part of the world to uphold the honour of our nation.

7.36 p.m.

Lieut.-Colonel Marcus Lipton: In the lottery that we operate from time to time the hon. Member for Dover (Mr. Arbuthnot) has been lucky in the draw. That has provided him with an opportunity of bringing to the notice of the House a very real problem affecting the Regular service element in the Armed Forces. It is true, as the hon. Member pointed out, that the governing factor in all this subject consists of political considerations into which it is not possible to go now. It is the political or international situation which decides, or will decide, where our permanent overseas garrisons are to be stationed.
Admitting this to be the overriding factor, we nevertheless have a duty to perform, and that duty has been not inadequately discharged by the hon. Member for Dover and the seconder of the Amendment in choosing the subject of married quarters. The problem of married quarters has a very decided effect upon recruitment for the Regular Army. I am sure that a number of very useful men have been deterred from joining the Regular Army simply because they were not sure what would happen to their wives and families, if they were married, and, if they were unmarried, because they were not sure what the position would be if and when they got married while fulfilling the terms of their engagement.
The problem is of importance because of its pronounced effect upon recruiting. I am sure that if it were possible for the War Office to guarantee to every man joining under Regular engagement that he would be provided with married quarters we should have a very substantial increase in Regular recruiting.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Would my hon. and gallant Friend apply this proposal also to the Home Guard?

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: I do not know whether that is covered by the terms of the Amendment now before the House. It may well be that, subject to the permission of Mr. Speaker, it may be possible for my hon. Friend to ventilate this and other problems related to the Home Guard. That is not a matter on which he can fairly expect me to pronounce judgment.
I was saying that the effect on recruiting would be considerable. If we can increase the Regular service element, to that extent we can bring nearer the day when we may dispense with compulsory military service. National Service is a regrettable necessity and the sooner we can dispense with it, and depend upon an adequate number of reasonably happy and contented Regular soldiers, the better.
The hon. Member for Dover referred to the effect on morale, and the disquieting statements about the consequences of long separations on the matrimonial happiness of soldiers overseas. He quoted some alarming figures of the number of applications for legal aid in divorce proceedings from men serving in the Middle East. I know that statistics are kept of the number of applications of this kind, and I hope that the hon. Member gave previous notice of this matter so that we may receive a reply. I hope that on this and other matters to which he referred I may have an assurance that such preliminary notice was given by him.

Mr. Arbuthnot: On that matter.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: That is something. On so many occasions in the past when we have discussed Army Estimates, the Minister has replied that careful note has been made of points and that in due course the necessary information will be provided. But we have never found what was the information, because if it was conveyed at all, it was in the form of a personal communication to the hon. Member concerned.
The position is all the more serious because of the large proportion of our Regular Forces serving overseas. At no previous period in the peace-time history


of this country have so large a proportion of our Forces been stationed overseas and so small a percentage at home. I view with alarm paragraph 42 of the Memorandum relating to the British Army of the Rhine. It states:
Special attention has been paid to financial economy… Considerable reduction in the number of requisitioned properties, for which rent is payable, has also been effected, with a consequent reduction in expenditure on public utilities.
I wish to know whether this will reduce the number of married quarters available to the men serving with the British Army of the Rhine. New B.A.O.R. headquarters are being built which will cost £12½ million. When I questioned the Minister about it, I was told that this sum was not a charge on British funds, but formed part of the occupation costs. I accept that. But the purpose of these vast headquarters is to provide accommodation for personnel, and I wish to know whether there is provision for married quarters.
I have referred to the question of married quarters because I do not wish it to appear that the interest in that subject is confined solely to one side of the House. So far as I am aware, there is no party issue in this matter; all hon. Members desire the utmost possible to be done to provide these necessary facilities for men serving abroad.

7.47 p.m.

Major H. Legge-Bourke: I agree with the hon. and gallant Member for Brixton (Lieut.-Colonel Lipton) that the question of the provision of married quarters ought not to be a party matter. But the right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) expressed views which have a considerable party bearing on the whole problem of the provision of married quarters in the Middle East. I wish to speak particularly on that subject, as I believe it is the most difficult of all the overseas welfare problems.
The right hon. Member for Dundee, West said—and I take it that he was speaking for his party—that there were only two alternatives; either that we completely evacuated the Canal Zone or we embarked on the re-occupation of Cairo. That is certainly clear enough as to where he thinks we stand.

Mr. Strachey: The hon. and gallant Member will remember that what I said

was that we had to come to an agreement with the Egyptian Government. That was the first alternative.

Major Legge-Bourke: I quite understand that the right hon. Gentleman said that, but he did say he saw no alternative to the general acceptance of the principle that we should totally evacuate the zone unless we were prepared to reoccupy Cairo.
I believe it absolutely vital to the interests of this country and of all those people who want peace, that we should have a base somewhere in that area. I believe that there is nowhere else for such a base except in the Canal Zone. The right hon. Gentleman will probably not agree. It is no use pretending there is no party dispute about this, because there is considerable dispute about it.
I want to consider, first, what needs to be done and, secondly, where in the Middle East we must do it. I assume that most of us regard the Middle East as being absolutely vital not only to this country but to the British Commonwealth and, indeed, to the peace-loving world. Unless those who are prepared to preserve our way of life have a base in that area, there is no hope of our being able to carry out our undertakings to preserve peace. That is the premise on which I base my remarks. Hon. Members opposite may not agree with it, but that is the premise.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Will the hon. and gallant Gentleman agree that, whether we remain in the Canal Zone or not, there is a problem of married quarters which must be tackled and, as far as possible, solved irrespective of strategic considerations in the Middle East?

Major Legge-Bourke: This is not the first time the hon. and gallant Gentleman has interrupted me. If only he had waited two minutes he would have found that is precisely what I propose to talk about.
My hon. Friend the Member for Dover (Mr. Arbuthnot) has done a most useful service tonight. The subject of married quarters is one which impinges upon almost every other aspect of well-being in the Army. Certainly, we know that the existing situation is far from satisfactory. In the Canal Zone I suppose that


rarely have so many of our troops been so concentrated in an area so extremely unpalatable to them.
Some people seem to think that if one goes to a hot country it is rather nice to live in a tent. But having lived in the Middle East in stone and brick buildings, in Nissen huts, concrete huts and in tents, I have come to the conclusion that there will never be a substitute for a properly built stone or brick building. However pleasant it may be in the early spring when the khamsin wind is not blowing, a tent can never become a home in the true sense of the word. Approximately 80,000 troops are in the Canal Zone. That is an over-concentration of men in an area which was designed to take, at most, about 10,000.
That is a matter to which we must give serious consideration whatever may be the final outcome of the negotiations with the Egyptian Government. I am convinced that the time is limited in which we can continue to expect that number of troops to live in the area without something being done about the conditions in which they live. That does not automatically mean that we must evacuate that area as a base. That is a different matter. What it means is that if we want to stay there with more men than the number for which the accommodation was originally designed we must spend some money, in the area or somewhere else, to provide the accommodation. That is the problem which I want to study.
Before we decide to spend that money, we should make sure that we are spending it in the right place. We are told in the Memorandum:
In the Middle East building has been inevitably delayed by political uncertainty; nevertheless a new cantonment for one infantry brigade has been started in Cyprus.
I should like to know how much money is to be spent in Cyprus on new buildings. What is the value of the new building to be started in Cyprus this year? What is the total value that that amount is intended to reach when all the buildings proposed have been completed? How many troops, or approximately what number of formations, can we expect to be accommodated in the new buildings? This is a matter of really vital importance.
As I said earlier when we were discussing the supply of jet aircraft to the Middle East, Cyprus seems to be a dangerous place in which to put much faith in the event of war. I say that because Cyprus is an island within fighter reach of the mainland. We know that now Turkey is a member of N.A.T.O. That in itself is most advantageous. In the north we hope that Turkey will be on our side in the event of another war. But what about the rest of the mainland in Syria, Lebanon and Israel? Are we certain that that mainland will be friendly towards us?
If we are not, is it wise to build a rather substantial base in Cyprus? That question is of vital importance. We should make up our minds on this subject. Islands have proved to have a limited use as military bases in war. The more atrocious the weapons of war become, the more unsuitable islands seem to be as bases.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Would the hon. and gallant Member include this island in that statement?

Major Legge-Bourke: I should indeed. It is one of the reasons I think that all of us ought to be doing our best to avoid another war. It is one of the reasons some of us on this side of the House have such a burning resentment against hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite who tried to suggest at the General Election that we wanted war. I know that the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) does not want one. He is a pacifist. He would demobilise everybody. He would not call up any builders. He has said all that before. However, I do not propose to be led away from my main argument to discuss whether or not England would be a good base in war.
I cannot think of a much more unsuitable place in which to build married quarters or a large base for an Army than Cyprus, unless we have made sure beforehand that the mainland all round, or on two sides, is certain to be with us. That is an absolute prerequisite. My belief is that even then Cyprus is not big enough for us to build married quarters and base depots sufficient to maintain the sort of garrison we have in the Middle East now.


One of the most encouraging comments made by my right hon. Friend was when he said that there were now signs that Transport Command of the Royal Air Force was being stepped up a little to keep pace with the need to be able to move our troops rapidly from place to place. That is good news, but it is very late. I should have thought that the right hon. Member for Dundee, West, when he was Secretary of State for War, and with his previous air experience, would have been able to achieve something more than he did in that direction. I do not put on him the whole blame. I realise that he was merely one member of the Cabinet.

Mr. Strachey: indicated dissent.

Major Legge-Bourke: He was not a member of the Cabinet when he was Secretary of State for War, but when he was Minister of Food.

Mr. Strachey: The hon. and gallant Gentleman has got my career wrong. I was Minister of Food before I became Secretary of State for War and in neither case was I a member of the Cabinet.

Major Legge-Bourke: It does not always follow that because one is in the Cabinet before one will necessarily be so afterwards.

Mr. Strachey: I was never in the Cabinet.

Major Legge-Bourke: The right hon. Gentleman was never in the Cabinet, but that is immaterial to the argument. The right hon. Gentleman was supposed to be a member of the Government.

Mr. Ede: He was a member of the Government.

Major Legge-Bourke: He was a member of the Government and I should have thought that he had some opportunity to provide alternative means of conveying troops to various parts of our Empire and the lines of communication that we have to maintain. That would avoid such a great need for married quarters. However, we are making some progress towards that end now, and I suppose that all of us hope that it will not be necessary for a great number of years to maintain as many troops in the Middle East as we are maintaining at present.
As I see it, we shall have to maintain a considerable number of troops in the Middle East for a very long time indeed, and it is perfectly obvious at once that there is an inadequate number of married quarters in the area where we need to have them. Where, then, are they to be built? My own feeling is that they will have to be built in the Canal Zone, and of all the unpalatable areas of which I can think there is none to equal it, unless we go further down the Red Sea to Aden, or even across the Sinai Peninsula to Akaba, where, I understand, we have a small sub-unit of one of the battalions now in the Canal Zone.
What are we to do to make life a little more tolerable for our troops in the Canal Zone? First, we must give them married quarters, but, even if we do that, we still have to do something else as well. What we have to do, I believe, is to take a leaf out of Mr. Butlin's book and provide some of the amenities which go with the type of holiday camp which we have in this country. I would not put it beyond the bounds of possibility that the War Office might get in touch with Mr. Butlin to see what they can do about it together. Not only will it be necessary for the families of married troops, but it will also be necessary in order to keep the morale of our troops, who are actually looking after stores at the level at which they should be maintained.
At present, I understand that even the leave ships to Cyprus have been stopped, and that the wives of many of the men now in the Canal Zone are living in Tripolitania. What an awful position in which to place a man. He gets the opportunity, in his turn, of coming back on leave to the United Kingdom, but his wife and family are in Tripolitania. Obviously, he feels that his first duty is to his wife and family, but by going to see them he misses the opportunity of going back, in his turn, to the United Kingdom. That seems to me to be an absolutely intolerable state of affairs which we should not allow to go on very much longer. I think it arose from the Abadan position, when more troops were moved from North Africa into the Canal Zone as a matter of urgency, because of a situation which had suddenly arisen.
I suppose that there is a continuing state of tension in the Canal Zone and elsewhere which can only be solved by a


new agreement, but nevertheless, I still believe that there must be a limit to the time during which this state of affairs should be allowed to continue. There are some men among the 80,000 troops we have there who are married and who have families in another overseas station, and it is quite wrong that these men should themselves have to decide whether they should go home to the United Kingdom or visit their families in another part of the world. These men should be given an assurance that they will get their full entitlement of leave in the place in which they are entitled to have it, and that place is back here at home, or, alternatively, that they can have their families with them in the zone in which they are serving.
There is the further question of where we are to find the money with which to do all this, and that perhaps is the biggest problem of all, although there is one suggestion which I should like to make. Last year, when we were discussing the Army Estimates, in company with the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget), I criticised to some degree the tank policy which we are following at the moment. I would say that this tank policy is crazy, from the long-term point of view. I am only using this point as an illustration to show one direction in which we could find the money that we want to spend on building married quarters. I know that I must not go into the question of tank design.
I can only say that I greeted with horror the statement of my right hon. Friend this afternoon that we are now going into production with an even bigger tank than the Centurion. As the hon. and learned Member for Northampton pointed out last year, in the same way as the knights in armour have passed away the tank is also on its way out. To be embarking on the production of a tank for which no landing craft has yet appeared which is capable of holding it and which no bridge in Europe will bear is absolutely idiotic.
Here, there seems to me to be an opportunity of doing far more good with this money by providing the men and their families in the Canal Zone with proper married quarters, and, as I believe that repetition is the only way of getting anything done by a Government Depart-

ment, I hope we shall face up to the fact that, even before we begin producing equipment which we could not produce in sufficient quantities in time of war, we should certainly think again about tank design.
I would far rather see the money now being spent on tanks heavier than the Centurion employed in building married quarters. The expenditure in this direction is buried in the Estimates in the figures concerning warlike stores, which amount to £69,400,000. I understand that the Centurion tank costs about £63,000, and what the new one will cost I dread to think, but, obviously, more than £63,000. It seems to me that we could do a great deal of building with the money to be spent on a few of these tanks.
I know that the hon. Member for South Ayrshire would like to see this building done in South Ayrshire, but I should prefer to see it done for the troops who have volunteered or whom we have called up and are now in the Canal Zone, and so that their families can be properly looked after. I do not think that they are being properly looked after with the married quarters at present available.
Finally, the Middle East is to me an area which is absolutely indispensable to the peace of the world. If we move out of it or weaken our position in it, it can only mean that peace has been weakened with our going. We have to spend a lot of money in that area, not only on suitable barracks for our troops but also on married quarters, and it is upon married quarters that I am particularly concentrating at the moment. I hope that what was said by my two hon. Friends earlier in the debate will bear fruit, and that we shall see the amount of money being spent today on married quarters, which, I fully admit, is considerable, being something like £7 million, very materially increased.
I believe that one of the best ways of providing that money is in the way I have suggested, by economising in the very heavy type of tank.

8.9 p.m.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: I have often listened to the hon. and gallant Member for the Isle of Ely (Major Legge-Bourke), but never with such a measure of agreement as I have


done today. He has even reached the stage of advocating married quarters for South Ayrshire, and I certainly think it would be safer, in view of what the hon. and gallant Gentleman said about the strategic value of islands, to build them in that part of the world than in the Isle of Ely.
I certainly associate myself with what the hon. and gallant Gentleman said about obtaining the money for married quarters by diverting it from the other Vote. The hon. and gallant Gentleman was absolutely logical. He pointed out that, in view of the fact that the Secretary of State told us that tanks were on their way out and that we now have an anti-tank gun which will make the tank obsolete, it is ridiculous to spend £63,000 on each of these tanks. I endorse his argument that the money would be better devoted to the provision of married quarters.
But married quarters where? I cannot follow the hon. and gallant Gentleman in his argument about the Middle East or Cyprus. The Foreign Secretary is negotiating an agreement which will result in our leaving the Canal Zone sooner or later. At a time when our Treaty provides for that withdrawal from the Canal Zone, surely it is a shortsighted policy to advocate building stone houses there. It is not very economic to advocate building stone houses in a zone which we propose to evacuate. Although I agree that the money should be transferred from building tanks to building married quarters, I cannot see that it is wise to spend it on building stone married quarters in the Suez Canal Zone.
We should emulate the example of that eminent and illustrious military commander, Moses, who evacuated his troops from the Canal Zone and was a most popular commander among his forces. I am quite sure that my proposal—that married quarters for the officers in the Canal Zone should be established in this island—would be far more popular among the officers in the Canal Zone than the proposals of the hon. and gallant Member for the Isle fo Ely.

Major Legge-Bourke: I hope that if the hon. Member visualises evacuation, he also visualises some arrangement for drying up the Red Sea in the event of our wanting to return.

Mr. Hughes: If I make representations to that effect, suitable representations might be made in another quarter by the Archbishop of Canterbury.
In any event, that is not a dominating strategic possibility in the present military situation. Both Front Benches now appear to believe that the Suez Canal Zone can no longer be regarded as a suitable military base for this country. Hon. Members on this side of the House believe that we should withdraw even sooner than is suggested, and even hon. Members opposite do not believe it possible to hold that base for 20, 40 or 50 years. If we were to borrow money for the provision of married quarters in the Canal Zone, presumably they would be financed in the same way as we finance housing schemes in this country, and the repayment period of the loan would have to be 40 or perhaps 60 years.
I agree with the hon. and gallant Member for the Isle of Ely that the number of divorces among soldiers in the Canal Zone is very high, but I suggest that the remedy is to bring the soldiers home. I would apply that remedy to the Middle East in general. The hon. and gallant Gentleman looked all over the Middle East, trying to find suitable bases. He landed on Cyprus. I agree that he did not stay there long. I have been to Cyprus, and I found that the natives were by no means enthusiastic about our having a garrison there at all.
An eminent prelate of the Greek Orthodox Church, the Archbishop of Cyprus, has been in this country expressing the view that the people of Cyprus would prefer to join their fellow compatriots of Greece. If that is the situation, I suggest that Cyprus is not a place where the building of married quarters can be regarded as a sensible proposition, especially in view of the fact that Cyprus is to be a bombing base and, as the hon. and gallant Gentleman said, islands which are bombing bases are likely to receive a great deal of enemy attention. It would be a very grave waste of money if the married quarters which we propose to erect in 1953 were demolished in 1955.
There has been no constructive contribution towards the solution of this problem from hon. Members opposite. The most constructive contribution was that of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member


for Brixton (Lieut.-Colonel Lipton) who said that, in order to stimulate recruiting, Regular soldiers joining the Army should be offered a house. If that suggestion were adopted, instead of having posters stating, "You will be somebody in the Regular Army today"—posters which tax the credulity of those who have been in the Army—we should have posters saying, "Join the Army and get a house," and we should then get an enormous number of recruits. That is the only constructive suggestion which has been made, and it came from this side of the House.
If we are to apply this principle of married quarters in order to encourage enlistment in the Regular Forces, it could equally be applied to the Home Guard. If it were, there would be a rush to join the Home Guard, which would swell to inordinate proportions.

Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison: I suppose that the hon. Gentleman would then say that the Home Guard had a home.

Mr. Hughes: That is precisely my argument. Hon. Members opposite ask where the money is to be found for these married quarters. I ask where the men and materials are to be found.
I asked the Minister of Labour, the other day, how many building workers—presumably needed to build these married quarters—had been called up into the Army last year. The answer was that there had been 10,000 from England and 3,000 from Scotland. I will not digress into the question of housing in Scotland, but if we are to have married quarters on the scale recommended in the debate this evening, I suggest that we must have the workers to build them. I suggest that hon. Members who are keen to build married quarters in this island, which is the only logical place to build them, should advocate with me the exemption of building workers from National Service. The services of building workers who are now called upon to waste their time in the Canal Zone would be more appropriately used for building married quarters not only for Service men but for other sections of the population, too.

8.21 p.m.

Mr. Anthony Fell: I am sure that the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) will forgive me if I do not attempt to follow his argu-

ments too closely. I shall not detain the House for long, but there are one or two points into which I wish to inquire, arising from the Amendment, which calls
attention to accommodation for married officers and other ranks;
and then talks about,
requiring action on high priority in the interests of the well-being of the service, the efficiency of the military machine and consequent promotion of economy.
Under Vote 8—I hope this is the right Vote—on page 134, I see that the Estimate for "Construction and Maintenance Services" for 1953–54 is £32 million, a slight increase over last year. I am not satisfied that the Army is an efficient machine when it comes to a question of its being run economically. I do not think it is possible to denationalise the Services, although I wish it were. Nevertheless, I wonder whether the Army is making the fullest possible use of private enterprise.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Mr. Hopkin Morris): I do not see how this arises under the Amendment to provide married quarters.

Mr. Fell: May I explain how I think it arises? I want to ask whether, in fact, the Army are being efficient in the building of their married quarters, and, therefore, using the money that is voted to that purpose to the best advantage.
My information is very much to the contrary. The Army have a large architectural establishment in London. I do not know, but they may have branches in other places. I am not at all satisfied that that architectural establishment is either fully engaged or engaged efficiently —or that it has been over a period of many years—and I should like to know whether the work is done not only for that architectural establishment but also for the Army by outside architects.
I should also like to be assured that, in this matter of building married quarters for officers and other ranks, the Army are being careful how they spend the money that they are asking for. I am quite certain that they can best do so by utilising private enterprise builders and architects for the whole operation. They can do it very much better and cheaper in that way in the long run, I am quite sure, than by entering into the architectural business and the building


industry on their own account, which, I believe, they have done on quite a large scale—I am not at all sure very efficiently.

8.25 p.m.

Mr. Harold Davies: I do not wish to detain the House very long, but so much of the debate so far reminds me of the general who was watering his flowers with no water in his watering-can when an orderly said to him, "Sir, there is no water in your can," and he replied," It does not matter. They are artificial flowers." So much of this discussion on married quarters could have been included in a defence debate, or contained in electoral promises made by the Tory Party at a General Election—especially all this eulogising of private enterprise. Already 10,000 workers, we have been told, have been taken out of the building industry into the Army, and that does not seem a helpful policy.
Everybody knows that the entire art of strategy has altered completely in this modern age, and all this talk about old-fashioned methods seems rather aimless. The best thing that Britain can do, probably, is to burrow underground—in this age of atomic warfare. We have already been warned by hon. Gentlemen opposite about how dangerous it is in these conditions to live on an island. I do not indulge in the cheap stuff of saying that the party opposite want war. On the contrary, I think they sincerely believe that what they propose will ensure peace, but one may well question that.
Personally, I do not care very much where the married quarters are provided, so long as they are provided, but what really concerns me is cases of the sort of which I had an example only last week, when a young woman with a large family came to me with tears in her eyes, and told a harassing tale of housing hardships. This was in the area of the Leek Rural District Council. She had been living in a tied cottage. It was tied because her husband was a Regular soldier: she had been living in married quarters abroad. Her soldier husband had been serving to the best of his ability —not under private enterprise conditions —but serving his country with all that he had to offer; and he had died. This girl was driven out of her home. She drifted into a little country district and had to live in a two-roomed cottage with four or five children. A widow, she is

running hither and thither seeking a home.
I ask the Secretary of State what he is prepared to do to guarantee for the widows of those men who, serving their country either here or abroad, and living in married quarters, have, through the fate of war or through climatic conditions, to make the supreme sacrifice. What are the Government going to do for the widows of those men—widows who may have children, because that girl I am speaking of cannot get on the priority lists of any local authorities?

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: This is a matter in which I have interested myself very much, and about which I have asked Questions. Can the hon. Gentleman tell me the name of the local authority that has refused to put a serving soldier's wife on a housing list on a priority basis? I know the number that have, and I know the number that have not, and that number is extremely few. Can I have the name?

Mr. Davies: I want to be fair to the local authority. Do not let the House misunderstand me. I did not say that these people are not given priority in some areas. In many areas in Britain, however, although priority may be given, the waiting lists of the priority cases is so long.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: This may be in itself an important matter, but it does not strictly arise on this Amendment.

Mr. Davies: Mr. Deputy-Speaker, I think that this is more relevant to the Amendment that a half of what I have been hearing. After all, we are discussing conditions to encourage recruitment to the Forces. However, I will try to put myself in order. Here is something which I believe the Secretary of State for War should look into, and I think he should help the local authorities to provide accommodation for soldiers' widows, just as help is given in providing accommodation for miners.

Mr. Burden: Would the hon. Gentleman like to know that, as a result of a Question I put to the Minister of Housing and Local Government, a circular was sent to every local authority in this country advocating that the highest possible priority should be given in these circumstances, and that, in fact, in my own constituency——

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: That question goes beyond this Amendment.

Mr. Davies: I know that that is out of order, and that was why I hesitated about giving way to the hon. Gentleman. Circulars may be sent out, but it is wishful thinking to expect that we shall get very far in some areas unless we have a formula from the War Office about providing or allocating to local authorities the raw materials and manpower to help solve the problem. If I talk around the problem any more, however, I shall be like some hon. Members opposite, in that I shall be reiterating statements. I have made my point, and I shall sit down now, warning the Secretary of State, that some of us on both sides of the House will press him to the utmost to deal with this problem.

8.30 p.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for War (Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison): This is the period of the Parliamentary year when we embark on a number of defence questions. Last week we had the broad international picture, with a certain focus on the question of the retention of the two-year period. Today the picture, or the focus, is narrowed somewhat to that of the Army only, and for the moment it is narrowed further on to the question of married accommodation for the members of the Forces.
If the question has become thus narrowed, however, I do not want the House to think that we regard that question as being unimportant. In fact, my hon. Friend the Member for Dover (Mr. Arbuthnot) has put his finger on a sore spot, and one which causes us a good deal of concern. I think the easiest way to answer all the questions that have been raised from various quarters of the House is for me to try to explain the system which is used about married accommodation, because I think that all hon. Members will find embedded in what I have to say the answer to most if not all of their questions.
The importance of a home to a soldier is just as great, though he is a soldier, as it would be if he were a civilian. The problem is probably more acute. The housing question is, as we all know, at the bottom of much unhappiness. The unity of the family, the upbringing of children, the health of the children and,

indeed, of the parents, all depend upon it. So we are guided by a simple objective or aim in all the plans that we make for married accommodation, and that is, to endeavour to unite as many families as possible. I think hon. Members ought to try to distinguish what may not be immediately apparent when I say that, which is, that we may move somebody from a married quarter who is already disunited, through circumstances we can come to later, in order to move a united family into that quarter, the whole purpose being to have as many families united as possible.
The problem is—quite obviously, it has been realised by everybody who has spoken—a very difficult one, with our Forces as dispersed as they are, in Korea, Japan, Malaya, Jamaica, Gibraltar, the Canal Zone. At many of these places at the present moment the normal garrisons are very much swollen, and the continuance in perpetuity or even for a long time of the present strengths of those garrisons is, at least, doubtful.
Who are those entitled—because we have drawn up a list of entitlement—to married quarters? All married men are entitled, except National Service officers and other ranks. But of those—that is to say, Regulars—officers must be over 25 years of age and other ranks over 21 to be entitled to a quarter. For that entitlement our aim is to build permanent quarters for what may be considered to he an enduring need.
Let me examine what arises in the three different categories—firstly, at home; secondly, abroad; and, thirdly, in the Canal Zone, which presents a very special problem, as evidenced by the debate today. The quarters are provided in the United Kingdom by one of four methods—firstly, by building; secondly, by hiring; thirdly, by purchase; and, fourthly, by the provision of temporary hostels. I will deal with building first.
The building is financed normally, and for the greater part, out of the Armed Forces (Housing Loan) Act. That Act provides for money to be made available to the Services to build houses and for the repayment of that money over a period of 60 years, provided that the houses are approved by the Treasury, as advised by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. Approval of these houses depends upon the locality, the


number, size and standard of houses, and is based on the conception that, if one day the Army find that they no longer require these houses, they must be reasonably usable by the local authority.
May I say a word to my hon. Friend the Member for Yarmouth (Mr. Fell), who was inclined to criticise the efficiency of the Army on this matter? A very good yardstick by which to measure our efficiency and costs is the local authority's building costs in approximately the same area—and we do not emerge badly from that test. Further, as my right hon. Friend has said, he has set up four committees of inquiry. One is engaged on just such an inquiry as this, and, no doubt, after my hon. Friend's remarks they will cast their eye particularly on this question. As to the second part of the building programme, if a house is not approved by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government because it is in an isolated area or is cheek by jowl with some barracks, and obviously never likely to be used by an ordinary member of the community, we build it out of our funds under Vote 8.
What are the calculations of our requirement for married quarters in the United Kingdom which we made a few years ago, and which I am bound to admit are rather greater than the figures I am now about to give? They showed that we required 10,200 new quarters in this country. The figures for the new quarters built since then are: 1950–51, 1,257; 1951–52, 2,021; 1952–53, approximately 2,000. Next year we estimate to build 2,000. So we are making some headway in closing this gap. That deals with the question of building at home.
Let me now deal with the second of the two alternatives for providing quarters—the hiring of furnished quarters in the civilian market. When we go into the civilian market and try to hire furnished quarters for our personnel, we normally pay a rent of up to about 5 guineas a week. I agree that this is an expensive way of doing it, but I think that hon. Members will agree that we have to try to find some sort of home for these members of the Army. When we do hire quarters, so that they are Army-provided quarters, we make what is known as a quartering charge for the use of the quarters by officers and other ranks.

Mr. Ede: Can the Under-Secretary tell us how these hired quarters are shared as between officers and other ranks? How many are for officers and how many for other ranks?

Mr. Hutchison: I cannot give the right hon. Gentleman the breakdown of the figures, but I will try and get that information for him. The houses hired for officers are slightly different from those hired for other ranks, in the same way that the houses built for officers are slightly larger than those built for other ranks.
The third alternative is that of purchase. We do not use that alternative very much. It is used only in the case of senior officers, because we do not want to put a burden on the civilian market, which is already overburdened by the demand.
I find that I have the total of hirings. At present there are 4,000 hirings so concluded. I shall still have to get the breakdown of the figures for the right hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Arbuthnot: Does that cover home and overseas?

Mr. Hutchison: It covers home only.
The last of the categories is hostels, which I regard as a temporary and emergency arrangement. At the moment we have 17 hostel camps containing 755 families. They consist of suitable buildings and hutments and are for temporary use while families have a chance to make more permanent arrangements. These hostels are used for families returning from overseas and also for the wives and families of soldiers previously in quarters in this country who have been posted abroad and cannot for the moment find other accommodation. When families were evacuated from the Canal Zone in a hurry a year or two ago and that problem arose, we made special arrangements to hire accommodation in Blackpool for them. We still have provision, should anything like that situation recur, for some 200 hirings of that kind to be made available.
When soldiers are posted abroad we cannot normally allow the family to stay in its quarters because of the general shortage; the quarters would be required for another soldier and his family. That was why I wished to indicate at the beginning of my remarks that one


has always to keep in mind the ultimate purpose of trying to unite as many families as possible. Suppose a soldier has been ordered abroad and his wife and family are in a house, and another soldier, with a wife and family, comes to take over the other man's job. If we allowed the original family to stay where they were, we should then have two separated families.
Consequently, we say to the first family, "We much regret it, but we are afraid that you will have to try to find some other place in which to live." That is the normal procedure. There are two exceptions. The families of soldiers posted to Korea are allowed to remain in married quarters; they are encouraged to find other accommodation, but if they cannot do so they may remain. The same applies to the families of soldiers in the 3rd Division and the 16th Parachute Brigade. The conception there is that they are a strategic reserve which we hope may soon come back to this country and be united with their families.
Families who are no longer entitled to stay in quarters have to try to find somewhere else. If they are unable to make their own arrangements for accommodation, they are normally accommodated in the hostels to which I have referred. The shortest, pithiest and neatest letter I have ever heard of came to my notice the other day. After a soldier's wife who was in a hostel had been informed that she would have to make other arrangements for accommodation, she wrote in reply, "Dear Sir, I remain, Yours truly."
We do all we can to help in these circumstances. We help in trying to find accommodation with local authorities. The reference which has already been made to local authorities by some hon. Members will not be forgotten by us. I have spent a great deal of my time trying to arrange for local authorities to be persuaded to give us a little more accommodation than they are sometimes able to do, but I have no power to do more than bring persuasion to bear on them.
I want to pay tribute to the Soldiers', Sailors' and Airmen's Families Association, which does a wonderful voluntary work. It investigates these housing problems and helps to secure alternative accommodation. It also advises and helps on a wide variety of questions. For example, the other day I went to a hostel

camp near Portsmouth. Very occasionally, the Commandant tells me, tense and acute situations develop among some of the female inhabitants. That is quite understandable when we recognise that they are sometimes of diverse nationalities, their husbands are away and they have not always an awful lot to do. We have seen the heights of vituperation to which the United Nations can rise, so who are we to criticise? In these situations the Commandant sends for the local head of the S.S.A.F.A., whose skill, tact and feminine intuition soon straightens things out. I can think of no more unenviable task, and my gratitude to her is sincere and my admiration unbounded.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: How many of these hostels camps are there?

Mr. Hutchison: There are 17. I stated earlier that there was accommodation for 755 families.
Let us consider the position abroad. When I say abroad I mean everywhere except the Canal Zone because, as I have already stated, that has special and peculiar difficulties. In B.A.O.R., Austria, Trieste, the Caribbean, Singapore and Gibraltar the problem is difficult but not serious. We must remember, when one considers this entitlement to married quarters abroad, that it is not invariably the case that the families want to go out, so that when I tell the House that there are in the first three of those areas, namely, B.A.O.R., Austria and Trieste, 15,000 men entitled to married quarters and that there are 9,675 families there—which does leave a gap—we must not assume automatically that all those families who are not out there want, in fact, to go.
In B.A.O.R., Austria and Trieste the quarters are obtained from the authorities on lease, or are requisitioned. The hon. and gallant Member for Brixton (Lieut.-Colonel Lipton) asked me whether a reduction in the powers of requisitioning in Germany was going to mean a reduction in married quarters. It is not. The total number of married quarters will remain at least as high. In Korea no provision has been made. I think the House will agree that it would be highly undesirable —quite impossible in fact—to have families in a theatre of war of that kind.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Before the hon. Gentleman leaves the subject of B.A.O.R.,


may I remind him that I put a question about the new headquarters. I asked him whether those headquarters included married quarters of any kind?

Mr. Hutchison: There will be married quarters, some of them requisitioned, in places adjoining or close to the new headquarters. I cannot tell the House bow many, but obviously it would not do to set up such an establishment without some married quarters being available for the people who are to compose the staff of the new centre.
In Hong Kong and Malaya there is a considerable shortage. Such accommodation as we have there is available in the form of permanent quarters or temporary quarters, while others are procured by hiring. The temporary quarters vary in type of construction in that theatre. The total entitlement to married quarters there is about 6,500 and the number of families who are united is 3200.
In all overseas theatres except Germany and Korea entitled officers and other ranks can hunt independently for accommodation. This is not quite as bad as hunting for the proverbial needle in the haystack, because it is surprising how often members of a family, particularly the husband, succeed in finding something. Where accommodation is found and a man proposes to bring his wife and family to live in it, he has got to get the authority of the local G.O.C.-in-C. for his own protection, because the place might be insanitary or he might be mulcted too heavily. If he succeeds in finding these married quarters and in getting them approved, we allow the family to come out on a free passage to join him.
In all the theatres with which I have dealt—and it applies also in the Canal Zone, to which subject I shall be coming shortly—there is a universal points system. Obviously where quarters are scarce we must have a method whereby those that are available are parcelled out fairly. A separate roster is kept for officers and other ranks.
This points system depends upon four factors; firstly, length of separation from the family—which applies to anyone who has been separated from his family; secondly, length of service and seniority; thirdly, size of family; and fourthly the

family's housing conditions at home. I was glad in a recent debate to hear the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) say that he had been out in the Canal Zone and had gone carefully into the points system, and had come to the conclusion that it was fair. There are one or two minor adjustments to the scheme that we are considering making at the present time.
In Belgium we have a new base, where 100 families are already in hired quarters. We plan to build 150 new quarters. When hired quarters are taken by the War Office at home, they are almost invariably furnished. When they are taken abroad, we make War Office furniture available for those who go into the quarters.
I was asked whether I would consider the question of extending the three-year tour of duty abroad, which has been incorporated recently as the policy for the units of the Royal Armoured Corps and the infantry, to the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers. We are examining at the present time the question as it applies to the Royal Artillery, but the Royal Engineers are not a sufficiently homogeneous unit or series of units to make that possible. I would point out to my hon. Friend who asked the question that there is a limit of a three-year tour overseas whether for the unit or for the individual man.
Now I would come to the most poignant question of the lot, the Canal Zone, which, as everyone has realised, is in a very artificial condition. Quarters which were originally designed only for a brigade are now asked to house more than two divisions. In addition to that, some quarters which did exist are now beyond and outside the protected area, and have had to be given up. I say frankly to the House now, as I said the other day, that no permanent plan is possible until the whole Middle East question has been decided. Whether we consider Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, Cyprus or anywhere else in the Middle East, the whole thing hangs upon the one big solution.
I make no bones about it; the position out there at the present time is quite unsatisfactory. We have a requirement for some 9,000 quarters; this would give a full entitlement if we could get all those


quarters. But we have only 187 permanent quarters. 244 temporary quarters. 310 hired quarters and hostel accommodation for 370. I have been asked about Cyprus. At the present moment we have in Cyprus 42 permanent quarters and 275 hired quarters, while 70 quarters are just about at the completion stage and will be added to those already available.
Finally, I have been asked—and there have been notices in the Press—about the unhappy situation in the Canal Zone giving rise to a great deal of domestic home unhappiness, and whether it is true that there are 40 divorces a week among families with husbands in the Canal Zone, as has been stated in the Press. I am glad to say that the figure is nothing like that at all. The Army legal service, who supply free legal advice in cases like this, get application for legal advice amounting to something less than 10 per cent. of that figure, which has been wildly and unhappily exaggerated. The proportion of those applications which comes from the Canal Zone is no greater than that which comes from other theatres.
What are we going to do to try to meet this general situation? Obviously the main sore is in the Canal Zone, and I have explained to the House that we can do nothing permanent until the big question is decided. We are examining the use of demountable houses which can become, as it were, part of the baggage of a unit and accompany the unit wherever it goes. I am told that the Americans have made considerable headway in that respect, and we are examining the position to see whether we can do anything by which the soldier takes up his house and walks.
There then is the general problem. It is filled with poignancy. It is complicated by an unstable world and it is sharpened by lack of funds. We have not solved it, I know, but what solution is possible until we attain some stability? I can assure my hon. Friend and all who have spoken this evening that the question is ever present in our minds, and we intend to go on trying to find the answer.

Mr. Arbuthnot: In view of what my hon. Friend has said, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

8.56 p.m.

Mr. R. T. Paget: I find this a depressing occasion——

Mr. Wigg: Mr. Deputy-Speaker, the hon. Gentleman has asked for leave to withdraw his Amendment. Is the Amendment withdrawn, or not?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: No, the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) wishes to continue the debate on the Amendment.

Mr. Paget: No, I was continuing the general debate.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Then is it the pleasure of the House that the Amendment should, by leave, be withdrawn?
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Main Question again proposed.

Mr. Paget: I am extremely sorry, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. I should have waited.
I find this a depressing occasion, because it seems to me that our defence situation is so much worse than it was this time last year. Then the Lisbon Agreement was freshly made, now the Lisbon Agreement is in pieces. We have an Army which is not equipped with a modern rifle and the modern rifle is not forthcoming; which is not equipped with the modern anti-tank equipment and that equipment is not forthcoming. Indeed, there is a very heavy cut in the programme of material for the Forces. This seems to me to be an alarming situation.
In 1950 the Government which I have the honour to support adopted a defence programme which, in the prices of that time, was expressed as £3,600 million. It was to be spread over three years and I do not believe that anybody on any side of the House will believe that this party adopted that lightly. It meant surrendering many projects which were very near to our hearts, but we did it because we believed that it was our duty to provide for the defence of our country and of the free world. Prices inflated after Korea. The cost of that programme rose to £4,700 million, but we were still resolved to carry it out. A few members of my party disagreed with that, but the majority of us accepted it as our duty and it was accepted as the duty of the nation by the party opposite.


In the Election the party opposite pledged themselves to carry out that programme, and when the nations of Europe met at Lisbon to consider our defence problems they did so on the basis that we were carrying out the defence programme which we had announced. And as lately as the Morecambe Conference the Labour Party pledged themselves to support that programme.
Some Members of my party disagreed. My right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) believed that we should have a lesser programme. To the amazement of most of us, in December, quite suddenly, we learnt that the Prime Minister and the Government had been converted to my right hon. Friend's opinion. His policy became, without a word of explanation, the Government's policy. The figure which my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) had suggested in the debate on the Queen's Speech—a cut of £250 million in the material part of the programme—became, within a few millions, the policy of the Government. Surely we are entitled to some explanation. We have not had one yet.
What, of course, really happened was that the Government had found what had been discovered by their predecessors in the 1914–18 war and in the late war. They had found, quite simply, that they could not carry out a major armaments programme with an uncontrolled economy. That issue was fought in the 1914–18 war. Mr. Runciman and Sir John Simon, as they were then, were the advocates of the free economy as against Mr. Lloyd George and the present Prime Minister, but it was found that the effort necessary for our security could not be achieved within the limits of "business as usual."
Precisely the same experience occurred during the last war, and during the last year the Government have found that they could not provide for our safety in a cold war any more than they were able to do in a hot war within the terms of "business as usual." They were faced with the alternative to do their duty and abandon their ideas to liberate the economy—to denationalise transport and to denationalise steel—and, on the contrary, to tighten up the controls and rationing or to fail in their duty.
Faced with that alternative they shirked their duty, adopted the defence policy of my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale and pursued their party interests. That is what we have seen occurring during the last year, and since that occurred the European Defence Community has been in disintegration. That is the contrast with the situation as it was a year ago, with the will which had been exhibited at the Lisbon Conference, with the will to defend Europe.
What have we now? Neither France nor Germany has ratified the E.D.C. agreements. Not one of these countries has performed their Lisbon undertakings any more than we have. If our will to survive proved inadequate, if our leadership went as it did go this year, then it became tragically clear that the will of Europe would go too.

Mr. Ian Harvey: Would the hon. and learned Member not agree that if his party had had their way, their Government would not have ratified the German Treaty either?

Mr. Paget: No, I would not agree. Our party were in favour of ratifying the agreement. The only issue which we took was that it was technically inadvisable to ratify at that particular time. If the hon. Member looks at the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Grimsby (Mr. Younger), who spoke on behalf of this party, he will see that the whole issue was one of timing.
Whether the timing was right then or not, personally, on this issue, I happened to agree with the Government. I thought it was right to give the lead at that time. Perhaps I was unwise and it would have been more effective to give the lead later. But we could not give the lead when we were abandoning our defence programme. That has been the whole difficulty here and it is in the light of this loss of will that we have to face this situation.
Various excuses have been put forward. At one time I think the Prime Minister suggested that the foreign situation was less dangerous. Can any man seriously believe that? Since this programme was launched the atom bomb has been developed by the Russians. Does that make our situation safer? Since that time we have seen in Russia the decks being purged and we have known what that meant before. Also, we have seen the


change resulting from the death of Stalin, the change in the Russian leadership. That may be for our benefit;. on the other hand, it may not. Can anyone seriously suggest that the situation today is safer than it was in 1950?
It has been said, "Ah. this policy was economically impossible." That was the case put forward by the Prime Minister in the defence debate. That is nonsense. As the "Economist" in two articles, has pointed out, it is complete nonsense. The programme which we put forward was rather less than a quarter of what we achieved in 1944 in the defence effort. It was too great to be performed within a free economy, but if we were prepared to make sacrifices that were necessary—we could not go on the basis of "business as usual"—it was within our power to execute the policy to which we have pledged ourselves and which we accepted as our duty.
Instead of that we spend foreign exchange, about the same foreign exchange content as that involved in what we have abandoned, in buying meat in the Argentine. It may be said that meat makes a people more vigorous. Those who believe that should visit Israel. There, they will see a people the vast majority of whom have not tasted meat for four years. They have had the will to survive, but it appears that this Government have preferred meat. It is a dangerous, unhappy situation with which we are faced, but within the realisation that the present Government will prefer "business as usual" to the defence of the country, we must take a realistic view of what we are to do with our Forces. It does not leave an adventurous policy available to us. We cannot pursue empire when we have not the will to carry out the defence programme which is being accepted.
Look at the situation in Egypt. What troops have we there? What would we do were the Russians to put down an airborne division here in England? It is within their absolute power. What could we throw against them? A flying column from the cookery school? There is nothing else.

Mr. Birch: There is the Home Guard.

Mr. Paget: The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence says

there is the Home Guard. Does he really think that the cookery school, even reinforced by the Home Guard, could fight a division of air-borne troops? It is a terrifyingly dangerous situation. In those circumstances, how can we seriously contemplate a war in the Middle East? The idea is farcical.
Once the defence programme is abandoned we are left with no alternative but to recall our legions and that is always a depressing prospect. However, there is one thing which is a good deal worse, that is to recall those legions too late. We need a mobile reserve in this country. Should the great war, which we all dread, break out, we need troops capable of defending the base. They are not here and they must be recalled. This Government have failed in their duty to provide that defence.
We must also be prepared to make the best use of lighter arms. The whole cut in the defence programme has been made upon materials. Within the "business as usual" concept men can be afforded better than materials which industry has to produce. It is vital that equipment should be provided which enables larger bodies of men to fight. A far higher priority should be given to the production of a rifle, whether it be standardised or not. A far higher priority should be given to providing anti-tank weapons for troops who are not supplied with tanks. They are cut in this programme and I urge that the seriousness of our situation should be realised.
The people should realise the extent of our surrender in abandoning our defence programme, and the nonsense talked about the Middle East and about imperialist ideas. It should be realised that these things are now beyond our power, and, I am sad to say, beyond our will.

9.14 p.m.

Mr. Ian Harvey: I listened to the speech of the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget), with amazement. Not least was I amazed at the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede) who nodded his head in what I took to be a nod of approval, and not of anything else.
We are to understand from the hon. and learned Gentleman that whereas we are all Bevanites now he and his hon. Friends apparently are not. We are to


understand that had the Labour Government returned for another period of office, or, rather, had they returned to continue the original period which they decided to forsake, they would have increased their armaments programme at the expense of the social services. If that is what he is saying, then he is either speaking for himself alone or, if he is representing the views of his party, the whole of the election programme put forward by hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite was a base hypocrisy. I assume that there must be some support for the view the hon. and learned Gentleman put forward, from the head-nodding of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Shields.

Mr. Paget: The hon. Gentleman and I, who speak from the back benches, speak for ourselves; but if he asks me what my opinion is I must tell him that had we been a Government we should have carried out the programme which we were pledged to carry out and had assumed as a duty, and we should have placed upon the economy controls which alone would have made that policy practicable.

Mr. Harvey: Like the hon. and learned Gentleman, I speak for myself. Perhaps the difference is that I speak in unison with a large number of my hon. Friends whereas he has some difficulty in finding unison on his side of the House. I would ask his hon. Friends whether they endorse what he has said. I ask right hon. Gentlemen on the Front Bench opposite whether they feel that they would have bad the full support of all hon. Gentlemen on their side of the House in the programme which their hon. and learned Friend outlined.
The hon. and learned Gentleman said that no explanation had been given from this side of the House about the abandonment—that is his phrase and I shall deal with it later—of the programme of the Socialist Government. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister made it clear that he acknowledged the courage of the previous Government in introducing the programme, but in the normal course of development and planning it had become obvious that it was a practical impossibility for technical reasons. Therefore, certain adjustments had to be made. That is a straightforward and reasonable explanation.
The question of abandonment brings me to some observations made during the defence debate and this debate by right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite. One abandonment has been that indicated by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), who has stumped the country until this debate saying that we must reduce National Service from two years to 18 months. Now, by a peculiarly clever formula, for which I have no doubt that the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition who leads the party opposite with such skill was partly responsible, the right hon. Gentleman goes into the Division Lobby in agreement with hon. Members opposite after the defence debate. But his argument then was very different from the argument which he adduced in the country.
The argument the other night—and this applies very much to this issue of National Service—was that there should be an annual review; but he had already made up his mind before the review had been made.

Mr. Wigg: I associate myself with the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell). I am sure that he stands by what he said on the previous occasion. He said that in his judgment a cut is possible, but that there should be a review which would establish that a cut was possible. There is no change at all.

Mr. Harvey: I concede to the hon. Gentleman the self-appointed adjutant to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Easington that he knows better than I do what the right hon Gentleman thinks. But my recollection is very clear. The right hon. Gentleman definitely said in the country that National Service could and should be cut. Unless we first have a review, it is not very easy to know how it can and should be cut. I think the arguments produced in that debate and also produced in this debate are incontestible. There is no case for cutting National Service, and let us therefore return to the very remarkable speech of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War, because it was remarkable in that it was made when he had a considerable temperature—higher than that of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Easington—and he has returned to bed from which he so courageously arose to make his speech today.


I think we should congratulate him upon the form of the Memorandum which has accompanied the Estimates, and we also particularly welcome the innovation of the reports from various theatres which give us a very clear picture of the situation prevailing there. The issue with which we are confronted is the balance between commitments and resources, and the point which I think escaped even the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) is that the commitments with which we are confronted are not commitments of our own choosing but have been dictated by the initiative of a potential aggressor. If there is any doubt on that subject, the speech of the hon. and learned Member for Northampton should convince anyone on that issue.
As has been rightly outlined both in the Memorandum and in the Defence White Paper, as well as in the debate, these commitments fall into the perimeter commitments under the United Nations obligations and in regard to the Commonwealth, and those on the home front, and we have to balance these commitments with the resources that are available to us at the present time. The most important of these resources is undoubtedly our Regular Army. The right hon. Gentleman and his predecessors opposite are to be congratulated on the fact that the Regular Army has been consistently build up over the past few years. I should like to say a word on this subject, because I have been a strong critic of the publicity employed by the Regular Army in the past, and I should like to congratulate my right hon. Friend on the very much improved publicity for recruiting for the Regular Army, which I think is not wholly unconnected with the appointment to the War Office of Mr. Sidney Rogerson, whose expert advice is shown to have had a most salutary effect upon this situation.
Next, there is the Territorial Army, which we have discussed to a certain extent in this debate. It is a matter of grave concern that there are not enough senior n.c.o.s coming forward in the Territorial Army at the present time, because the general development of all our Armed Forces must depend upon rapid expansion through the Territorial Army. If the Territorial Army itself is not capable of bearing the brunt of that expansion, then the

whole system is open to a grave defect, and the fact that there are not at the moment sufficient senior n.c.o.s coming forward is a very grave defect, not only in the Territorial Army itself but in the whole system.
Finally, there is the highly important element of National Service. I have already dealt with the question of the proposed reduction of the two-year period of service, and one of the questions that has never been answered by any speaker on the other side is where the reduction is to take place to enable us to reduce the period of service. The right hon. Member for Dundee, West made a remarkable speech in the defence debate. He indicated —and he developed this theme today —that the point of reduction was to be in the Middle East; but, as both he and the right hon. Member for Easington know, the two spheres in which National Service men are most required are those of Korea and Malaya, and those are the places which, geographically, make the reduction of the period of National Service quite impossible. I do not want to pursue the political arguments about the Canal Zone, which seemed to me a little dangerous, but I submit that there did not seem to be a recompense in the right hon. Gentleman's argument of anything like enough men to envisage the reduction in the period of National Service which has been proposed from time to time.
I agree with the hon. and learned Member for Northampton that the present situation is depressing in that we have to spend such a large percentage of our national income in this way, but I would not agree with him that it has not greatly improved over the last two years. In my opinion, that improvement is due to the efforts of both parties, and it is regrettable that there is a tendency in certain quarters from time to time to make political capital out of the statement that the situation has improved in order, first of all, to suggest that we should reduce our National Service commitments and, secondly, to suggest that volunteers should not be forthcoming for the various very important voluntary organisations which make up our national defence resources.
The Secretary of State for War is to be complimented upon his insistence on strengthening the scientific aspect of our Army. It is true that it lacks what the Minister of Housing and Local Government would call a "panache," but it


seems to me that it holds the key to the future development of our Army. The most important thing which we have to consider tonight and in the future is how, if at all, we can stop this ascending spiral of expenditure. According to the hon. and learned Member for Northampton, there is no way of stopping it, and, if there were another Labour Administration, it would be increased. I agree more with the right hon. Member for Dundee, because I think that there are ways in which the expenditure can be steadied. The most important way is to see how we can provide less extravagant means of defence in certain quarters. It is also highly important that, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War has repeatedly said, we should ensure value for money.
There is one sphere which has not been mentioned to any considerable extent, although the right hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger) touched upon it and the hon. and learned Member for Northampton made rather scornful reference to it; and it is the home defence of this country where, I believe, we can make a much more profitable start with some of the methods which have been envisaged by the right hon. Member for Dundee, which could eventually begin to effect certain savings in our defence arrangements. I do not mean that these developments are immediate or imminent, but they ought to be considered most seriously.
The defence of the home front falls at the moment on two main military contributions, the first of which is ground defence. Under the present strategy, it seems improbable that there will be Regular Forces of any dimension available for the defence of the home front, and I share with the hon. and learned Member for Northampton some scepticism about the effectiveness of the mobile columns, to which a certain amount of undue importance has been attached.
The hon. and learned Member for Northampton then referred to the Home Guard. The Home Guard has been greatly bedevilled by political controversy, and the hon. Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt), who, I believe, is to take part in the debate, has been largely responsible for bedevilling the Home Guard by his attitude. I suggest that a

great responsibility can rest on the Home Guard.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the main and most influential critic of the Home Guard has been Lord Beaverbrook's "Evening Standard," which said the Home Guard was useless and should be disbanded and its members put to dig for food on the allotments?

Mr. Harvey: I am surprised to see that Lord Beaverbrook has a new ally in the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes). I am by no means convinced by the quotation of that authority—any more than I was convinced by the hon. Member for Aston. The combination of the two is interesting, especially when it is accompanied by the hon. Member for South Ayrshire.

Mr. Wyatt: I am flattered by the suggestion that I, by myself, have managed to bedevil the Home Guard. All I did was to prophesy what has, in fact, happened.

Mr. Harvey: In view of the fact that the hon. Gentleman had been entrusted with a high position in the last Government, responsible for conducting military affairs, his views, rightly or wrongly, were taken far more seriously in the country than perhaps they are in the House. However, he now has the assistance of Lord Beaverbrook and the hon. Member for South Ayrshire.
If I may take this matter a little more seriously, I would ask my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War to consider very carefully the real position of the Home Guard. I believe that the Home Guard today is in exactly the same position as the Territorial Army used to be. I am certain that the right way to treat the Home Guard is to regard then as part of the Territorial Army, who will step in when the Territorial Army is mobilised to take its proper place with the Regulars, and I would submit to my right hon. Friend that the whole matter needs basic reorganisation, that the Home Guard are too far out on a limb, that they are organised too much on the basis of the last war, looking backwards instead of forwards, and should be more closely associated with the Territorial Army and given the place they fully deserve in the military organisation which we are planning.


I would turn now to the more controversial and more difficult field of antiaircraft. The right hon. Member for Bassetlaw dealt with that in passing. I think that we have to look at that most carefully. The Minister of Supply got into some trouble before the last war for making some observations on this subject. However, he has not suffered too seriously as a result, and I am moderately encouraged by his present position to make some similar observations myself. In so doing I realise, and I am sure all hon. Members realise, that we are confronted in this particular field by this fact, that there has been extreme development—development which is referred to very modestly in the White Paper in paragraph 85 on guided missiles.
We have to consider in anti-aircraft strategy against what are we defending this country? It is a fact, so far as guided weapons and atomic weapons and rockets are concerned, that not a single one of the anti-aircraft weapons in operation at the end of the last war is of the slightest good. There is a very serious factor here from the point of view of developing and training Anti-Aircraft Command. Today, quite a lot of money—and that is an understatement—is being spent upon the completion of heavy anti-aircraft gun-emplacements which, in my humble submission, are not likely to be of any considerable value at all in defending this country against the sort of attacks which we have to expect. That is one aspect which concerns me very considerably.
Secondly, we are still talking about the development of the 40 millimetre gun as an anti-aircraft weapon. It is true that the 40 millimetre gun, with certain developments, will still be valuable for the defence of ground troops against low flying aircraft, but I would submit that the proper handling of those weapons would be by the infantry; that they should not be in the hands of the artillery, but that they should be transferred, as the lower calibre anti-tank gun, so that the troops on the march are self-protected from tank and aircraft attack.
Believe it or not, people are still talking about searchlights, yet searchlights, as instruments of anti-aircraft defence, will be useless. We should really stop talking about searchlights in this connection and get rid of them. One of the most serious aspects of this, I ask my hon.

Friends to believe, is that the men who are keen on this defence system are men who have had some experience of antiaircraft work, and they know that these things are now obsolescent; and it is an insult to men's intelligences to ask them to train with equipment which they know, in the development of hostilities, will be useless, or, at best, of very little value.
I therefore ask my right hon. Friend to consider very carefully whether the vast expenditure upon manpower and equipment for anti-aircraft defence is, in fact, necessary or desirable, and that he should carry out a very complete and courageous review of this whole situation.
I understand that there must be a point at which development outstrips practical operation, and that it is necessary to draw the line and to say, "This is the point of development which is one of practical operation. We realise we have already advanced a long way further on the drawing board, but we draw this line, and at this point we shall bring all operational troops into line." I submit to my right hon. Friend that that line is drawn too far back in too many spheres of our military developments—drawn not at 1950 but drawn at 1945; and I ask him to consider this matter very carefully, because by economising in unnecessary expenditure we can make the contribution to the implementation of the principle of getting value for money, which he and the Government have outlined in the defence White Paper.
We realise that in this White Paper a programme is laid down, despite what the hon. and learned Member for Northampton may have said, which envisages continuous and increasing expenditure. It is essential in the long run that we should try to find a solution which will reduce that expenditure, and that drain on our manpower. I am sure that the eventual solution from the point of view of our Army is to produce the maximum power per man by high mobility and by increased fire power, and I agree entirely that the quicker that we find a solution with regard to the rifle the better. I think that in that way it will be possible to obtain greater results with fewer men.

Mr. Paget: Surely the hon. Gentleman realises that what he is saying involves a higher expenditure upon


equipment and a lower expenditure upon manpower. That is precisely the opposite to what the Government are doing.

Mr. Harvey: Unlike the hon. and learned Gentleman, I do realise what I am saying and the implications of what I am saying. I say that in the long term that is what we have to do in order to break through the continuous spiral in which we have involved ourselves. That is a very long-term measure.
For the time being this problem will not be solved by the various suggestions which have been forthcoming with regard to cutting National Service and cutting expenditure, although the hon. and learned Gentleman is a distinguished lone wolf in that particular direction. Eventually, we must aim to mobilise the "know-how" of this country to the best of our ability, and that will involve having a voluntary organisation in the Territorial Army, quickly expandable on our regular set-up. We must also see that very large number of men going out of the Service and becoming older are available still to our Army.
For that reason, I hope that my right hon. Friend will succeed in his project of reorganisation and recruiting for the Home Guard, no matter how strong the opposition may be from various orthodox and unorthodox quarters. I trust that he will make a special effort to strengthen the Home Guard, which, I am quite satisfied, has a highly-important part to play in the future structure of our Army.

9.42 p.m.

Mr. Michael Stewart: I should like to follow for a moment the serious paragraphs in the speech of the hon. Member for Harrow, East (Mr. Ian Harvey), in which he remarked that it was very difficult for us to see quite what we would be up against in the event of another war. I am afraid that my quotation has not quite the elegance of the original phrasing, but I think that was the point he was making.
The Secretary of State for War, in his speech, made a very brief reference to an exercise which is to be held later this year, the purpose of which will be to discover something about the effect of atomic weapons upon tactics. I very much hope that we shall, in due time, hear a good

deal more about that, and that the right hon. Gentleman himself, when that exercise takes place and when he has studied the results of it, will accept the view that something very much more than military tactics will be affected by the development of atomic weapons.
It will call into question such problems as the comparative size which the three Services ought to bear to one another. One of our great difficulties all through this debate is that all of us, in discussing whether the Army ought to be of this size, or of this kind, or ought to have this or that equipment, have to make a large number of unproved assumptions about the nature of any future war. At present, I doubt very much if anyone has a very clear idea of what the nature of that conflict will be.
It is commonly supposed, I think, by the public at large that a future war will be much more greatly affected by scientific inventions than in fact it will; but it is right to say that we are living in an age when the rate of new invention is much faster than it has ever been before. I hope that later this year we shall be given, so far as is compatible with security, some account of what conclusions can be drawn about the effects on warfare of modern weapons. I believe that they are likely to be extremely far-reaching, and we may have completely to revise our ideas as to what kind of expenditure is sensible. The hon. Member for Harrow, East mentioned one or two instances.
It is possible that we shall find that those forms of expenditure which ought to be retained turn out to be the exception rather than the rule. By the nature of the subject, we cannot at this stage say any more about it than that, beyond begging the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues to give very great attention to the problem and not to allow themselves to be influenced by the entrenched interest of certain Services and certain arms, and not to permit those interests to deflect national defence from the direction in which the best modern knowledge and judgment would point it.
I do not believe it possible at the present time to effect a reduction in National Service, and I want to make that quite clear. At the same time, it is extremely important that neither this Government nor any other should, out of


a mistaken notion of prestige, nail to their mast the flag of "Two years' National Service, whatever the conditions may be." The Statement on Defence said that the period was to be reviewed "from time to time." It is not clear what "from time to time" means, except, apparently, to judge from the behaviour of the party opposite in the defence debate, that, whatever it means, it does not mean "from year to year," which was the proposal of the Opposition. It may mean "from decade to decade." If hon. Members opposite do not accept one or other of those interpretations, it would be interesting to know what was meant by "from time to time" in the Defence White Paper. I took the view that it meant "from time to time."
I will now give one or two reasons why it is important that no Government and no party should nail any flags to their mast on this subject. In the first place, it is always possible to comb and re-comb one's tail. Having stood at the Dispatch Box as Under-Secretary, I know well enough that a number of light-hearted suggestions are often made about how one can save a very large number of men. I have often wished it were possible to do as much by reducing the number of batmen in the Army as some critics have supposed.
I believe it to be true of all armies of all nations in all ages that they have a tendency, if not watched carefully, to waste manpower in every way. In his "War and Peace," Tolstoy remarks that one of the difficulties which had always faced mankind was that, by nature, none of us wants to work but, on the other hand, we all have a feeling of moral guilt if we do not, and the great advantage of the profession of arms is that it enables one to reconcile those two conflicting opinions.
There is no one solution to the problem of avoiding waste of manpower in the Army. The only thing is for whatever Government is in power to exercise the most ceaseless vigilance over the size of establishments and the way in which men's time is used. That is why I feel it would be a good thing if it were up to the Government of the day year after year to make their case for the retention for the period of National Service. If the Government had to do it in a set

debate today I believe that they could do it, but if Governments were required to do that from time to time it would keep them on their toes and ensure that the military machine was kept on its toes about economy in the use of manpower.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: There are two points I wish to ask the hon. Gentleman on that. What would be the position of parents and the boys themselves who would not know whether next year, as a result of a new decision, the youths would not be called to the Colours? How could anybody make plans under those conditions? Then there is the other aspect of the same problem. How could the War Office possibly assess the strength of their Forces for two, three or four years ahead if they knew that it was dependent each year on a decision taken in this way?

Mr. Stewart: I might ask how are people going to make plans if the period is subject to review from time to time. [HON. MEMBERS: "It is for five years.") Oh, no, it is not. What the Government asked was the retention of National Service for five years. The period of National Service is subject to review from time to time. How can the War Office and parents make any plans at present in the knowledge that the Government of the day can reduce the period of National Service at any moment? That is the position at present, and if it is possible for plans to be made in the present situation, it is possible for them to be made in the case of an annual review.
Moreover, if the Government had an annual review they would be in an extremely strong position to refuse to discuss the matter merely in response to public opinion between the time of one annual review and another, and if they are worried about the War Office making plans, how is it possible to make plans about weapons if the Government can suddenly and without warning reduce the amount that is being spent on equipment in the manner described by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget). However, Parliament cannot base its work on the assumption that plans must be made for the Service Departments and the powers of Parliament fitted in to the nature of


the plans so made. It has got to be the other way round. That is just the risk of someone whose lot is cast in working in one of the Service Departments.
The Secretary of State mentioned the possibility of doing more in the way of air trooping. He himself realises that here is an avenue through which certain economies in manpower can be accomplished by reducing the number of men in the pipeline; and if a greater mobility of men is achieved, it is possible to maintain security with rather smaller garrisons because each can be reinforced much more rapidly.
There is also the possibility of the greater use of colonial troops, and in that respect I would ask the hon. Gentleman who is to reply to the debate to clear up one point. Mention was made of the recruitment of colonial troops, but I think that by no means covers all the colonial troops referred to in the Secretary of State's figure in Vote A, because I find that the number of colonial troops, including a brigade of Gurkhas, will be 2,000 less than last year. I am not suggesting that there is necessarily a discrepancy between those figures and what the Secretary of State said. All I am saying is that there is a point here that does require to be explained. There, again, is another possible way—I say no more than that—of meeting difficulties arising from our manpower situation.
It should also be noticed that we bear a heavier burden of National Service than most of our fellow members of the Commonwealth or partners in the North Atlantic alliance. I know quite well that that is not a reason for saying we should do less; indeed, it is the reverse, but it means that the Government should make this fact and the feelings of our people about it known to our fellow members of the Commonwealth and our partners in N.A.T.O.
In view of those considerations, one obviously cannot say that the two-year period is sacrosanct at all times and in all places. Further, we have to consider the balance of desirability between the numbers of men we have at any one moment and the degree of training of the reserves. At the moment there is two years' full-time service, followed by a period in the Territorial Army, during which a man does a fortnight's camp a year.
There are obvious advantages in a man's doing not a fortnight but a three-week camp a year, and I invite the Government to consider this point. I put it no higher than this: can they say what their reactions would be to the proposal that men should in future do three weeks' Territorial camp instead of two, and serve 21 months' full-time service instead of 24? Obviously the Government have more knowledge on that subject and can comment upon it more effectively than can any private individual.
I have made reference to the Territorial Army, and I should like to agree with the tribute paid by the Secretary of State to those men in the Territorial Army who have made the present magnificent development of our reserve Forces possible. Nearly everything that the Secretary of State said today demonstrated the essential soundness of the conception of the Armed Forces which was held during the years following the war to the time when the right hon. Gentleman took office.
I hope that will have been noticed, particularly by some of the more responsible Conservative propagandists who tried to maintain during that period that the policy of the Regular Army was being destroyed, that National Service was producing merely a collection of Boy Scouts, that the nation was not getting value for money and that the rising generation was being ruined by mollycoddling Socialists. We now know, from the statement and the Memorandum of the Secretary of State for War, that all that was pure rubbish, as he himself, to do him justice, always knew it was.
On this question of reserves, have we very much information from the White Paper and the speech of the right hon. Gentleman as to how those reserves would be equipped if, in the very near future, it were necessary to mobilise? I can by no means agree with much that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) said. I think he overlooked one point. When the original £4,700 million programme was introduced it was explicitly stated that the programme was subject to very important qualifications about what was economically possible. I agree with him that if the programme is to be modified it ought not to be done in the jerky manner in


which it has been done, and that we ought to have more explanation about the modifications that are being made and the form they are to take.
All we know at the present time is that there is a substantial reduction in arms and stores compared with what was originally intended, but that the number of men will be much the same. In view of that fact, have we any certainty that the very large figure of our reserve Forces is backed by adequate equipment? What would be the position if it became necessary for the services of those men to be immediately called upon? We ought to have more information than we have had on that point.
While on the subject of weapons and equipment, I would say a few words about the.280 rifle. If I have the words of the Secretary of State correctly, he said he hoped that the new rifle will retain most of the advantages of the.280. It is to retain most of the advantages of the.280, but he said nothing to suggest that it possessed any special merits of its own. The implication of that phrase clearly is that it is an inferior weapon to the.280 but we must accept it because it seems the only way of getting standardisation. If there is anything to compensate for the fact that it does not retain all the advantages of the.280, I wish the Secretary of State had told us what were those compensations.
What, in any case, were the objections to the.280 rifle? One, I believe, was that it was considered not to be a sufficiently lethal weapon, that its penetrative power at certain distances was considered not to be sufficiently great. In fact, although I believe that objection was raised, I do not believe it had any substance in it. However, I have never heard any other substantial objection urged against the.280 rifle as a weapon. It would appear, then, that, in effect, what the Government have decided to do in the endeavour to get standardisation is to agree to get an inferior weapon when a superior one could have been secured. I doubt very much whether that was the right decision.

Mr. Ian Harvey: What is the point of having a superior weapon if there is no guarantee that we can supply it with ammunition.

Mr. Stewart: I do not think there is the least difficulty in supplying it with ammunition. It is not necessary to have standardisation of a weapon among all the nations in an alliance in order to have adequate supplies of ammunition. Moreover, if we had been able to get standardisation on the.280 that difficulty would have solved itself and we should have got as near to having the best of both worlds as one ever can in human affairs.
My criticism of the Government is that they did not stand out in order to secure both for us and possibly for our allies the excellent weapon which British inventive genius had created. However, it may be that the conference described to us by the Secretary of State may produce a weapon which will be as good as the.280.

Mr. Hutchison: May I clear up that point now? What I believe my right hon. Friend said was that there was every indication that the new compromise rifle would retain the exceptional performance and features of the.280 and would be in no way inferior.

Mr. Stewart: Yes, there is every indication that it "will be in no way inferior." That still leaves us in the position that the best possibility we can hope for is getting something as good as the.280, but any mention of a compromise means a compromise between the.280 and something less effective. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] If I am proved to be wrong about that, we shall all be delighted.
I hope that when the new weapon emerges the Government will give hon. Members of this House the same opportunities for seeing its performance as were given to hon. Members by the last Government. If we find that what has emerged is a superior weapon, I shall be the first to proclaim the fact and congratulate the Government [An HON. MEMBER: "Or equal."] Yes, or equal. At the moment, because of the considerabl delay, all we have are hopes and possibilities, and for those a really excellent weapon has apparently been sacrificed.
I wish now to refer to one or two quite small matters—soldiers' grouses—which will probably cause some of the more hard-bitten military members of the House to laugh heartily and to regard this as very small beer indeed, but I


shall not be put off by that. The Government have recently decided to proclaim an amnesty for deserters, and I shall without difficulty manage to keep my enthusiasm for that proposal within reasonable bounds.
If we are to have an amnesty for those who for any reason have abandoned their duty, and particularly if we are to have it at a time when we are asking young men who have performed their duty of National Service to go on the register for another five years, there is a heavy burden of responsibility on the Government to see that they do the best they can for those young men who have not deserted but who stay and do their duty. I shall make no apology for mentioning even the smallest grouses voiced by young men in the Army from time to time. I have always endeavoured to try to keep in touch with this kind of thing.
As one might expect, one finds that some of the men say that they are worked much too hard and others say that they are not worked anything like hard enough. I believe that in many parts of the Army both of those complaints are true. There is a tendency—the Under-Secretary should keep an eye on this—when young men first go into the Army to delight in making their life and training, not only as rigorous, but as positively unpleasant, as possible in order to show them just what life can be like.
That may not be a universal practice, but it does happen in some units. There are men, for instance, who are required to get out of bed at half-past four in the morning merely to demonstrate that with really good discipline men can be got up at half-past four in the morning without complaint. [Interruption.] I said that some of the more hard-bitten military Members would laugh at this but I do not propose to be deterred.

Mr. Nigel Fisher: Mr. Nigel Fisher (Hitchin) rose——

Major Sydney Markham: rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. Two hon. Members cannot speak at the same time. Mr. Fisher.

Mr. Fisher: Can the hon. Gentleman say what unit gets its men up as early in the morning as that without any object for doing so?

Mr. Stewart: I am not mentioning the units here—[HON. MEMBERS: "but I shall tell the Secretary of State. The young man who made that complaint wrote also, when he had been in the Army rather longer, in very glowing terms of what his life was like then. He wanted to make it clear that he had no grouse against the Army as a whole but that that particular thing seemed to be silly and unnecessary, and I agree with him. [An HON. MEMBER: "It does not happen very widely."] Perhaps it does not occur very widely, but looking round the Army one finds a certain number of pieces of absolute nonsense here and there, and it is part of the job of Ministers to see that those pieces of nonsense do not take root and multiply.
Another not uncommon complaint is that when the period of training is over—this occurs, of course, much more frequently with men stationed in this country than overseas—and the men are put in the places where they are supposed to be in what is to be their regular position in the Army, they do not appear to be occupied anything like fully enough. I know quite well that all complaints of this sort often relate only to a few units, but if Ministers do not keep a sharp eye on them the general standard of efficient administration in the Army goes down.
The idea that it does not much matter what a young lad who is doing his National Service thinks may become widespread in the Army, and it is against that that I am appealing to the hon. Gentleman to be on his guard. I say the hon. Gentleman particularly rather than his right hon. Friend, because Secretaries of State always have to concern themselves with matters of high policy, conferring with their colleagues in the other Service Departments, and so on, and it often falls to the Under-Secretary to look at the Army not so much as a fighting machine, but as a collection of human beings.
It should also be remembered that National Service men have precious little money until the last six months of their service. I hope, therefore, that we shall not hear any more complaints of the kind that have cropped up from time to time of men having compulsory levies made on them for what ought to be charitable subscriptions. This matter was brought to the attention of the hon. Gentleman


in a Question. It came to my attention in connection with another unit, and this also is the kind of abuse that it ought to be made quite clear is not to be allowed in the Army.
The same applies to the collection of barrack damages as a lazy substitute for finding out who really was responsible for damage. It should be remembered that National Service men have precious little money in their first months, and life should not be made more difficult for them in those respects.

Mr. Hutchison: It is quite wrong to suppose that the Army resorts to barrack damages if there is any chance of finding the culprit who is responsible.

Mr. Stewart: The hon. Gentleman is a very brave man if he will answer for every commanding officer. I repeat that I am not suggesting that these things are the general rule in the Army, but I am giving examples of things which occur from time to time, and I beg the hon. Gentleman to be on the look-out against them. When they occur they are recounted by one man to another and, possibly, they bulk unduly large and affect a man's opinion towards the Army as a whole.
Another thing which might be looked at is the quality of instruction given by n.c.o.s I am inclined to think that the Army today know as much about the technical job of giving instruction as any university or seat of learning in the country and when they are doing their job at their best they are doing a very good job indeed. Not always, however, are n.c.o.s themselves sufficiently acquainted with the best methods of instruction, and we find that the job of training new recruits is done in a heavy, dull, repetitive manner for which there is no need if the commanding officer sees to it that the n.c.o.s are well trained in their job.
I hope that the hon. Gentleman will give special attention to the position of boy soldiers in the Army. A few months ago there was a case where a number absconded, and I do not think that would have happened if their conditions of life and work had been what they should have been and could be if all Army administration were equal to the best Army administration.
I have put these points forward in the hope that the hon. Gentleman will look into them. He goes round visiting units. It has long been a question of what effect a Ministerial visit has. I remember once in a unit being asked to inspect the food. I was assured that this was the food they normally ate from day to day. I ventured to inquire of one young man what the food was like as a general rule and he said, "Oh, it is fairly good. Of course, when a brigadier comes along it is very good. Today it is just about average." [Laughter.] I am obliged to hon. Members who appear to think that funny, but on one occasion I told the story to a brigadier and he could not see anything funny in it at all.
It is true that if it becomes known that what are popularly called V.I.Ps.—whether civilian or military—are interested in the prevention of particular abuses, that helps create a general atmosphere which is unfriendly to the growth of those abuses. I remember how once it was explained to me, when it was important to prevent the mis-handling of vehicles, that the thing to do was to collect together a body of very senior officers and give them a short course which would enable them, whenever they went round inspecting, to ask what sounded really knowledgeable questions about how to care for a vehicle. Once it became known that when so-and-so came round he was sure to ask what the vehicles were like, the result was a rise in the general standard of the care of vehicles. That is one way in which both military V.I.Ps. and Ministers have made themselves useful.
I say again that even though these matters I have raised relate "to isolated and particular cases, they are the complaints of men trying to do their duty in the Army, and they should have some attention.

10.15 p.m.

Mr. Frederick Gough: I am glad of the opportunity to follow the hon. Gentleman the Member for Fulham, East (Mr. M. Stewart). The last time we debated together was at a famous public school in my constituency, of which the hon. Member is a distinguished old boy. We did not debate the subject under discussion this evening, but we used all the tactical weapons of political warfare; and if I may use the expression which he


used earlier, the boys of his old school rather "combed his tail."
I do not want to pursue the rather narrow tactical matters which the hon. Gentleman discussed, but rather the question of manpower. When my right hon. Friend opened the debate I was reminded of the days of my youth; not those days when I was learning mathematics, but earlier than that. My brother and I were brought up in our early youth by an aunt who was affectionate, though somewhat austere. I seem to remember that every afternoon we were regaled with a large, unappetising looking piece of bread, and on the same plate was a small, but reasonably sized pat of butter. We were told that the bread and butter had to be devoured, and we could deal with the matter as we liked.
I used to scrape the butter evenly over the bread and eat it. My brother, on the other hand, put practically no butter on the bread, but kept a little on which to put the pat at the end. He called it his "saint's reward." In later life he became a Regular soldier. I do not know whether that explains anything. But he did keep a strategic reserve, and today we are suffering from a lack of a strategic reserve in the Army. We have our various commitments all over the world, and although it is not my intention to follow the right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) on that matter, I think we have most seriously to consider whether it is wise to have virtually no strategic reserve in this country.
We could quite easily start to form a strategic reserve on a modest scale by recalling our Parachute Brigade from the Middle East and, whatever the cost, providing it with the necessary tactical aircraft. We should then have a strategic reserve, however small, to cover our various commitments all over Europe, and the Middle East, and even further should occasion arise. I admit that I have mentioned this matter before; indeed, I made it the theme of my maiden speech. We could go further and build up an airborne division, and by doing that I believe we could cut down some of the commitments we have which involve little parcels of troops in Trieste and places in Austria. We could do that if we could have even one division as a strategic reserve capable of lightning speed in moving to the various points

where unrest may occur. I earnestly ask my right hon. Friend and my hon. Friend to consider that.
I now come to our other reserves, the troops we have in this country. I am sorry that the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) is not in his place. He talked of the mobile columns which the Prime Minister formed during the early days of this Government. I am sure that the hon. and learned Gentleman would be the first to realise that it is a pity that he referred to them in somewhat degrading terms—as cooks' columns or something like that. I was engaged in one battle where we had to form an ad hoc company of signallers, cooks, batmen, and so on. They fought as well as anybody else.
Today, when we find ourselves very short of troops on the ground, it is most important to build up the morale of these mobile columns. Indeed, it is a great responsibility on my right hon. Friend and on the War Office to see that these columns receive adequate training. I hope that these troops are receiving really first-class field firing training in musketry. It is not much good administratively forming these columns which can be called out at any hour to meet airborne troops who may arrive anywhere if when they get there they do not know anything about the rifles which are in their hands. I hope that an assurance may be given that the training in small arms of these troops on the home front is being carried out and that the men are given the impression that their role is of vital importance.
I speak as one who has served for a number of years in the Territorial Army. I was rather concerned after reading the White Paper on defence and hearing my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister speak about the Territorial Army. There is no doubt that today the Territorials are at the crossroads. Those who came back after the war and gave their services as senior officers and noncommissioned officers have now begun to indicate that they want to have a rest. Who can blame them? Very largely, the difficulty is that the impossible was attempted. An attempt was made to weld on to the Territorial Army the auxiliary Army of National Service men.
A great deal has been said about the 29 per cent, of the National Service men


who have volunteered for the Territorial Army. But if we look at the position from the other point of view, we see that 71 per cent, of the National Service men have no use for the Territorial Army. I was most interested in the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow, East (Mr. Ian Harvey). It might well be worth pursuing further the suggestion that the Home Guard and the voluntary section of the Territorial Army should be more closely merged and, on the other hand, that those National Service men just completing their service but not having any special wish to volunteer for further voluntary service should be put somewhere on the same lines as the Z Reserve. They should do their annual training. Perhaps they should do weekend training with local Regular troops or local training establishments.
The voluntary element of the Territorial Army should be merged with the older people of the voluntary element of the Home Guard. The whole of that system, with the spirit of voluntary service, which, after all, has served this country well for many years—with the old Volunteers going back to the Boer War, the Territorial Army which came to the colours at the beginning of the First World War and that Territorial Army which took part in the Second World War—should be kept on one side, and not be merged in this auxiliary or National Service system, which is quite a different thing.
May I end on a slightly different note, also touching on the question of manpower but in regard to retired officers? I was able to put a supplementary question a week or so ago to my right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour about the difficulty of employing ex-officers, and not only ex-officers but also former rank and file, and particularly senior warrant officers and n.c.os. I think the question of the date of retirement should be investigated. It is strange that, in every other walk of life, men of 45 or 50 are considered to be quite reasonably young and more than capable of taking on an administrative job.
Why is it, then, that so often men who have done quite reasonably well in the Army are suddenly retired out of the Army after 20 or more years' service and are thrown on the employment exchange

of the civilian world, where they find it very difficult to get employment? I believe that if any hon. Members would come with me to the War Office, we should find dozens of young men sitting at desks—young men who are there because it is the only way in which they can get their promotion—filling up jobs which could quite well be done by men of 50, 55 or 60.
I believe that the time has come when the Army must realise that its ideas about retirement must be more in keeping with the normal ideas of civilian life. We cannot afford to take men at the age of 50 and put them into retirement. The expectation of life of a man of 50 is, on the average, over 20 years, and we cannot afford to throw such men out of employment when they are doing a good job and put them on pensions, only to find that they have great difficulty in securing any other job in civilian life. I ask my hon. Friend to consider this question and to see whether we cannot keep these men, both ex-officers and those from other ranks, for a longer period in the service of the Crown.
I compliment my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State not only on his Estimates but upon his excellent Memorandum, which shows that a very great effort has been made during the past year. It also shows what is perhaps the most important thing of all, that the very great spirit of the British Army is just the same as it has been in the past in the testing time of war, and that, if another testing time should come, there will be no flaw or fault so far as the ordinary men in the Army are concerned.

10.29 p.m.

Mr. James Johnson: As a layman, I enter this debate with some temerity, because, unlike so many hon. Gentlemen opposite, I feel that my qualifications are limited, although I have spent some time in a quartermaster's stores. I want to keep to one idea which has been mentioned already by my hon. Friend the Member for Fulham, East (Mr. Mr. Stewart)—the question of Colonial Forces.
The Secretary of State spoke earlier about five battalions, but I cannot square that figure either with Vote A, with the amount of money paid by the Colonial Governments or with any of the total figures contained in the Estimates. I


hope to give some figures to substantiate my opinion that the Minister's statement. while I do not say that it was bogus or even fictitious, takes some swallowing in the light of the facts before us.

Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison: The great majority of the five battalions to which the hon. Member referred are not borne on the Army Vote at all, but on the Colonial Vote. That is why there is an apparent discrepancy.

Mr. Johnson: May I draw the Minister's attention to page 27, where it says:
Provision is made for recovery from the Colonial and Middle Eastern Services Vote of the full cost of local military forces in the West Indies and part of the cost of local forces in the African Colonies.
I cannot square that with the statement in the middle of page 21, which says,
The local forces of the East and West African Colonies, Gibraltar and Jamaica are at present under War Office control and their cost is borne on Army Votes. Contributions towards their cost are received by the War Office and provided for under subhead Z.

Mr. Hutchison: Some of the Colonial Forces are in the War Office Vote and others are borne by the Colonial Vote, for instance, Malaya. A great deal of the expansion has been among those Forces which are borne on the Colonial Vote. The hon. Member must take care in comparing Vote A, which deals with numbers, with the other Vote, which deals with cash.

Mr. Johnson: May I then pass to a wider field? I should like to see many more than five, 10 or 14 battalions. I am in excellent company here, for I am following the path of the Chancellor of the Exchequer who, many years ago, extolled in glowing terms the idea of building up the Colonial Forces, not merely because the educational experience was valuable when the men were demobilised and returned to their villages and tribal societies or even because of the technical know-how and citizenship which they acquired, but also because of the important fact that we should think in terms of a strategic base in East Africa. I am in the excellent company of both the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Foreign Secretary, although I do not go as far as the Financial Secretary who, at one stage of his more ebullient career, even asked for a Foreign Legion.
But I want to see much larger Colonial Forces. This matter was mentioned in the defence debate on Thursday not only by my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) but also by the hon. Member for Abingdon (Sir R. Glyn), and it was not answered at all in the winding-up speech of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, the hon. Member for Flint, West (Mr. Birch), who is now somnolent on the benches opposite. I hope that the Under-Secretary of State will tell us something about the Government's intentions. I shall quote from the "Sunday Times" about the forthcoming conference in Africa on this matter of Imperial defence and raising forces from among the African peoples. It might have been helpful had the Secretary of State mentioned the subject earlier today when he commented on the added number of battalions we had obtained and those we hoped to obtain in the coming year.
Security, like peace, is indivisible, and in my view we need to make imperial defence, and particularly the defence of Africa, a joint affair with the peoples who live in these areas. While some people may think about the Empire as being the source of copper or manganese, and so on, I think that our biggest single asset in the Empire lies in the peoples them—selves and they are largely, to my mind, untapped at present. How can this untapped manpower, particularly in Africa, help not merely themselves but the United Kingdom and the wider Commonwealth family of nations?
In the last war the quality of those men was never in doubt. The name of the East African soldiers will always live in association with the memory of the Burma campaign. There will always live in memory the names of the West Africans, the Basutos, the West African Flying Squadron, the West Indian Regiment, the Fijians in Malaya—first class fighting men all. When hon. Members now on the Government benches were on these benches they spoke in favour of having these Colonial Forces—in those old days; now, in these days, they are unfortunately silent on the matter, and I should like to support the arguments they used in those old days.
The figures are startling. At the beginning of the Second World War the number in the Colonial Forces was 42,000,


but at the end of the war the number was just under 500,000. Of course, they went down again to something like 87,000 or 85,000 by 1947. What are the figures today? If we look at Vote A we see this year we have something like 78,300 in the Colonial Forces; but next year the number will have fallen to something like 75,900. I think that if we take out of that number—I should not care to say how many, really—perhaps some 10,000 Gurkhas, that will leave us next year with a lesser number in the Colonial Forces than there were last year.
The Tories chastised us in the past for neglect of the Colonial Forces. At the moment, I do not think they are doing better. They are by no means doing what we had expected—what they said. when they were on this side of the House. what they would do when they crossed the Floor of the House to that side.
The Secretary of State for War spoke earlier today about "established" battalions. I should like to know what he means by "established" battalions. Does he mean that he has companies here and there, which go to make the equivalent of one battalion?

Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison: I think my right hon. Friend used the word "equivalent." In other words, he meant there were four companies stationed separately which would add up to the equivalent of one battalion, but not concentrated as one.

Mr. Johnson: I am much obliged. Why not double them? I would suggest that we have in West Africa at least one division, that we have another division in East Africa. I do not think it is fanciful to talk in terms of a Catterick and an Aldershot of East Africa, somewhere on the Kenya plateau. I was a little disturbed today to hear the Secretary of State for War mention Kenya in this connection as being in the cold war. Perhaps, that was a slip of the tongue. Perhaps, the hon. Gentleman will tell us, if the right hon. Gentleman did say that, what he meant exactly by saying that Kenya was within the area of the cold war. I was rather surprised to hear that being said.
The next point that I would emphasise is this, that in the two divisions I envisage

there would be all volunteers. I contemplate our having genuine volunteers. Moreover, it is important that they should have a clear idea of what they are serving—and, if necessary, fighting—for. They must not be mercenaries, or even levies, raised by the chief headsman of the particular areas.

Mr. Wigg: The hon. Member has got the Under-Secretary to reveal an important point. Apparently, colonial battalions have only four companies.

Mr. Hutchison: No. I merely gave that as an illustration.

Mr. Johnson: These Africans should be aware of what they are fighting for. I want to quote from part of a speech by the Prime Minister of the Gold Coast. Kwame Nkrumah, at the third meeting of the 1952 session. He said:
If the Minister for Defence or External Affairs were replaced by a representative Minister one implication would be that the Gold Coast was prepared to take over immediately full responsibility for its own defence. The main burden of our defence is borne by the armed naval, military and air forces of the Commonwealth. We possess a very small military force, and contribute only a portion of the cost of it.
The implications are obvious. These people are prepared to take their place in the defence of the Commonwealth and Empire. They are prepared to put their share into the kitty and to play their part in the matter of Imperial defence. We ought not to think merely of Vote A in this Imperial, Metropolitan Parliament, and of raising four, six, or eight battalions. We ought to take a wider view of the African people playing their part alongside us not as Colonial Dependencies, but in line with New Zealand. Australia, and the other sister Dominions.
I also want to quote from the "Sunday Times" of this last week-end. I was unhappy because I did not hear the Secretary of State for War mention this when he spoke about raising battalions for colonial defence. If I had not seen this quotation I was going to suggest this very thing—the matter of a conference between the West African, or East African. people and the War Office. The "Sunday Times" says:
Referring to the forthcoming defence conference between representatives of the West African and British Governments he said…


and the "he" was the Acting Financial Secretary for Nigeria, Mr. Baker-Beall:
Nigeria must be prepared to meet a reasonable share of increased military costs. These had risen by 90 per cent. since her annual contribution of £750,000 was agreed four years ago.
I do not think we need worry too much about asking these peoples to play a larger part and to supply more men for imperial defence. But if, and when, we get these larger numbers we must be sure that the colour bar has gone, and will never come back. Twelve months ago I was speaking to the G.O.C. of the West Africa Command, at Accra, and he praised highly the quality and calibre of the Gold Coast and West African soldiers. He was sending his best young men to Sandhurst to be qualified for the full Queen's commission.
I look forward to the day when we shall have African officers—this may shatter some people who are living out there—and white sergeant-majors. Even more, I suggest that we might integrate some of those African officers into our Army at home. It is interesting to think of Gold Coast officers with the Queen's commission commanding "Geordie" miners out of the pit in the Northumberland Fusiliers, for example. If we have a multi-linguel Commonwealth we must face up to some of the consequences. In the old Indian Army there was a mixing of races and types; so why cannot we have the same thing in the future English Army?
The second argument in favour of a much larger contingent of Africans in the Army is the need for a young, emergent nation really to feel, and to let other people know it feels, that it has become emancipated. The Army is a means of social advance for tens of thousands of young men as well as a place where they can learn such things as soil chemistry, the use of fertilisers and mechanisation of farming. They are taught many things that they will need if and when they go back to village life. They can become leaders of urban life and members of local councils, and provide almost that "shot in the arm" for a society which needs that kind of uplift.
Why cannot we enlist African women? Why not have an African W.R.A.C.? We need women for hospitals and in the wider sphere inside the Army. One of the sad things is the position in which

African men hold their women. We can emancipate these women and make their lives brighter and fuller by enlisting them in this way in the Army.
The Secretary of State told us that there was now better food, discipline and exercise in National Service, and that between 4 lb. and 8 lb. had been gained by young men who had enlisted. How much more could that benefit Africans. I do not want to advocate a full-belly policy, but there are tens of thousands, perhaps up to 100,000 men, in our African Army who could be turned out much better physically and could be sent back to village life to do their jobs more effectively. Is there any political opposition to the idea that the African Army might be what the Indian Army was? It is said that the War Office are not too happy about this idea.
In the past we did not arm our colonial peoples because we obviously feared some kind of insurrection. This view may be held by some people in South Africa; by people like Malan, but I do not think that it is held in Kenya, or other parts of Africa. Could I ask if there is any inhibition at all on the other side of the House against having 50,000 to 80,000 or more, if we can get them, of these young men for the future African Army?
May I just touch upon what may be the objections to this? We may be told at the Dispatch Box later that the scheme would cost money. When the subject was mentioned last year, it was stated on behalf of the Government that to have one division in West Africa would cost £10 to £12 million, or perhaps even more, for housing and accommodation for these soldiers in whatever may be this future base. We were told that it would cost money; money which would have to be found by the United Kingdom taxpayer. But surely it must be agreed that any money found would be well spent and would pay good dividend.
Furthermore, do we really pay so much? Vote A shows that the Colonial Governments pay something more than we do in this matter of upkeep of the Colonial Forces. The figures are here in the Estimates, and I would quote them but for the fact that hon. Members have them and I do not wish to weary the House. I think that something in the region of £13 million is contributed by


the Colonial Territories, and much less by the mother country. Of course, one realises that some Colonies could not pay more. Gambia and Nyasaland could not pay a large subvention towards added colonial Forces.
The last point which I wish to make is the need for getting good officers and n.c.os. in the initial stages to look after and train these battalions; but, given the inducement, I think we could get many good men to go out to Africa to undertake this task. But I think they would have to have better tax allowances and particularly better housing than at the moment. I remember that when I visited Kaduna, in Nigeria, last year one of the largest complaints made to me was that of the living quarters. I was told that they were not very good. Another complaint which can be foreseen, and which we shall have to face up to if our European soldiers are to be contented, is the matter of leave and getting home. One criticism among wives is that they have to come home by sea with their families and that they cannot get an early seat on an aircraft. All these are things which have to be faced up to; but, if they are, then I feel that we should get the right men; men of adventurous spirit, or, if I may use the expression, guts, and even of idealism, for building up this colonial Army in Africa.
One suggestion I would make to those who may say we should not get them quickly enough is that, since I think we have to leave the Canal Zone by 1956—or earlier, some people believe, if we can reach agreement with General Neguib—then why not begin judiciously by taking selected officers and n.c.o.s out for this future African army? Buildings to house them? Well, the Minister of Housing and Local Government has been talking a lot lately about our future export industry in houses. Why not begin by exporting some houses to West Africa?
In conclusion, I think that all here will agree that it would be a good thing if we could get these increased numbers of African colonial soldiers with us in the future, to act as a strategic reserve, both in East Africa and for the wider Indian Ocean basin, as a cadre, core or basis for building up in the future when we may need larger Forces in the event of any emergencies. I am convinced that the

need of this country is the opportunity of the African Colonies.

10.56 p.m.

Colonel Alan Gomme-Duncan: We have just listened to an exceedingly interesting speech from the hon. Member for Rugby (Mr. J. Johnson), made with great sincerity and with great knowledge of local conditions. I have been a soldier for many years and I am particularly interested to hear from the benches opposite such an admirable statement of the excellent work done by the Army. For many years I have been told that they were a reactionary, backward, Blimpish, and thoroughly rotten outfit, particularly the officers.
Now, apparently, the first thing we want for the backward peoples is that they should go into the Army. Today, if anyone wants to learn about fertilisers, he must go into the Army. If anyone wants to learn anything for his country, he must go into the Army. What is it that has suddenly changed the Army from the Blimpish, backward thing it was a year ago to what it is today? I should be interested to hear. [An HON. MEMBER: "Socialism."] Six years of Socialism have done a vast amount of harm to this country and to the world, but that is hardly an excuse for saying that today the Army is better than ever it was before.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Rugby because I am particularly interested in the question of raising an African Army. There is a great deal of commonsense and sound judgment about the suggestion though it is not as easy as it sounds. Of course, 80,000 men could be found easily in Africa, but what does that number represent in officers and n.c.o.s? The hon. Gentleman suggested taking them out of the units now in the Canal Zone. What would happen to the units in the Canal Zone if all those officers and n.c.o.s were taken away?
The fact is that the limitation of raising new forces is the limitation of obtaining officers and n.c.o.s and without them we shall get nowhere. At this juncture, and for many years to come, they must be white officers and n.c.o.s There is no question about that. It is no good pretending that the African in East or West Africa is capable of running an Army on his own at present. The more enlightened of them would themselves admit that,


although some of the wilder ones with a little education think they are able to do it straight away. There is a grave danger that by encouraging this advancement too quickly we may get a top-heavy thing composed of a vast number of native soldiers without the proper n.c.o.s and officers to train and control them.
I hope that the Under-Secretary will be able to give us some encouragement on this question of a Colonial Army in whatever part of the Colonial Empire it happens to come, because I believe now that the great Indian Army has been flung away—flung away, I say Mr. Deputy-Speaker—[An HON. MEMBER: "That is Blimpish enough."] The hon. Gentleman says that that is Blimpish enough, but he must remember the great gap left by the lack of the Indian Army in the defence of the Empire.

Mr. Ernest Popplewell: What would the hon. and gallant Gentleman have done?

Colonel Gomme-Duncan: It is not what I would have done. It is what has been done. We have to find something to take its place. I believe that, cautiously built up, trained and organised, Africa provides the answer. But it is no good rushing it. It is no good thinking that it can be done in a moment. It is no good thinking that we can do it without the white officers and n.c.o.s The important thing is: where are we to get them from?

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Mau Mau.

Colonel Gomme-Duncan: We shall not get them from Mau Mau at all. The hon. Member is talking about Mau Mau. I am talking about building up Africa in the way that the white man has tried to do up to now, which is an example of excellent justice and rule such as the world has never seen anywhere else, in spite of all that is said.
I hope that the very interesting speech to which we have just listened will be dealt with by my hon. Friend when he replies. Although we recognise the difficulties, particularly the danger of rushing too fast at the start, here lies a possible solution to a great many of our difficulties, and I hope that my hon. Friend will have something to say about it or that, if it is not possible to do that at the moment, possibly a White Paper or

something showing how the idea can be developed might be given to us a little later.

11.1 p.m.

Mr. Edward Short: I do not want to follow the hon. and gallant Member for Perth and East Perthshire (Colonel GommeDuncan), but I want to take up a point which was made by my hon. Friend the Member for Fulham, East (Mr. M. Stewart) and which I raised last year in the debate on the Estimates; that is, the question of the scrappiness of the instruction in the Army.
I suggested last year that we should take steps to harness the new teaching techniques which have been, and are being, worked out in the universities and the institutes of education. I understand from inquiries which I have made that the position this year is just as scrappy as it was last year. In some units it is very good indeed, but in other units the standard of instruction is really third-rate.
There are still men who are being bored to death by dull and semi-efficient instructors. The result of this is two-fold, and we cannot afford either of the results. The first result is that it wastes time, and the second is that some men go out not having reached the highest degree of skill and efficiency. With our limited manpower and our limited resources, we cannot afford either of those things. We cannot afford to waste any time, and we cannot afford to have any men who are not fully trained.
Last year, the Under-Secretary of State was kind enough to write to me after the debate and tell me of the steps that were being taken in the Army to improve the standard of instruction. I am grateful to him for taking that trouble, but I am perfectly sure that there are lots of commanding officers throughout the country today who still do not realise the importance of this factor. It seems to me that if a man is not instructed properly in the early stages of his training, that will condition the whole of his service.
The problem in our Armed Forces is, I believe, very similar to our problem in our economic difficulties. The problem is to make the maximum use of our limited resources by trying to make ourselves 100 per cent. efficient. In seeking to make ourselves more efficient, we have


not only to cut out waste of time and manpower in instructing, but we must also cut out waste of manpower in every other way.
We have heard a lot in the last fortnight about combing the tail, and the more often the tail is combed the better, but lots of really grotesque things are still happening throughout the Army. We heard from one hon. Member today about officers' servants. I should have thought that in this age, when it is almost impossible for anybody to get any domestic help even for essential needs. there should not be such an institution as officers' servants.

Mr. Simmons: Hear, hear.

Mr. Short: I do not see any reason why an officer should not clean his own shoes or his Sam Browne. I clean my shoes. Indeed, when I am at home I clean the shoes for the whole family, and I do not see any reason why an officer should not do the same.

Colonel Gomme-Duncan: Does not the hon. Member realise, first, that every officer's servant is a fully-trained soldier, capable of fighting, and, secondly, that the object of an officer having a servant is that he should be turned out ready to look after his men instead of sitting behind to clean the stuff. which he would be doing otherwise, instead of looking after his men? That is the whole object of servants looking after officers.

Mr. Short: That is the orthodox time-honoured justification, but I do not think that it bears examination today.

Major Tufton Beamish: Of course it does.

Mr. Short: In addition to that, I see all over the place in London and in my home city comparatively junior officers being driven about in motor cars. I cannot see any reason why any officer should not drive his own car. Why should he have a driver to drive him about? [Interruption.] It might be dangerous, but most of these young men drive cars in civil life, or could very quickly be taught to drive them. I suggest that the present arrangement is a waste of manpower.
Those are only small things, I know, but there are lots of other things as well. In many ways the Army wastes millions of man-hours every year. There are

grotesque examples in the running of some units. I had an example in my family, only a few weeks ago. On a farm owned by my brother a tank knocked down a gatepost. He complained to the commanding officer. The commanding officer sent 12 men under a sergeant to re-erect the gatepost and they spent the whole morning doing the job.
I believe that if everyone in the Army in command of men would apply to his command the sort of practice which reduces waste to a minimum in industrial undertakings and that if, in addition, the War Office would set to work to make instruction really efficient, a definite contribution would be made towards reducing the period of National Service. I put it no higher than that. I believe that a contribution could be made, because let not the Government imagine that the country is willing to carry on indefinitely with a two-year period of National Service. To most people throughout the country it is absolutely abhorrent and should be reduced at the earliest possible moment.
I want to say a word about one of the most efficient time-wasting institutions in the British Army—the Guards depot at Caterham. I speak with some personal knowledge here. It is a place where intelligent young men go in at one end and come out at the other as tailors' dummies. They are converted from intelligent young men into tailors' dummies——

Colonel Gomme-Duncan: They are prepared to die for you, anyway.

Mr. Short: They are converted from intelligent young men to tailors' dummies by a system which is more stupid and more brutal than anything the Prussians ever had. I will give some examples. At the height of the Battle of Britain recruits in the Guards depot were not issued with or allowed to handle rifles for four weeks until they had learned to slow march.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: They are still doing it.

Mr. Short: They are still doing it. Quite recently a squad in the Guards depot was back squadded and had to do a considerable amount of training all over again because in the passing out parade a wretched recruit said that the Duke of Wellington was the regimental lieutenant-colonel.


Three hours are spent in the Guards depot laying kit out for inspection. At the end of the three hours, if everything is not correct in alignment, both on the bed and down the barrack room, the sergeant or trained soldier gets hold of the end of the blanket and throws the whole lot off and the wretched man has to start to make it all over again.
All this is in addition to what hon. Members opposite know as the "shining parade." For two hours a day the men have to sit on their beds and shine. If everything is shined already they have to shine it still further and they are not allowed to speak. They are allowed to smoke a pipe, but not cigarettes——

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Not cigars?

Mr. Short: A trained soldier in charge of the barrack room is supposed to instruct them in regimental history. This may have been good fun for guards officers in the 1890s, but it is absolutely unforgiveable today. There is a good reason; it is because the officer class in the Brigade of Guards is a closed shop.

Mr. Fisher: We have heard this all before.

Mr. Short: Yes, and hon. Members will hear about it a lot more until it is put right. It is interesting to note that some of the most vicious opponents of the closed shop in Durham are the strongest supporters of this closed shop.
Officers of the Brigade of Guards are a very small section of the community, and, by and large, the least intelligent. The Brigade of Guards is the last citadel of privilege in the British Army. I think, and I say this having carefully considered my words, that it is all the more regrettable that the Brigade of Guards is so closely connected with the Sovereign. It would be an excellent idea if officers from the Brigade of Guards were seconded for a tour of duty with some of the county regiments, and some of the excellent officers in the county regiments did a tour of duty with the Guards.
The Guards depot today is the supreme example of the mentality which an hon. and gallant Member opposite described as "Blimpism." It is a mentality which uses, or misuses, men as though we were at the dawn of the century instead of in

the second half of it. I suggest that what we require is a highly efficient democratic Army in which any boy can rise to the top——

Colonel Gomme-Duncan: He can already.

Mr. Short: —and I suggest to the Minister that if he wishes to leave his mark on the Army he should set that sort of goal for himself.

11.12 p.m.

Mr. Nigel Fisher: I count myself fortunate in being called to follow the hon. Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Central (Mr. Short). Whatever he may say about the Brigade of Guards, and I have no idea with what knowledge he speaks, the fact remains that the Guards depots produce the best disciplined troops in the whole world. They are also the best fighting troops because of the basic depot training which the hon. Member so despises.
I am rather fed up with this ill-informed criticism which we hear year after year, generally from the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) and also this year, I am sorry to say, because it is unworthy of him, from the hon. Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt) in the shape of a lurid article in the Sunday Press. Anyone who has fought alongside or as a member of a Guards unit in battle knows full well that the very things which the hon. Member has criticised have produced those qualities which have stood us. and him, and everyone else in good stead in the past.

Mr. Simmons: Is the hon. Member saying that the county regiments are not as good fighters or as brave men as the Guards regiments?

Mr. Fisher: I say what I have said before, that the Brigade of Guards are the best fighting troops in the world.

Mr. Simmons: And I will say that the Worcesters are as good as anybody.

Mr. Fisher: What is more, in spite of the ridicule which the hon. Member has poured on the depot system, guardsmen are immensely proud of their regiments and immensely proud of the training they receive. They look with sorrow on troops who have not had the benefit of the same sort of training, and they acknowledge that it stands them in very good stead when war-time comes. Even the hon.


Member for Dudley was generous enough to admit last year that they are the best troops in the world.

Mr. Wigg: I never said that. I said: best troops, worst officers in the world.

Mr. Fisher: My only comment on that remark is how can one seriously imagine one can have the best troops without having very fine officers.

Mr. Wigg: The best troops include the best warrant officers and n.c.o.s, but they still have the worst officers.

Mr. Fisher: It is absurd to imagine that we can have such successful troops in action unless their leaders are also efficient. I have a good deal of experience of officers of the Brigade of Guards. They are not stupid, and they have nothing whatever to be ashamed of. They are every bit as good and probably better than officers of other units. In order not to upset my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Perth and East Perthshire (Colonel Gomme-Duncan) perhaps I had better say as good.

Mr. M. Stewart: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman can resolve what has always been to me a difficulty. I do not dispute the tribute he pays to the extraordinarily formidable fighting qualities of the Guards, but is he saying that it is necessary to expend three hours laying kit out, and two hours shining it, in order to acquire these qualities? Exactly the same sort of argument was used by the Duke of Wellington as a reason for retaining flogging. You had flogging and the men were magnificent fighters, and if you took it away they would not be magnificent fighters. Might not the hon. Gentleman be mistaken in saying that we must keep discipline exactly as it is today?

Mr. Fisher: I think that all these things contribute. There is another interesting thing which the Duke of Wellington did not say but which also had a good deal in it and that was that the Battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton. That is probably more true than the hon. Gentleman realises.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Mr. Emrys Hughesrose——

Mr. Fisher: I cannot give way further on this point.

Mr. Strachey: The Guards never give in.

Mr. Fisher: I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that tribute. It is quite true. I want to deal with man-power more generally and the difficulties of voluntary recruiting, starting with the Regular Army. There is no doubt that the three-year engagement has been a tremendous success, but there is the imponderable aspect of who is going to stay on after the three years are over. Anyone on National Service would be mad not to sign on for the three years and get all the advantages, but the question is whether he is going to sign on after that.
This matter is a constant worry to regimental commanders and regimental adjutants, and no doubt to the Secretary of State. There is very little that can be done to instil this "military bug" in a man's mind. The task has not been made easier by the fact that there is a far larger proportion of foreign service now, with all the lack of stability that implies. A man has no idea when he is going, where, or how long for. For instance, a Guards Brigade was sent out to the Middle East 18 months ago. The men had no idea whether it was for two months or two years. Naturally, being guardsmen they bore it well; but it is a serious disadvantage, particularly for the married men.
The hon. Gentleman the Member for East Fulham (Mr. M. Stewart) seemed to be apologising for talking about small points. I do not think there is any need to apologise. These ordinary, small things and small grievances are very important and, cumulatively, may make all the difference between a man deciding to sign on and his deciding not to do so. If they could be removed and the Army made more attractive, recruiting figures would be better and the men might sign on for longer than three years.
A friend of mine—and I think that this was an imaginative thing to do—asked the whole regiment to write a short paper giving their views on recruiting difficulties and the reasons for them. He had some very interesting replies, particularly from the other ranks. These are some of the comments which they made.
First of all, they said that the existing pensions scheme was inadequate. They pointed out that men left the Army at


an awkward age—40 to 45—and obtained jobs as commissionaires outside restaurants, flats and cinemas, and that they found it difficult—I am talking of n.c.o.s—to command good jobs at good salaries. They felt that a contributory pensions scheme to supplement the Army pension would be popular with the men and would make it much easier for them to look after their families after they had retired from the Army.
The second point they made was that the clothing allowance was inadequate. The guardsmen or private soldier receives 1s. 8d. a week clothing allowance. I think the National Service man receives only 8d. But the cost of a pair of socks in the Army today is 7s. 5d. A man has to save for a month to buy one pair of socks.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Private enterprise.

Mr. Fisher: I shall come to private enterprise in a moment.
The same socks can be bought in a stores in the Strand, selling surplus equipment, at three pairs for 11s. 6d. These men say to themselves, "This is rather a lot. Are the Army trying to make money out of it?" Why is it that socks are more expensive in the Army than to the man who walks down the Strand to buy them? Not everyone can shop in the Strand. The chap in Germany cannot, so that there are many thousands of forced customers for the Army in Germany. They resent that very much.

Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison: The clothing allowance was fixed at a time when socks cost approximately the amount which my hon. Friend quotes, but the allowance still continues even though, thanks to this Government, the price of many articles of clothing has fallen. It is not true to say that the quality of the socks which can be bought at three pairs for 1 ls. 6d. is the same as that of the socks for which a charge is made, against the clothing allowance, of 7s. 6d., and for which the real price would be something between the two figures which my hon. Friend quotes.

Mr. Fisher: I would not cast doubt on what my hon. Friend says, but, as I anticipated such a rejoinder, I inspected the socks this morning and they were so similar that it was difficult to distinguish any difference between them at all. The

quartermaster-sergeant who showed me the socks said he had worn both types and had noticed no difference. Perhaps we need not pursue the matter any further.
Another point made was the state of some of the larger barracks. I am glad that my right hon. Friend referred to this, for the state of some of the larger barracks is appalling. My right hon. Friend acknowledged that some of them were built during the Crimean war and he even used the word "slums" in connection with some of the conditions—and he is quite right. I am thinking of well-known barracks like Wellington and Chelsea and Tower of London, in some of which I suffered for a time; and they are much worse now than they were in those days.
The reason which the War Office always give for these conditions is "No money for any improvements." I know of a regimental tailor who sat all through this hard, cold winter in a little room with no form of heating at all because the Army could not afford to buy him a stove. I am told that it takes 14 months to get a stove at Wellington Barracks. If so, it is not very clever, because there is not very much money involved. In spite of this constant excuse that there is no money, no less than £8,000 is about to be spent on painting the outside of Wellington Barracks white for the Coronation. That is not very good. These places inside are practically sepulchres. It now seems they are to become whited sepulchres. It is only to impress the American visitors to the Coronation, and it is extremely irritating to the private soldier and guardsman whose own living conditions are left absolutely untouched, always because of the excuse that there is not enough money.
There is another thing I do not like very much. I know that this will be brought home to me as coming from the Brigade of Guards. They do not like some of the petty restrictions. They feel that some of them could be relaxed. I sympathise very much with them. They feel they could do with a little less chasing and harrying. Why have a parade for a parade, they ask. Hon. Members will know exactly what I mean. That is exactly what happens. Why not trust the men to be on time? Tell them the time of the parade, and if a man is late, punish


him afterwards; but to have them on parade half an hour before they are required to do anything is a little exaggerated. That point was made by an officer, not by a guardsman.
There were no major complaints in these question papers about pay. That was rather interesting. There was only one complaint about pay, and that came from the officers' mess sergeant, and he was not complaining about his own pay, or the men's pay. What he wrote was, "I cannot understand how the officers can afford to exist." That point was confirmed in the officers' papers!
My next point is about dress, because the men loathe this battledress for walking out, and they dislike khaki, and have no tremendous enthusiasm for blue. But they would simply adore wearing scarlet. The Army feels at a disadvantage compared with the other Services in the matter of dress. It feels itself to be the sartorial Cinderella of the Forces. There is no doubt, I think—and I have said this before in the House—that a gay uniform does get the girls, and that is an important psychological feature. After all, that is what any young man wants to do; it is natural. Moreover, a gay uniform gives greater pride in his appearance. It gives a man greater pride in his regiment. It probably means he behaves better outside, because he is anxious not to let down his regiment, or the smart uniform he is wearing.

Colonel Gomme-Duncan: Does my hon. Friend realise that before 1914, at Aldershot, the girls used to pay the soldiers to walk out with them, and that the rate in those days for an evening, which the girls would pay, was 2s. for a guardsman and 2s. 6d. for a Highlander?

Mr. Fisher: I am most grateful to my hon. and gallant Friend for his confirmation of the importance of a gay uniform. The girls' preference for the Scotsmen may have had a different origin. Anyway, I hope that we shall be able to get away from this complaint of having the battledress for walking out, because I am sure it is bad for recruiting, and bad for morale.
Just a word about the officers. Recruiting for officers is not very easy either, and the reason is simply and solely that

many people really cannot afford the Army now. Like politics, it is an extremely badly paid career. Their standards, like ours, have to be kept up. Officers' standards are expensive standards. Pre-war, in the days when some of those officers had unearned incomes, they could manage; nowadays, when they have not those unearned incomes, they cannot afford those standards. Like politics, the Army is now a full-time job, which it was not always before the war. I do not think that the officers are paid a full-time rate for their job, just as we in politics are not. That is something which could be remedied, and I hope it will be. These are some suggestions for matters of personnel, and which, I hope, will be helpful in relation to the manpower problem.
I want to turn now to the Home Guard. The statement of the Secretary of State, in November, was an admission of failure. He could not get 900 men per battalion in the Eastern Counties. I warned him that he would not. I did that privately, whereas the hon. Member for Aston, did it publicly. Perhaps it would have been better had he done it privately. The Secretary of State's admission of failure was a fairly complete one; it was not just a modification, but a fairly drastic cut from 900 to 300 men per battalion. It was dictated by necessity. Volunteers were not forthcoming. I welcomed the statement which the Secretary of State made then, not because I wanted the scheme to fail—I desperately wanted it to succeed—but because there is a well-known military principle, which I believe it would be useful to accept as a political principle, that it is seldom wise to reinforce failure. Hon. Members opposite who may be contemplating further nationalisation schemes ought to bear that in mind.
The Home Guard failed, and is still failing, to attract volunteers. Men do not see the necessity of service. They do not want to be inconvenienced until war seems imminent. Another reason is that the ordinary chap no longer likes voluntary organisations. Many men have said to me, "I will not volunteer because I know my mates will not." Again, the majority of people do not like military discipline. When the need arises, and they are properly trained and well led, these men are the finest troops in the


world, but there must be an immediate, pressing need. There have been only 39 recruits, only just 10 per cent. of the reduced strength, for a Home Guard unit I know of in Hertfordshire. Neighbouring battalions are not much better, despite the efforts of battalion commanders and company commanders, who have organised public meetings, letters to the local Press, personal canvassing, and so on.
Those who have joined are confined to the more than usually patriotic and to those with a natural keenness for soldiering. But, having said all this, I agree that the Home Guard is necessary. It is essential to save the Regular and Territorial troops from doing guard duties, and from having to take anti-sabotage precautions and help with Civil Defence. Should war become imminent, these duties will all need to be done at the very time when the Territorial Army is mobilising, and to be done later, when that Army is overseas. I do not think it would be realistic to have the answer to the problem merely on paper. That would not allow enough time to enrol key personnel in time of need, and to prepare a defensive scheme which would avoid chaos on the outbreak of war. We must not assume that the next aggressor will give us the breathing space which we had in 1939. So we have these two facts—a Home Guard is necessary, but its numbers are inadequate. How can we reconcile these two facts?
We have to try to achieve our object with the material available. It can be done. The men who have joined are of extremely high quality; one expected that and it is so. They are potential leaders, officers and n.c.o.s. Why not train them as such now, and make our preparations for the more general mobilisation which will take place when war becomes imminent? When we get a real threat, volunteers will pour in, as they always do. The ranks will be filled. Until then, we must train existing personnel as leaders for the men who are coming in later.
This would be tremendously encouraging for those who had already joined, because they would see prospects of promotion, and of doing a very useful job. That would be good for their morale and be a stimulus to recruiting. I have the impression very much that those now in the scheme think it is a flop, and there

is nothing more demoralising than to work for an unsuccessful organisation. Financial economies would also follow. The storeman clerk at £6 per week could look after a whole battalion instead of only one company and an adjutant-quartermaster at £700 a year could look after three battalions instead of only one.
I hope that my suggestions will be considered, because I think they would be of practical use. They should also receive the endorsement of my right hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden), who said in March, 1951:
I am not suggesting that we should immediately reform the Home Guard as we had it in the last war. What I suggest is that the essential organisation should now be set on foot. Commanders, down to company commanders, adjutants and quartermasters, and all the key personnel, should be enrolled now and should know what their duties are. Once this has been done, they should be empowered themselves to take the names of men willing to serve so that, should an emergency arise or be threatened, they are all at once available. That is my suggestion, and I add, of course, that the arms should go out to the depots to he available should the need arise."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 8th March, 1951; Vol. 485, c. 718.]
That is very much in line with the sort of thing I am suggesting and I believe it would be the best solution.
I do not know what we shall do otherwise. The only other alternative would be to cancel the call-up for agricultural workers and make them join the Home Guard instead. I do not personally advocate that. It might not be good politics, but it is common sense, because in war they will not he allowed to fight in the Regular Forces. They will be needed on the land and if hostilities broke out they would be needed in the Home Guard. Why not start them where they will ultimately have to stay?
I would say a word about the Territorial Army, to complete the picture. As in the Regular Army, there is a shortage of senior non-commissioned officers, who must come from volunteers. There is no real shortage of officers, and the private soldiers are provided by the National Service element for the time being. What can be done to encourage volunteer recruiting of the type of man who will eventually become an n.c.o.? I do not believe that there is any sovereign remedy, but a large number of small things together may contribute to it.


Take recruiting posters. Could they not be less general and more local? Could they not have some such words as, "Your nearest depot is …" and then give the address? Cannot individual regiments advertise themselves, instead of having a general Territorial Army advertisement? The Territorial Army is so essentially a regimental organisation that it would be helpful. It would also be helpful if there were more bands and bright uniforms. Men enjoy the glamour that military music and smart uniforms inevitably produce. Human nature being what it is, I think it would be most foolish to disregard this sort of "peacock" element in our nature; and the value of giving a chap something to wear which will make him a little more romantic in the estimation of his girl friend should not be forgotten. A man will join the Army to wear scarlet and march to a military band and impress his sweetheart; who would never join to peel potatoes and fire a rifle.
As another suggestion, why should be not make use of bombed sites and other open spaces so that the public can see the men at their training? I am quite sure that that would help to create interest and prove to be a good stimulus to recruiting. Then, why not let us do something to improve the drill halls? Some of them are about as antiquated as some of the barracks like Wellington and Chelsea. There is often no space for drill and no proper accommodation for company stores. There are seldom adequate canteen facilities.

Colonel J. H. Harrison: Does my hon. Friend say that there is no canteen accommodation in Territorial drill halls?

Mr. Fisher: I know of some where there are no canteen facilities.
Then there is the question of uniform upkeep allowances for officers. At £4 a year, it is not over-generous. It costs 10s. to have a battledress cleaned, and there are socks and boots to be replaced, and one cannot go far with £4 a year. The private soldier gets no uniform allowance, and his battledress has to last for four years. But, if he goes to camp, and attends all training week-ends, his uniform may not last for four years. I do not think that the pay of the permanent staff is over-generous. A regimental

quartermaster-sergeant at camp gets the full Regular Army rate; but he gets it only at camp, although he is full-time all the time. He has to be. But he gets only £6 14s. a week, although in the Regular Army he would get £10 a week, plus allowances. Further, why are instructors from the A, B, and D Reserves paid 7s. 6d. a day in addition to Reserve pay, whereas the Territorial Army warrant officer only gets 3s. a day for the same duty?
All these are rather small points, but they do add up in the minds of many Territorials to the feeling that the object, from the War Office point of view is to get a Reserve Army on the cheap. [An HON. MEMBER: "The Treasury; not the War Office".] I agree that it is the Treasury in the final reckoning, but the fact is that that is just what we are getting. All I ask is that we do not make it too cheap. In the long run it might be a false economy. The backbone of the Territorial Army is, and has always been, the volunteer, and men with a fine sense of duty and good spirit will always go on volunteering, whatever the circumstances.
I do say, however, that we should not take too much advantage of that really superb spirit of selflessness and sense of duty to one's country. Let us always be fair to these men; if we can let us try to be more than fair. Let us be generous. Because, whatever we do, we shall always be in their debt and the State, whatever it does, can never match the generosity of these men who give so much of their time and trouble and energy and enthusiasm for the benefit of their country and of us all.

11.44 p.m.

Mr. Stephen Swingler: I hope that I shall not embarrass the hon. Member for Hitchin (Mr. Fisher) by saying that what he said about the Home Guard is much in line with what the Opposition said at the time of the Home Guard Bill. I hope that more time will be available to deal with that subject. My hon. Friend the Member for Fulham, East (Mr. M. Stewart) dealt with some matters of detail of the same kind, and was greeted with raucous laughter and jeers from the other side; but the hon. Member who has just sat down agreed with many of the things which he said.


I should like to refer to the cogent speech of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget). Not many hon. Members have addressed themselves to the subject matter of his speech, which was a valuable contribution to the debate. While I disagree profoundly with the point of view of my hon. and learned Friend, I believe that the choice he put before the House was perfectly correct.
He pointed out that this year we abandoned the defence programme, including the Army programme, to which most hon. Members paid lip service a year ago; that in the Defence White Paper the Government had been compelled, because they found it too great a burden upon the economy, to cut the rate of expenditure upon equipment. But the Government were bringing forward, in particular for the Army, precisely the same manpower budget and the same commitments as had previously been agreed in connection with a very much larger and more expensive defence programme. My hon. and learned Friend pointed out the contradiction between a reduced rate of expenditure upon equipment and stores and the maintenance of the same draft of manpower and the same commitments, regarded by the Service chiefs previously as only maintainable with a much more expensive programme of equipment.
I take the view that the two-year period of National Service, which is the most crucial issue confronting us in these Estimates debates, is also too great a burden upon the economy of the country, as was the programme of equipment which the Government have been forced to abandon. I agree with my hon. and learned Friend that if we cut down the defence programme in one sphere, we are forced, in order to maintain a proper balance between manpower, materials, and commitments, to cut it down also in other respects.
One hon. Gentleman opposite talked about the members of the party opposite speaking in unison. I should like to know whether the present Secretary of State for War—whose absence we much regret and who, we hope, will soon be restored to health—is still able to speak in unison with himself. There are many hon. Members who can recall how the Secretary of State for War preached quite a

different view about National Service and the approach to the manpower question when he was on this side of the House. It is time we recalled, particularly in connection with the Army—for whose benefit the National Service scheme is retained—the reasons why the National Service scheme and the two-year call-up were ever introduced in the period after the war.
I recall that the National Service scheme was justified previously on both sides of the House on two grounds. The first was the necessity in any future emergency of having large, trained reserves, particularly for the Army. Nobody—particularly not the Secretary of State for War and the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, who spoke on these matters in previous Parliaments—supposes that the two-year period of call-up is necessary for the purpose of producing large-scale reserves for the Army. In fact, a few years ago the Secretary of State for War said that he preferred six months. It is on the record that he advocated in the House a six months' period of conscription for the purpose of producing a large trained reserve for the Army.
The second ground on which the National Service scheme, and in particular the two-year period of conscription, was justified, was because of the lack of Regular Forces. It was because after the war of the decline of Regular voluntary forces and the difficulty of raising Regular recruitment in conditions of full employment that it was thought necessary to carry on the National Service scheme for a period of years. But the present Secretary of State for War was outstanding, year after year, in advocating that this was an unfortunate necessity and that the National Service scheme should go as soon as possible, as soon as Regular recruitment could be raised; that as soon as the number of reservists for the Army could be increased the National Service scheme should be abolished.
While the Secretary of State was introducing the Estimates this afternoon, I refreshed my mind on some of the speeches that he used to make in the 1945 Parliament, and I recall particularly a speech which he made towards the end of 1947, when he said:
I am not certain that I would at present entirely jettison National Service, but I would perhaps call on every man for a short period


of, say, six months, or less, in which he would be given the fundamental training common to all three Services, with instructors called from all three Services."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 19th December, 1947; Vol. 445, c. 2028.]
It is no good hon. Members saying that all of that can just be thrown into the waste paper basket because of the Korean war. It had nothing to do with the size of the commitments. It was the fundamental principle behind the approach of the present Secretary of State for War and of a large number of Members, that the National Service scheme should only be prolonged and was only justified because there were insufficient Regular Forces.
In fact, in those days the present Secretary of State always advocated the idea that the best Forces for this country were Forces composed of long-term volunteers and highly-trained specialists—those were, I think, his actual words—and that, therefore, the National Service scheme was a mere stop-gap.
Now we find, in this Army Estimates debate today, that quite a number of Members opposite regard the five-year extension of the National Service scheme as inextricably connected with the two-year period of call-up. One hon. and gallant Member said that he interpreted it as meaning a definite five years' extension of the two years' period of call-up and to many hon. Members the two years' period has become practically sacrosanct.
Let us examine some of the facts. Since the extension of the call-up to two years, there has been a large-scale increase in the number of Regulars in the Forces. Since that extension, which was said to be for a temporary emergency, there has been a substantial increase in the number of reservists, and in the scope of training for the reservists; but none of this is now mentioned by present Service Ministers as having anything to do with the National Service scheme.
I should have thought, from the principles on which the National Service scheme was based, that these increases in the numbers of Regulars and reservists would be immediate arguments for the reconsideration of the National Service scheme, but it now appears from the arguments of the Ministers that, irrespective

of Regular recruitment or the number of reservists, the National Service scheme must go on and the two-year period of call-up continue.
Perhaps the Under-Secretary of State for War will tell us what is the Army's view about Regular recruitment. It is quite clear from what the Minister said that the view of the Army chiefs is quite defeatist about Regular recruitment. Otherwise, the Government would not ask for the five-year extension of the National Service scheme and hon. Members would not presume that it would be a two-year call-up.
Either Ministers have changed their views and now think National Service and the two-year period are no longer regrettable necessities but good things in themselves, or they are not hopeful of the future of Regular recruitment and think that two years' conscription will be required for a very long period. We should like to know which of these alternatives is the case. Is it still the view of Ministers in charge of the Army that they are trying to get an army composed of sufficiently highly trained, specialists and long-term volunteers so as to do away with National Service altogether, or has that policy been abandoned?
If it is the policy to get sufficient Regular recruitment and sufficiently large numbers of reserves so as gradually to reduce the period of National Service until the National Service scheme can be abolished, what is the view of the Ministers at the War Office about the future of Regular recruitment? Are we to take it from the fact that the Government says that we must have a five-year extension of National Service at least—and that many hon. Members think it will be a five years extension of the two years' call-up—that it means Ministers have abandoned the idea that they can get sufficient Regular recruits to be able to reduce the period of National Service in the meantime?
Ministers should address themselves to the fact that on all sides, when the period of National Service was increased to two years, it was regarded as an emergency measure. The present Secretary of State for War should recall that five years ago he regarded National Service itself as an emergency to be abandoned as quickly as possible. He was very boastful then about the possibility of getting Regular


recruits. We understood from him that we had only to raise the pay and do a few other things to get sufficient volunteers to abandon the scheme. Now we hear nothing about that, nothing about his view of National Service in principle, and of the numbers of Regular recruits it is necessary to get to cut National Service—nothing, in fact, of the relation between the manpower budget and the reduced equipment budget and the commitments which the Army have to undertake.
This is a very crucial issue, and no one can deny that. while the attempt to produce more arms than the economy of the country can stand is a heavy burden, large numbers of people are of opinion that the two-year call-up is a heavy burden, also, and too great a strain on the country's manpower. When now, almost exclusively for the sake of the Army, the Government ask Parliament to continue this scheme we should have a clear statement from the Government as to whether they have changed their policy about conscription and now regard conscription as having come for ever. If they do not, what is the relation now in the Army between the rate of Regular recruitment and the number of conscripts required and for how long are they required. It should be possible for the Under-Secretary to tell us.
Supposing Regular recruitment goes on increasing and we make an estimate based on the improvement in Regular recruitment this year and that continues in 1954, what effect will it have on the number of conscripts the Army require and the period for which they require them? It should be possible for him to say that, with a certain improvement in the Regular recruitment, National Service could be reduced by a number of months.
I hope that we shall get a realistic statement of the views of those in charge of the Army about the future manpower budget; that it will be seen that the whole defence budget becomes unbalanced if the equipment programme is cut without a cut in the manpower budget. In view of the pledges given, people expect that Ministers will review the manpower in the Services and the schemes for regular recruitment so as to achieve the earliest possible reduction in the period of service.

12.1 a.m.

Mr. John Hall: I do not wish to follow the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler) in his very interesting arguments about National Service. The question has been discussed exhaustively today and on other occasions. I wish to deal with the tail which has been combed by a number of hon. Members, and to suggest one or two more hairs which might be combed out of it.
Many hon. Members may have had experience of the odd types who creep into the war establishments of formations for one reason or another and I hope that the Under-Secretary can assure us that attention is being paid to the establishment of formations which will operate in the field. I can remember a number of these odd creatures, including the "G3 Chemical Warfare," who continued to exist, doing all sorts of odd jobs long after their original function had ceased. There were "Intelligence Officer, Liaison," and "Intelligence Officer, Enemy," and just "Intelligence Officer," being used for all sorts of jobs long after their original usefulness had been lost sight of.
It is easy for any commander of whatever rank to justify a demand for more staff. It used to be said that the 2nd lieutenant or the lance-corporal were the lowest form of life in the British Army, but I think the G3 Chemical Warfare ran them fairly close.
There is a considerable growth in the Services which one notices in the changes of function in the R.A.S.C., R.A.O.C. and R.E.M.E. I am aware that the more complicated equipment used by a modern army demands a greater tail, more units based in the line of communications, and so on. But I sometimes wonder whether the Services, when they are competing for the manpower requirements which they consider necessary, ever bear in mind the tremendous calls on manpower that their demands involve.
For example, there is a new system of supply of vehicles in the field. I understand that the policy is to be much more that of replacing vehicles rather than repairing them in the various workshops at different levels throughout the lines of communication. This will mean a greater concentration of vehicles and a much greater manpower problem in providing additional R.A.O.C. units.


I sometimes wonder whether we are becoming too vehicle minded—too road-bound. I am aware that an Army must be capable of rapid movement, but too many vehicles on the road defeats that very purpose. If you see any ordnance unit with its vast supply of reserve vehicles, you can imagine the problem it poses to the staff of any formation in war.
I know that some progress has been made with the standardisation of vehicles. I hope that that will be pursued energetically because if we could standardise the load-carrying vehicles alone we would have an immense effect not only in base depots, but it would reduce the work right through, down to the smallest unit which has a storeman. One of the great problems in the last war was the millions of spare parts that had to be carried for all the different vehicles in use.
During the debate a lot has been said about the Territorial Army, the Home Guard, and the Reserves in general, but I have heard nothing so far about the Army Emergency Reserve, a very valuable one for which there have been far too few volunteers. The National Service man can opt when he finishes his training to go into this Reserve. It only involves two weeks' training a year, and there are no other drills at all. May I plead with the Under Secretary to examine one or two matters in connection with this Reserve? Training facilities are supplied by the Regular units with whom the reservists train. These units do their best to meet these demands, but it is not always easy for them to give the many units which go through their hands all that is required, especially as regards ammunition.
In my experience, most of the National Service men who finish their training, especially in the corps, turn out to be appalling shots when they reach the Emergency Reserve. I hope that I shall not be thought too reactionary, but I feel that the reservists must he able to handle their weapons well, and the standard is deplorably low. They cannot improve unless we find sufficient ammunition for training, and I plead with the Under-Secretary to arrange with the Regular training units, and, indeed, the Territorial units, for them to be given sufficient ammunition for use on the range. It is only by actual shooting on the range,

rather than by lectures from the Weapon Training Manual, that the standard can be raised.
Second and third year units should be given the opportunity of training under more realistic conditions than in ordinary barracks. I suggest that they might occasionally be given an opportunity of going to Germany and training with one of the formations engaged in exercises. It would give them far more valuable training than they would get with a static training unit at home. These units of the Emergency Reserve are expected to be in a condition of training so that they would be available quickly in the event of war. They would be called up within a very short time, and expected to function efficiently. Unless they have adequate training on an adequate basis they will not be able to fulfil that function.
We cannot expect to do much with a unit in two weeks every 12 months, so the greatest possible help should be given to them, more so than the Territorial Army units, which have the opportunity of meeting far more frequently. I do not know whether the Under-Secretary believes that enough publicity has been given to this reserve, because the number of volunteers is far too few. We have a tremendous scarcity of well-trained and good n.c.o.s. That is a problem running throughout the whole of the Army today. If we cannot attract that type of man into the reserve Forces it will be very difficult, whatever else we do, to have well-trained Forces.

12.10 a.m.

Mr. George Wigg: I am very sorry indeed that the Secretary of State for War is ill and has had to go home, and I join with other hon. Members in wishing him a speedy recovery. Apart from my natural feelings of sympathy, I wish very much that he were here because there are one or two things which I wish to say to him and I would prefer to say them to his face than to say them in his absence.
I thought that his speech this afternoon was a confession of failure. In saying that, I am not altogether relying on what he said when he was on these benches but rather on what he set out to do as Secretary of State for War. I am quite sure that when he spoke from these benches he honestly and sincerely thought that his party would be able to solve the


problem of recruiting by raising pay. I think he overlooked the hard fact that it is not the increase in pay which has done the trick, but the differential. As soon as it was decided—I think wisely but belatedly decided—by my right hon. Friend to introduce two rates of pay, one for the Regular and one for the National Service man, obviously the young man faced with the duty of doing two years with the Service would think twice before he accepted 4s. a day when he could get 7s. a day by taking on the obligation of a third year.
Of course, the right hon. Gentleman put all his eggs in that basket, but he also played around with the terms of service. I have dealt with the latter point before, and I do not apologise for dealing with it again. It seems to me absolutely vital to have a fairly lengthy period of Colour service if we do hope to get competent n.c.os. and warrant officers—and I am thinking not only in terms of competence in their physical and mental attributes, but competence arising from a fairly lengthy service and wide experience of the handling of men and the day-to-day problems of their command.
Looking at what has happened in other countries, it seems to me that no country has yet succeeded in harnessing this problem of the long-term warrant officer and n.c.o. with that of the considerable number of men conscripted for service. Certainly, up to 1914, the German Army succeeded in doing it only by paying a terrible price in terms of forgoing the growth of democracy in Germany. I will not weary the House with this subject for more than a moment, but it is interesting to look at what the Germans did with this problem—and I suppose they did it successfully from their point of view. To every man who undertook an engagement of some years they gave a guarantee of a job when he left the Service.
In the long run, of course, it meant that all the officials in Germany—dustmen, sanitary inspectors, police officers and the like—consisted of long-service Regular German soldiers; and it is, of course, true that the attributes taught by long service in the Army—obedience and honesty—are not necessarily the best ground in which democracy will thrive. I have always held the view that democracy failed to flourish in Germany because of the existence of the official class.
Equally, we have broken the link between the military families and those we hope to get into the Army. One of the present difficulties in recruiting both officers and n.c.os. arises from the fact that in the past those who have served in the Forces have not been given the kind of deal which they ought to have had. These people tend to say to their sons, "Go into other professions and look for other jobs." Thus the link with the Armed Forces is broken. I do not apologise, therefore, for mentioning the Secretary of State's shortcomings.
My next point is to draw attention to the way in which we have treated retired officers, n.c.o.s, and warrant officers. I want again to draw attention to the debate we had on the Adjournment for the Christmas Recess. We got a thoroughly dusty answer from the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, and we have had nothing better from his noble Friend in another place. The House has a right to expect that the Government will not only do something for the young men who are coming into the Forces now but, in the interests of the Army, in the interests of the country, that they will try to give a square deal to the retired officers who served in the years before the war and who are left to exist on a rate of retired pay which is based upon conditions in 1919 and the succeeding years.
This is not exclusively the responsibility of the Secretary of State for War, but he is faced with the fact that his recruiting policy has failed. He is looking for the reasons. As I say, in the past he blamed failure in recruiting
on the low rates of pay. Well, the rates of pay have been put right; temporarily, he has got an increase in the number of recruits, but it has already tended to tail off. Before I deal with the alibi he introduced today, I want to pinpoint what I think is the major defect in the Government's policy, and that is their failure to give a square deal to officers, warrant officers and n.c.o.s who have given a lifetime of service to the Armed Forces and who, after all, are the best recruiting agents.
Let me turn to the right hon. Gentleman's new alibi which appeared for the first time today. [An HON. MEMBER: "Excuse."] All right, excuse. He blames it on to the cold war and the


period of overseas service. I notice that a number of his hon. Friends have already fallen for this bait, because several have talked about soldiers being required to serve longer periods abroad now than they were before the war. All I can say to that is: complete and utter nonsense. Before the war the average recruit joining the infantry for seven or five was very lucky indeed if he did not go abroad in the first year of his service; if he did not go in the first year, he went in the second; and once he went abroad not only did he serve for the whole of his Colour engagement abroad but he was held to serve an extra year as well. Invariably he was held to serve eight years instead of seven.
That was a quite common and accepted experience. Everyone expected it to happen, and it did happen. The idea that a Regular soldier, before the war, served abroad for only three years is complete nonsense. He went abroad. Nobody worried about it. To have suggested for a moment one would get leave would have caused one to have been regarded as a sort of music hall comedian. It would have been thought a sort of music hall joke if, as one disembarked at Bombay, one had said one expected to see England again in fewer than five or six years.
As to married quarters, I am all for having the best accommodation the Government can give, but I must make a point here. I think I am an authority on this matter because, after all, my three daughters were all born in married quarters. I have spent more time in married quarters than anybody else in the House, I dare say—indeed, longer than all the rest of the House put together. Nobody worried very much about us in those days. The idea that a young soldier should marry was rather discouraged.
The Secretary of State seems to have forgotten what the legacy is. We have here a legacy from the past. I am not at all sure that one wants to turn the Army into a profession in which a man is rather encouraged to marry young. I am not at all sure that the new Regulations are any improvement on the old. At least, under the old Regulations one knew where one stood—or where one did not stand. Now, of course, young men are encouraged to join up, get married,

and expect subsequently to get married quarters.
Of course, the married quarters are not there; and when there are married quarters they are, as has been said this afternoon, inadequate. The Secretary of State must base his policy on realism. The short-term recruiting advantages of last year were very short-term, and in two years from now he will find re-engagements much fewer than the 33⅓ per cent. that he wants. The encouragement of married quarters and jam today will have no effect unless the Secretary of State does something more fundamental, less spectacular, and very much more long-term than he is thinking about at present. There is no short cut to a solution of this problem. It has been growing since 1920. There was failure between the wars to give the Army a square deal—to provide married quarters then, and decent opportunities for promotion. The seeds were planted then, and we are reaping the reward.
To solve this problem we have to get down to fundamentals. The hon. Member for Windsor (Mr. Mott-Radclyffe) raised the question of regimental tradition. I think it is valuable, but it has never had the value, which he seems to think it has, for the other rank. Such men could not opt for the Oxford and Bucks, the Berkshires or the Hampshires. [HON. MEMBERS: "They could."] I am sorry that hon. Members opposite are out of date. They are 30 years out of date. Before the war there was a system of zone recruiting. A recruit who wanted to join the Oxford and Bucks could do so if the regiment was open: but if it had just been squadded up he would find it was closed to him. He would be told that he could join the Berkshires or Hampshires. There was no regimental tradition for the other rank. Before hon. Members say that I am wrong they should consult the pre-war Regulations. They will find that particular regiments were closed according to their strength. A man could only get into a regiment which was closed if he could prove a family association with it.
Hon. Members must also remember that there are many good sections of the Services which are not tied to localities. For instance, the Royal Artillery, the Royal Engineers, the Royal Army Ordnance Corps, the Royal Army


Medical Corps. [An HON. MEMBER: "The Guards."] An hon. Member suggests the Guards, but that would not be completely true, because the Scots, Welsh and Irish Guards were associated with particular areas. A man who joined the Cavalry before the war, entering the 14/20 Hussars, might find himself in the 15/19 Hussars at the next trooping season.
There is no competent soldier with a reputation to lose who will not deny that one can fight a war and maintain the "tribal system." The system of local associations is bound to break down in war-time. There must be an overwhelming case for it if it is to be maintained in peace-time. We cannot run the Army on that basis.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: I have been 35 years in the Army and I think the hon. Gentleman is mixing up the geographical association with the regimental tradition. He was citing the Royal Artillery, than which none has a greater regimental tradition. There are other regiments with county and geographical traditions which are equally strong. Surely he must recognise that.

Mr. Wigg: I agree that there is a great tradition in the Royal Artillery, but even there a man or an n.c.o. can be cross-posted from battery to battery. Before the war men were so posted all the time. The idea that a man could join a particular battery, however eminent, is mistaken. He might want to join a crack one like A battery or K, but he would find himself in A battery in England this year and posted to India next year. When the battery was coming home, he might find himself sent to Africa.
With the commitments of this country we need a corps of infantry. We have gone some way towards it in the establishment of the group system. What is our overwhelming military problem? It is the same as it was before the war and as it was before the First World War. We have current commitments and international obligations which involve the possibility of lengthy and large-scale operations on the Continent of Europe immediately after mobilisation. Therefore, we have a conflict between short-term and long-term obligations. Clearly, the Army cannot best be organised upon a regimental basis.
What happens at present when a regiment moves? Not only all the men, but all the kit, the silver and the equipment move. I wonder whether the War Office have worked out in terms of tonnage what it takes to move a complete infantry regiment, and what it would take if they moved only the personnel. I would have thought that in Malaya, where we have 23 battalions taking part in the cold war, we ought to have a sufficient number of units to fulfil all the military and police requirements of those battalions. What we should do, as men need to be replaced, is to move men and not their equipment and all their heavy baggage. That type of organisation would be flexible for both police operations and long-term commitments.
In two or three years' time, as I see it, not even the present Secretary of State will be able to disguise from the House and the country that his recruiting policy has completely failed because he has put all his eggs in one basket. If there are any eggs left they will be addled. At the same time, he will not be getting the re-engagements that he wants. We shall find that we have no long-service warrant officers and n.c.o.s because of the habit of enlisting for three years. The bad will have pushed out the good. There will be no 9, 7, 5, and 3; there will be only 3. If I do not mistake my guess, the young men of today, who can do simple addition, will realise that they have taken 7s. per day instead of 4s., and at the end of three years they will go.
What happens then? I do not know. It can only mean one thing; that we shall have conscription for a period of two years permanently in this country; and even when we have conscription permanently for two years we shall not be getting the military force we want because we shall have many on the ration strength, so to speak, but a great deficiency of senior, experienced, n.c.o.s and w.o.s, without which no Army is fit to fight.
Now I turn to another aspect. The right hon. Gentleman made a great song and dance about shortening the tail and sharpening the teeth of the Army. Well, we have had a year of that process and, according to him, we have one-third more of a division. We have seven extra battalions, but I thought he was a little coy this afternoon when I questioned him about the extent to which the regiments


were up to strength. He said that those in the Far East were up to strength. Some of the less essential ones had to take the rap as a result.
I questioned the right hon. Gentleman about the Middle East, and he did not seem to know just what was the position there, but stated that some would be up to strength, and some would not. Could I ask about the 16th Parachute Brigade in the Middle East? I understand that this is on nothing more than a cadre basis. What is the actual number of units in the Canal Zone, and are they all up to establishment at present? My information is that not one unit there is up to establishment. Therefore, if the Secretary of State for War has formed seven battalions at the expense of the strength of units over a very wide scale, we have nothing but a weakening process.
I want to push the question of the combing of the tail a little further. Last year, I asked about the 5th Infantry Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division; because, in 1951, the Secretary of State told us that this particular brigade had 14 officers and he thought that to be very wrong indeed. I asked last year how many officers the 5th Infantry Brigade had got, but the right hon. Gentleman did not answer the question. Can we be told whether the Secretary of State has been able to comb the strength of this brigade in order to reduce the number from 14 to a considerably lesser figure?
Again, in 1951, speaking of this brigade, the right hon. Gentleman said:
At one command headquarters I have a personal friend, a major-general, General Staff—no names, no pack drill—and he has a B.G.S. (Operations), B.G.S. (A. and Q.), General Staff Officer Class 1 (Operations), G.S.O. 1 (Training), G.S.O. 1 (A. and G.S.O. 1 Q). Then there is the G.S.O. 2 level and the G.S.O. 3 level. Quite a family tree."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 8th March, 1951; Vol. 485, col. 817.]
What has the Secretary of State done about that problem, which he thought was so bad? How much has really been the tooth sharpening as a result of his policy? I should like him to answer me this specific question. What is the extent to which the seven battalions which have been formed are up to strength? If, for reasons of security, we cannot be told the figures, could we be given the percentages so that the House may know if they are up to establishment or not?
The hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr. John Hall) referred to Reserve training. One of the most important things that will arise during the next few years is the question of the higher training of Reserves. I said in the defence debate that as far as I was concerned I would settle for a reduced period of training and an increased period of Reserve service, because it seems to me that as we move towards our Reserve ceiling, towards the point in the middle of 1954 when our Reserve strength will be in the neighbourhood of half a million, we must pay considerable attention to the higher training of these reservists. Thousands will be in almost exclusively Reserve units. I should have thought that 15 days was not enough. It is certainly not enough to do what the hon. Member for Wycombe wanted when he referred to those on the Army Reserve training in Germany.
One of the great arguments for a lengthy period of training is to be able to take the men to Germany to train with the units in which they may be called upon to serve. It is part of the National Army plan, as I understand, that men serving in units when things happened to go wrong would provide the screen behind which mobilisation would take place. The degree of efficiency of the Reserve units will be the thing upon which the safety of this country depends. Therefore, the House must this year and, in succeeding years, pay increasing attention to the question of Reserve training.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) is of the opinion, which I share, that a case has been made out for a reduction in the period of service. Short of being able to get our way, we hold the view that an inquiry ought to be held—not as others have been held, not an inquiry into the use of manpower, but an all-party, independent inquiry by a committee appointed by the Prime Minister, which would enjoy public confidence, into the workings of the National Service Acts as such. This country is attempting to do something quite stupid. It is trying to have a great Army, a great Navy and a great Air Force, and we cannot have them all. We must put our money on what we think is the winning horse—and I am quite sure it is not the Navy. I am quite sure that belongs to the museum. Naval power has been supplanted by air power. [An


HON. MEMBER: "Nonsense."] It may be air plus Army. Anyway, I am certain that if we go for all three, we shall lose on all.
Some of the experiences between the two wars are extremely significant. Take, for example, what happened in Iraq from 1920 to 1927. General Haldane, I think, had something like a division and a half when he suppressed the Arab revolt in 1922, but by 1927 the last battalion of infantry—the King's Liverpool Regiment, I believe—was withdrawn from Baghdad. From that time onwards the Air Force took over the control of Iraq and did it with great success, without the use of ground troops except, I think, for one armoured car company belonging to the Air Force. That was the shape of things to come.
It seems to me that we have reached the absolute limit in terms of expenditure of money and manpower as far as the Army is concerned. If we want to spend more on air power, we must make up our minds where we are going to take it from, because the economy of the country cannot stand any more. What we have to do in these debates is not only to count the shekels which we pay out, but we must see what we get in return. What I am afraid of is that we are building up a Maginot Line of our own, no greater than the Maginot Line of before the war, with vast numbers of men serving for two or three years and spread all over the world; and then one fine day, if things go wrong, we shall find that not only have we spent all our money but, what is infinitely worse, we shall have wasted it.

12.41 a.m.

Brigadier Terence Clarke: I do not want to follow the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) at great length—I think we all see in him a future Lord Cardwell, who reorganises the Army for us once a year—but when he starts to reorganise the Navy in the middle of the Army Estimates debate, a Member for Portsmouth has a right to object.
I want particularly to touch on the question of the 22 years' service that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State explained this afternoon and which appears in the Memorandum which has been before us for some days. This new

22 years' service, with options every three years, has proved, we are told, a great success. I hope that when my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State replies to the debate, he will explain exactly at what periods the men may exercise their three-yearly option. If it is not explained and is not well known in the country, there will always be arguments as to whether it should have been done the month before or the month after, or whether six months' notice or a month's notice must be given before a man takes his discharge at the end of three years. I hope that my hon. Friend can give us this information today.
I do not feel that we shall have the same success with this 22 years' service as was anticipated by my right hon. Friend who produced the scheme. After a man has been in the Service for three, six or nine years, he has been separated from his family through, possibly, the shortage of housing overseas or he has been out on active service, and he will come back and discover that life at home with his wife is very sweet.
After about three terms of three years, he has got to the stage where he decides whether he will continue serving to do his 22 years and get a pension or will come out after serving nine years. If he comes out after nine years, he is still under the age of 30 and is in a position to get himself a job in civil life. If he stays on until he has done his 22 years, he will be getting near the age of 40, and to a man of that age, after 22 years in the Army, the average civilian employer begins to say, "What can you do to earn your living? Why should I employ you? "If he is a tradesman it is perfectly easy; he can find employment anywhere at any time. It is the ordinary regimental soldier with a wonderful ability for organising things who is seldom considered as worthy of being taken on by an employer after he is 40. There are not enough good jobs in clubs or cinemas, or at the doors of this House, for all those who will be retiring at 40 and want another livelihood.
The way to keep these men in the Army until they have done their 22 years is to increase their pension. The pay of the soldier and of all the Services has been considerably improved in the last three or four years, but the pensions of the other rank has not kept


pace with his pay. In my constituency, where I see soldiers and sailors regularly every other week-end, people who have been in the Service say it is the pension which is worrying them. When they joined the Service they felt that they would get indifferent pay for some years but that they would get something built up for their retirement, a little nest egg for when they were old.
They resent—I do not think there is justice in their resentment—having to pay Income Tax. That is chiefly because, in the past, the rate of pay of the soldier was so small that he did not pay Income Tax on his pay and did not realise that there was such a thing as Income Tax until he got out into the wicked world. Before the war, as a major with a wife and two children, I was paying only £5 a year Income Tax. The ordinary soldier does not realise that there is such a thing as Income Tax for anyone except the rich. When he comes out of the Service he thinks he will get a job which will bring him £7 or £8 a week which he can add to his pension; but he finds that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has stepped in and his pension has disappeared into thin air, together with some of his wages.
The soldier should be told at the time he enlists that his pay will be on a certain rate and when he retires in due course as a private or W.O. he will receive a certain pension but that all the pay and the pension will be subject to the rate of Income Tax ruling at the time he retires. I am sorry to labour the point, but every week men come to me and ask, "Why do we have to pay Income Tax on our pensions?" I have to explain to them that even the civilian pays Income Tax on any pension which accrues to him and there is no difference between Service man and civilian in that respect.
Another reason I think the soldier will not make this 22 years' service a great success is that he has been told by his father of various things which happened in the Service in the past. These things have not all been to the credit of the Service. For example, he may be told that during times of crisis the Army invariably has its pay cut. It always was so in the past and I would not be surprised if it were the case in the future. When there is a rise in the cost of living the

Army has always been the last to follow suit and give the soldier a rise.
The example will be quoted to me of how the Opposition did raise the pay, but I would point out that they did very little about raising the pay until the crisis in Korea made them want an Army once more, after they had almost completely disbanded it. To get the men back they had to raise the pay. They did not give it because they wanted to, but because it was the only way to get the soldiers back into the Army. I hope that this Government will never lower the soldier's pay in time of crisis, because he has not too much now. Although I think he is fairly paid in the present circumstances of the country, the pension is the thing I would like the Parliamentary Secretary to watch.
As another example of the sort of thing the Army can do, I would quote an experience of my own. In 1931 I transferred to a technical corps because I was too "broke" to continue in the Gloucestershire Regiment. I was to receive 5s. a day after doing an 18 months' technical course. That may not seem very much, but after I had received it for less than a year there was one of the periodical crises and my 5s. disappeared. I wasted part of my life going through that course, and was never able to get back to my old regiment. Part of the 5s. was eventually paid back, but after the last war all technical pay was washed out and the infantry and technical corps all got the same.
There are officers who retired before 1951 who are still waiting for an answer from the Treasury. Because we have remained silent on this matter for a few weeks I hope it will not be thought that the issue has been lost sight of. It is not being raised today because I understand the matter is being discussed at a higher level, but I put in this "probe" as a reminder that it has not been forgotten.
Last year, when subsidies were taken off, the Chancellor said that long-service Regular pensioners, and others on small incomes, would get an increase to help them to meet the increase in the cost of living. Most of the old soldiers, sailors and airmen thought that their rather meagre pensions would be increased. I sat on a Committee upstairs and I raised this matter. I was informed that a Royal


Warrant would follow the same course as the 1952 pension increase. Several months later the Royal Warrant was produced, but in it there were three tests, a means test—to which I do not object—a health test, and an age test.
A civilian does not have to undergo either an age or a health test, and it surprises me that the Chancellor should imagine that a soldier of, say, 49 years of age, on a small pension, would want to wait until he is 60 before getting an increased pension. If these men are unemployed, as many are in my constituency, it is now that they are hungry and not when they are 60. These men expected to get the increase automatically after the means test if it was shown that their income was low and they were entitled to it. I ask the Under Secretary to look into this matter, because if we have any further rise in the cost of living these pensioners will be hard hit.
I want to bring to the notice of the Under-Secretary a difficulty confronting officers who have to go overseas at short notice, and then sometimes with promotion are brought back again at shorter notice. There are any number of officers who write to me about the money they lose when they import cars on change of station. Civilians are in the same difficulty, too, but they do have a choice, and often when they are put to this sort of expense their employers pay the difference. But if a major serving in Germany is suddenly promoted and sent home before 18 months are up, he finds himself faced with the expense of the Purchase Tax on his car. Soldiers are not well enough off to pay £200 Purchase Tax on a car for which they have scraped and skimped to buy.
I should like to thank the Secretary of State and the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence for what they have done for Service widows. On the last two Army Estimates, and on the Navy Estimates last year, I pleaded for those admirals' and colonels' widows getting only £95 a year, and I am glad to know that the vice-admiral's widow for whom I pleaded last year is now getting £220 a year, which is a very reasonable rise. I hope that this generous treatment which sometimes comes out of the Treasury will be pushed for all it is worth by the Under-Secretary and the Secretary of State to see that the Services get justice.

12.57 a.m.

Mr. Woodrow Wyatt: We have had a very full and varied day so far, beginning with the Secretary of State unfortunately becoming a casualty soon after the proceedings opened. I am sure that we all wish to congratulate him on the way in which he presented his Estimates, particularly knowing that he was suffering from a high temperature and had to leave immediately after his speech. We moved from gloom at some points to utter darkness, to hilarity and sometimes farce. I do not think that anyone could claim the debate has been without the incident and life which we expect from these debates on the Army Estimates.
Before I come to deal with some of the points that have emerged, I should like to say on behalf of those of us on this side how glad we were to hear the Secretary of State pay his tribute to Field Marshal Slim. We who have had the opportunity of working with him know how much his skill and experience have done for the Army.
I want to begin with one or two unrelated points, and the first of them is a rather small one in one sense, but one which does cause a great deal of grievance and feeling among old soldiers, and I really mean old soldiers. I have always felt rather guilty about the question of campaign pensions. I have always hoped something would be done, and I would like to ask the Under-Secretary whether these are still being deducted when some other form of pension or National Assistance is given. These pensions were small enough to begin with, and were intended to be some recognition of an extra burden which had been borne, and it is rather derisory to take this small amount away.
The next point is in connection with the Home Guard, which, I notice the Secretary of State completely left out of his speech. I was surprised at that because I thought he had taken some pride in the formation of the Home Guard, even although it was against the warnings from this side of the House. I would like to correct a misapprehension existing in the mind of the Member for East Harrow (Mr. Ian Harvey), who said that we had tried to sabotage the Home Guard. We have done nothing of the sort. The position which we adopted


was roughly the position adopted tonight by the hon. Member for Hitchin (Mr. Fisher), and it was that this was not the right time to form the Home Guard.
We said it was the right time to have a nucleus earmarked, to have commanding officers earmarked, to keep registers, to form cadres—which my right hon. Friend did before he left office—but was not the time to try to enrol a Home Guard, partly for the reasons given by the hon. Member for Hitchin—that the enthusiasm we created earlier would soon be dissipated when it became realised that the scheme was not a success and that there was no immediate necessity for it. We thought that the only way to get impetus behind a scheme of this sort was to introduce it when a war seemed imminent to people generally. If a war were to break out, it would have seemed imminent for at least three or four weeks before hand; and we felt that that was the moment at which to try to enrol a Home Guard.

Mr. Fisher: I went a little further than that. The hon. Member is advocating a paper scheme, but I went a little further, because there are disadvantages about a paper scheme when the crisis occurs.

Mr. Wyatt: I think we differ in a very small way about this. What hon. Members choose to call a paper scheme is a matter of opinion. I think commanding officers and adjutants had been earmarked for the battalions, so that it would have been rather more than a paper scheme; it would have been easy to put flesh and blood on to the skeleton when necessary.
The result of this pathetic little episode has been that, instead of having a Home Guard which it was estimated, last year, would have a strength of 170,000, we have a Home Guard of 26,000, and a Home Guard which, as is admitted on all sides of the House, is losing enthusiasm and interest and which will not serve the purpose for which it was originally formed. We still maintain that it was a mistake to have undertaken the scheme and we think it is a pity that the Government do not have sufficient honesty to admit that it was a mistake, to scrap it and to start again with something more sensible. If the present scheme is continued, all the life which remains behind it will be dissipated.
I want to make some comments on the.280 rifle, because I thought the Secretary of State for War did not leave a satisfactory situation after my right hon. Friend had asked several questions about it. We were not very much further informed than we were before the Secretary of State spoke. I want to reinforce the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Fulham, East (Mr. M. Stewart). As I understood it, the situation which had been reached before the Labour Government left office was that there was no difficulty about the cartridge case at all; it had already been arranged that the cartridge case was interchangeable with that of the American round. What was not interchangeable was the calibres of the rifles themselves.
I do not think that we have done very well if, after two years, all the Government can tell us is that they have got as far as having interchangeable cartridge cases, because we were as far as that two years ago. As the Secretary of State said, what still remains to be decided is what the calibre is to be. But that was the cause of all the trouble in the first place. We all knew that two years ago. There seems to have been no improvement in the situation at all.
As we understood it, it was not possible to have the calibre which the Americans wanted and, at the same time, produce the results which had already been produced by the.280. I am sorry to take up the time of the House on this point, but it is one of tremendous importance. If we had a larger calibre, then one of two things must happen. Either we had an altogether unacceptable muzzle blast and flash—which was unacceptable for obvious reasons, for use by night and even by day—or we had a recoil which was uncomfortable, to put it at its mildest. That is a recoil which does not exist at all in the present.280 rifle. It was simply not scientifically possible to produce a rifle with a larger calibre than the.280, which had all the qualities of the.280, which did not have this recoil or this exaggerated muzzle flash. Of course, quite apart from that, it means having a heavier rifle, and the loss of the lightness.
I think it is disgraceful that the Government should have waited for two years and yet have been able only to tell us they have got as far as we had got before,


and that was to have an interchangeable cartridge case with the Americans. What we have done is to sacrifice the possibility of the British Army being armed with this superb weapon for the sake of trying to get a standardisation that is impossible. It is a tragedy because this country cannot let its Armed Forces rely on large numbers; it has to rely on quality. Every soldier we have has to he able to feel he has in his hands a weapon with which to take on the undoubtedly much larger numbers that he will find opposed to him.
I think it is a great pity that the British soldiers in Germany today cannot feel they have a weapon in their hands—as they could have been having this summer if only the Government had not been so dilatory about it—with which they could take on any number of advancing Russians should war break out in Germany.

Mr. Strachey: Or in Korea.

Mr. Wyatt: This particularly applies to Korea, as my right hon Friend says, where there is actual fighting at the moment.
I would wager anything that if that rifle were in our men's hands in Korea the Americans fighting alongside them would be offering any amount of dollars to get hold of it themselves for their personal use, and that that would end the controversy as to which was the better rifle. I hope that the Government will now stop tinkering about with this matter and will go ahead with the manufacture of this weapon, because it is an absurd argument to say we cannot do so because we could not possibly make the ammunition for it in time of war. That is the argument that has been advanced by the Government.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: I should have thought that the hon. Gentleman, having been in the position that he was, would have known that the reason we did not go on with that rifle was that we could not have the production behind us. In war, of course, the Army gets rid of rifles in the most fantastic way, and there must be great production behind us. We in this country could not possibly manufacture rifles on that scale. We might have to get rid of aircraft. tanks, or some other production. Unless we had American production behind

us for that type of rifle we could not possibly go in for it. That was the only reason.

Mr. Wyatt: The hon. and gallant Gentleman has not understood the problem. Where does he think our present rifles come from? They are manufactured here. We have no difficulty about manufacturing rifles and small arms in this country. Rifles wear out and have to be replaced even today, and it is quite a simple matter to manufacture rifles. It does not require a vast scale of production at all. I do not think that our economy is so strained that we cannot even manufacture rifles. I think that is a most absurd argument.
I should now like to leave that subject —I could argue about it all night with the hon. and gallant Gentleman, but there are other topics to discuss as well —and deal with the question of officers and manpower shortage. The Secretary of State has rightly expressed to us his anxiety at the shortage—the continuing shortage—of officers in the Army today. I should like to suggest that he should make very serious and energetic attempts
to try to draw officers from a wider field than that from which they are at present coming. I see an hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite becoming agitated already. I am not saying this because I am suggesting that there is any prejudice in the Army in a general way about the selection of officers.
I am basing my remarks on an interesting article in "The Times," in February. "The Times" is not a revolutionary paper. In that article the last pass-out at Sandhurst was analysed. It worked out that about 170 of the officers passing out had come from schools in the South of England, and 46 from the North. That was one curious division which I think the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) pointed out in the House at the time. Another division was of even greater interest. It was that 162 of those who passed out had come from schools represented at the Headmasters' Conference, in other words, from those schools generally recognised as public schools. Sixty-nine only had come from other schools. In fact, 70 per cent. of all the officers passing through Sandhurst since the war have come from public schools which are members of the Headmasters' Conference.


What this amounts to is that whereas there is a great potential of talent in the other schools, which is shown by certain grammar schools and secondary schools which continue to send boys to Sandhurst, there is no general feeling in the North of England or in most schools outside the public schools, that the Army is a possible career for their boys who hope to get on in life and perhaps to become officers. It is not certain why this is the case. It may be that there has been no tradition of entering the Army from these schools or areas, or it may be the result of prejudice. I think one of the reasons is, and I say this in all seriousness to hon. Members opposite, that there is still a feeling, particularly in schools outside the public schools, that the Army is still a closed preserve: that one has to have a private income— saying that one does in most regiments—and to come from the right sort of background to be accepted in the officers' mess, and to get on.
A lot more has to be done if we are to get the 3,000 officers of which the Army is at present short, the right hon. Gentleman tells us in the Memorandum to the Estimates. That is a tremendous number. We are not going to get them without making every effort to persuade those who run schools outside the Headmasters' Conference that this is a good career for their boys. There is another thing which I think also has an effect, though I hardly dare mention the subject because it seems to bring a rush of blood to the head in some quarters. There is that corps d'elite in the Army, the Brigade of Guards, which gives a wrong impression about the Army to many people who do not have much connection with it.

Mr. Fisher: Mr. Fisherrose——

Mr. Wyatt: Perhaps the hon. Member, who made a charming speech earlier, will contain himself, and I will allow him to intervene if I have said anything which is not true.
It is true, so far as I know, that no officer has received a regular commission in the Brigade of Guards since the end of the war who was not at a public school or educated privately at his parents' expense. It is also true, as the hon. Member for Dudley pointed out, last year, that no officer in the Brigade

of Guards has received a regular commission, apart from quartermasters, who served in the ranks of the Guards on Regular engagement. This means that there is a corps d'elite, a body of troops which has a high, fine record, commanded by persons who must only be drawn from one narrow section of the community, and that one can only achieve a commission in that corps d'elite by birth or wealth, or a combination of both. We are saying to men who are ambitious that they cannot get into that corps unless they have the right background either monetarily or socially.

Mr. Fisher: The hon. Gentleman is advocating greater publicity for those who do not recognise the advantages of an Army career. Surely he would help that cause by acknowledging that Sandhurst is open to all and that it is not a question of privilege. Anybody can get into it.

Mr. Wyatt: I do not follow the relevance of that interruption, because the point I was making was that however possible it might be to get to Sandhurst there are many people who feel that because of their background it is not open to them to become officers in the Army—mistakenly, I believe. Pre-war prejudice lingers on to some extent.
It is also an indisputable fact, which I never heard controverted, that the Brigade of Guards and one or two other regiments—but we will not widen the area too far tonight—are closed preserves on a privilege basis and are not a basis of merit alone. It may be that a large number of officers in the Guards are highly meritorious, but that is not the reason why they got their commissions. One can get a commission in the Guards without being particularly meritorious but not, however meritorious one is, if one has not the right background in the first place.
I suggest that hon. Gentlemen who support the Brigade of Guards—and who, I must say, are a little more patient tonight than they sometimes are—should do what they can to persuade the Brigade of Guards that the present situation cannot indefinitely continue and will be swept aside sooner or later in a way they will find extremely uncomfortable, unless they do something to set their own house in order and make it possible for people


to get commissions in the Guards on merit alone, when they will find that criticism will very much lessen. It would help recruiting generally for officers in the Army because those who are young and ambitious would feel that there was no part of the Army they cannot get into by merit.

Major Legge-Bourke: I was not in the Brigade of Guards, although my father was. My own observations are based on what I have seen myself as instructor at Sandhurst during the war, and I believe that the same policy was followed before the war and is now followed again. There are no colonels who take more trouble over the selection of their officers, to make sure that they are worthy of the commission, than in the Brigade of Guards.

Mr. Wyatt: On merit?

Major Legge-Bourke: I can speak from my own experience when I say that these officers are chosen on merit. No officer who is not making the grade at Sandhurst, where he is judged by his peers—and they come from many other schools than those which the hon. Gentleman dislikes so much——

Mr. Wyatt: Mr. Wyattrose——

Major Legge-Bourge: Let me finish my sentence. The hon. Gentleman gave way to me.

Mr. Wyatt: I think I have grasped the the point which the hon. and gallant Gentleman is making and I do not think, however much more he elaborates it——

Major Legge-Bourke: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. When an hon. Gentleman gives way, does he not usually let the Member to whom he gave way complete his sentence?

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Charles MacAndrew): I think he has come to the end of a good many sentences.

Mr. Wyatt: I think I grasp the hon. and gallant Gentleman's point.
What I think he is trying to say is that, from within a small group from which selection is possible, they select the best. I have never disputed that, but what the hon. and gallant Member says is rather like saying the present Government contains all the best men in this House. That is not true; what it may

contain is some of the best men in the Conservative Party, although there is some division of opinion in the party opposite even about that. Those responsible for selecting officers for the Brigade of Guards take enormous trouble to get the best from the very small group from which selection is allowed; but one of my major complaints is that they restrict the group to such a small number in the first instance.
I should like to go a little further into this question of the shortage of officers. When the Secretary of State sat on this side of the House he was very fearsome about the terrible way in which the previous Government got officers stuck in the War Office and other undesirable and worthless places. That is a summary of his words, and not mine. Today, we have 1,073 fighting Army officers in the War Office; that is only 50 fewer than last year, and if the Secretary of State really meant what he said in 1951 about what we should have, there would have been fewer than 1,073 fighting officers at the War Office today.
The right hon. Gentleman spoke during a debate on the Army Estimates in 1951. He told us how the size of the War Office staff of senior officers was regularly mounting, and he spoke of the evils that flowed from it; how senior officers wanted more senior officers under them, and how they all wanted clerks and desks, and he became poetical and witty in a way that only he can. He said:
There is some excuse for an increase, but not of this size. Directors, major-general—today, 22; in 1938, 15; directors, grade B—today, 12; 1938, none; Brigadiers—today, 6; 1938, none; deputy directors, brigadiers—today, 25; 1938, 5; deputy directors, colonels, today, 10; 1938, none; full colonels, today, 12; 1938, none—though I am coming to that—grade one staff officers —today, 172; 1938, 50."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 8th March, 1951; Vol. 485, c. 816.]
He added that up to 259, but we know that arithmetic is not his strong point, for the fact is that the total is 247.
I thought that when the right hon. Gentleman got to the War Office there would be a tremendous slaughter of these high staff officers who were sitting in their comfortable offices; that we should see a wholesale removal into active theatres, where they would have been more useful. But it is interesting to look at the figures for this year; for, whereas in 1951, the


total was 247, today for the same grant it is 271. So much for his enthusiasm for the policy of scouring out the higher levels at the War Office. I do not say that he should have done so, but it is surely wrong to add 24 generals and brigadiers to the higher levels.
I would like to make a suggestion to the right hon. Gentleman; I actually made this when I was at the War Office, but it did not get very far at that time. I am sure it will appeal to him now. It is that there should be no Grade 3 staff officer of military age capable of serving in a field unit in the War Office. What is the point of a fit Grade 3 staff officer sitting in the War Office? Sometimes we are told that he gets to see another part of the Army and it is useful to have a little knowledge about the War Office disseminated among the units at large. I do not think that it is useful and those of us who have been Grade 3 staff officers, particularly at high H.Qs., know that the work could be done by a chief clerk, by a G.2 who worked a little harder or by an officer from the women's side of the Service of an equivalent rank. I can see no justification for having in the War Office 250 Grade 3 staff officers who ought to be in field units. If we applied ourselves to this and used more of the officers who were retired as G.3s we should be able to deal with that situation quite quickly.
The problem of raising the Regular content of the Army, both in officers and men, is certainly one to which I do not propose to try to offer any permanent solution tonight. It is a problem which will remain with us for a long time and I do not see my way clearly through it. I think that the new scheme for three-year recruiting, which was agreed to before the Labour Government left office, is showing good results and we should wait and see how that develops, as the Secretary of State suggested this afternoon.
Of course, there is always the question as to whether or not one should pay officers and other ranks more, but it has always been the case that the officers and other ranks of the Army have been paid not according to what they are worth—they have never been paid that—but what the country can afford at any given time. I do not think that any officer or soldier in the British Army is worth less than an

American officer or soldier, and I should like us to be in a position to pay them as much, but we know that we can never do that and that payment will always be governed by what we can afford.
Meanwhile, I think that the Secretary of State ought not to resort to rather superficial methods of apparently increasing the size of the Army which are not genuine increases. My hon. Friend the Member for Dudley touched on this tonight. He referred to the question of increasing the size of the Army from 10 1/3 divisions to 11 1/3 divisions apparently by producing seven more new battalions. In his Memorandum the Secretary of State says that the Army is short of 3,000 officers and 5,000 other ranks. I would not mind betting that, if we take an average in the battalions of the Army of today, most of them have no more than 700 other ranks in each battalion, and if we multiply that by seven, it is 4,900, or the seven battalions which the Secretary of State says he has produced since he came into office. But he says he is short of 5,000 other ranks and that is where they are.
This is not good enough. We can make any number of battalions by halving the strength of the battalions and other formations, but it does not mean that we have increased our strength. It is a shadow. It is the same as putting pieces of cardboard in exercises to represent tanks. I do not think that the right hon. Gentleman should try to get away with that one because he has not really increased the effective strength of the Army. He found that the problem which he thought was so easy when he was not in office, of reducing the size of the divisions, was a great deal harder when he got into office. In fact, there is not very much he can do about it so long as we agree on the present size of the division.
I will touch briefly on the question of National Service. I do not think that we are committed indefinitely to having a two-year period of National Service. It is quite conceivable that with the adjustments which will come from the alteration of our dispositions in the Middle East, over a period of 12–18 months it may be found possible to reduce conscription perhaps by three months, at any rate for a start, although I do not think that at this moment, with our present commitments, it can be done.


I should like to consider one or two other questions relating to the use of the Army in a wider sense. At present we use the Army (a) as a police force to keep order in various parts of the world, and (b) as a deterrent force to warn any potential aggressor that if he attacks us he will be resisted. I should like to touch particularly on this second category, because if the Army is to be a good deterrent it must be an effective fighting force if we should be attacked.
I wonder whether we have not closed our minds a little too soon to thinking about the correct size and shape of the Army. I refer particularly to the size of the division. My hon. Friend the Member for Fulham, East spoke of the exercise which is to take place later this year and which may reveal something of what warfare under atomic conditions would be like. One thing which I am certain it will show is that we cannot expect to have a division, as constructed today, with 5,272 vehicles able to move up and down the roads in anything like the kind of way that was done during the last war. I think that that would be absolutely impossible.
The only reason that we were able to have vast concourses of vehicles in Normandy during the last war without them all being utterly destroyed was that we had complete air superiority. It would have been insane to have put that number of vehicles into the bridgehead at Normandy if we had not had complete air superiority—and even then we only just got away with it.
If anybody thinks that if war breaks out we can disport a division with 5,272 vehicles, 1,277 of them three-ton lorries, up and down the roads and use it as an effective fighting force, he is living in cloud cuckoo land. The first dropping of an atom bomb would disperse that lot of vehicles quickly, and at once we would find that the roads were laid waste to a very greater extent than in the last war.
It would be much more difficult to use vehicles in the way that we did in the last war, and we certainly would not have air superiority at the beginning of the next war if it should come within the next few years, because, as we know, there is the preponderance of potential enemy aeroplanes to our own. I would

not even like to say what the ratio is, but the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence has a fairly good idea of it, and it would certainly not give us anything like air cover for the number of vehicles which we would be disposing.
I ask whether we cannot consider reducing the number of vehicles. We were always over-insured on vehicles in the last war. I think that it was the no-doubt wise feeling of Field Marshal Montgomery in certain situations, but it was partly due to the mentality which he shed forth that we always had a heavy over-insurance. I am quite certain that one could ruthlessly strip the number of vehicles in an infantry division and it would fight just as effectively as before.

Mr. Ian Harvey: The hon. Member accused my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War of finding things more difficult now that he is in office as opposed to when he was in opposition. Not one single word or factor that the hon. Member is mentioning is new. Would he be good enough to tell us what he did when he was in office as opposed to now that he is in opposition?

Mr. Wyatt: We cut the number of vehicles in the infantry divisions quite a lot, but they need to be cut more. It is rather pathetic that the party opposite always have to govern by reference to what the Labour Party did when in office. They seem quite unable to put a foot forward in any direction without seeing whether we did it first. If we did not do it, of course it cannot be done.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: Brigadier Prior-Palmer rose——

Mr. Wyatt: We do not want to prolong the debate too long.
There is another point I should like to make about the size of the division. It came up in the discussion on the.280 rifle. We are a small nation which has to live and to fight, if it has to fight, by quality. It seems extraordinary that we should have committed ourselves, over a period of time, to what is one of the largest divisions in the world as though we had a vast mass of manpower behind on which to draw—which we have not—instead of having smaller and lighter divisions. I should like us to have experiments to see whether we could dispense


with corps headquarters altogether, I have never been in corps headquarters so have naturally thought them a superfluous organisation—that is a deliberately exaggerated view, but I think that we could certainly experiment in order to cut one link in the chain. [Laughter.]
The hon. and gallant Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer) laughs, but I am sure that with his military experience even he would be equal to commanding an army without corps headquarters interposing. In the last war it was frequently the fact that Army commanders had such poor information that they by-passed corps headquarters with special information units. There were too many links in the chain—

Mr. Paget: The Germans very often did without corps headquarters.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: They lost the war.

Mr. Wyatt: I thank my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) for his assistance. It is absolutely true and the laughter from the other side of the House and the comment that the Germans lost the war discounts any pretentious military knowledge whatever, because at least the Germans have one claim to fame in the world and we all know how well they did against very superior numbers on both fronts.
Another reason why I suggest that we should really consider whether we have got to the last word in the size of a division and could not do with a smaller division is because a smaller division would bring us more into line with the divisions on the Continent and the gruppentents to be formed at some future date in the European Army. Whether we like the European Army or not and whether we finally enter it, or whatever association we have with it, it would be much more sensible to have a division which was nearer in size to divisions in that Army than one which is so disparate as is ours today.
While on the subject of the European Army, one wonders why the Government never give us any information on what is going on about it. We are not allowed to have any information in any debate on foreign affairs and never in

a defence debate and we do not get answers to Questions at Question time. I suppose it is quite hopeless to expect the Under-Secretary to say anything about it tonight, but I understand that the French Government have proposed to us that we should declare that our four divisions at present in Germany shall remain in Germany indefinitely and be associated indefinitely with the European Army and work in co-operation with it.
If we make such a declaration they would see that we had a seat on the Council of Ministers with the power to intervene and to vote whenever matters arose which concerned our interests; also, we would have a similar seat on the Commissariat running the Army in a more detailed form. Speaking for myself I do not think that is an unreasonable bargain, but we have not been told the facts by the Government. We have never been told what answer was sent by the Government to those proposals.
Whatever we may think about this question, the British public are entitled to know what proposals have been made about the European Army and what was the reply. I understand that we have replied that we do not want to accept the French proposals; that we have done nothing whatever about the present European Defence Community nor made any proposals to form a fresh one should the present proposals collapse. I think it time we were told about these matters by the Government and that more initiative was taken by the Government.
Finally, I wish to touch on the question of arms and equipment for the reserve divisions of the Army. My right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) read out some alarming statements he had found in the Memorandum to the Estimates. But there is an even more alarming statement in the White Paper on Defence. It states, at the end of paragraph 5:
There was also good reason to doubt whether, even after the plan had been completed,"—
this refers to the £4,700 million rearmament programme—
the cost of maintaining the forces which would have by then been built up and of keeping them equipped with the most up-to-date material would have been within the country's resources.


In other words, it is not now intended, as I see it from the White Paper —and I think we are entitled to know the facts in this serious matter—to supply the 12 reserve divisions being built up under the rearmament programme with the arms and equipment they were to have originally. We are building up 12 reserve divisions which will not be properly equipped. That is what the White Paper means unless the Government can give us some other explanation. The plan which was to give us 12 reserve divisions, capable of being landed on the Continent or elsewhere fully armed and equipped within a matter of days after the outbreak of war, has apparently been shelved.
The Under-Secretary should inform us of the position about these resrve divisions. If they are not to be armed and equipped as was originally intended why have them at all? Within the limits of the present rearmament programme it would be wiser to make certain that the reserve divisions are properly equipped before going in for more futuristic weapons. It is no use having reserves unless they have a fair chance if war begins.
I feel very much as does my hon. Friend the Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons) about the British soldier—I say the hon. and gallant Member for Brierley Hill, because he is just as much entitled to be called that as any hon. Member who held a Commission. He described the British soldier as the best in the world, the most patient and the most cheerful, and deserves the best weapons. It is wicked for the Government to create a situation in which the young British soldier may be sent into the horrors of a modern war with inadequate weapons. They have completely dodged telling the country that they are, in fact, proposing to have 12 reserve divisions, some of which may not be adequately armed, even although they may have to be used in the first few days of war. We want to be told much more about this so that the country may judge what the Government are doing.
We on this side of the House feel that the British Army has done more than its duty since the end of the war. It has proved itself to be still the finest fighting force in the world, and if it is given the weapons to do its job it will never fail us in the future.

1.46 a.m.

Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison: I must start by asking for some measure of indulgence from the House because illness is no respector of persons or Parliamentary programmes, and only quite recently, today, in fact, I had to take over from the Secretary of State something which he would have done far better than I can hope to do. Everyone will say that the Secretary of State, in addition to being an excellent Minister, is also a master of camouflage because there must have been very few who recognised, from what I considered to be an excellent speech, that he was running a rather disturbing temperature. He asked me also to say that he was sorry not to be able to see the debate out, and that he hopes the House will forgive him.
I have accumulated, as I have listened to the debate, a very large number of questions, and I have been thinking with a certain amount of envy of the jingle in Alice in Wonderland, in which the old man says:
I have answered three questions, and that is enough.
Said his father: Don't give yourself airs, Do you think I can listen all day to such stuff?
Be off, or I'll kick you downstairs.
However much one would like to reply in that way it would be unparliamentary if not undemocratic, so I will go through the debate, answering the more important points. The other points will be considered, and hon. Gentlemen will get an answer to their points in writing.
The hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) asked about the recruiting in the five colonial battalions. The answer to that is one infantry battalion of the Malay Regiment, one battalion of the Malayan Federation Forces, two battalions of the Malay Regiment volunteer forces, and the equivalent of a battalion from units raised in Singapore, West Africa and elsewhere.
I think the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) replied effectively to his hon. Friend, who said earlier that the A.A. defences were lamentable. The right hon. Gentleman said that they were not lamentable. They are not lost from view in the share of weapons which they should get.
Then a question was put to me on the reductions in divisional and brigade headquarters, and the proportion of


officers to other ranks. The proportion is one officer to 15 other ranks. Both formations are, in fact, suffering from the cut that has taken place.
The next important point I would like to come to is about the.280 rifle which was put by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey). It was also raised by the Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt). The kernel of the question, as I think is realised, is the cartridge. The hon. Member for Aston and his colleagues realised the great importance and value of standardisation, if only it could be achieved, and, after the last conference with the United States, which reached no conclusion, we decided to go ahead with the production of a new and, as far as possible, ideal cartridge, plus bullet, along with our friends in Canada and Belgium. A considerable amount of progress has been made. I would point out that even if the steps which the hon. Member suggested had been taken immediately we came into office, there would not have been a single.280 rifle in the hands of a soldier in the British Army at present. There would not have been one in 1953, and it is doubtful whether there would have been in 1954.
Trials are taking place this summer with the new cartridge. We shall then proceed to produce the best rifle to fire that cartridge. If our colleagues in the United States wish to come in with us, it will be easy for them to do so, for in any case the calibre will not be greater than.300 and will probably be.280; and a fairly simple adaptation of the breech of the rifle or the automatic gun will make it possible for the Americans to join in. That is as far as I can go at present. We recognise the very important point contained in this question and we are pushing ahead with the work at present.
The right hon. Member for Dundee, West, asked about the cotton battledress. I think he meant the combat clothing to be used in Korea. That is being made and is partly cotton, and it is to be issued as and when it is suitable. It is not suitable for all climates, and is certainly not suitable except under operational conditions. It has been put into production. The right hon. Gentleman asked about storage for the vehicles and other equipment which we are receiving. I am

glad to say that the situation is more balanced and that the provision of storage is starting to keep pace with the production of this equipment.
I do not intend to dwell for long on the part of the right hon. Gentleman's speech in which he asked how we could get some relaxation in our commitments. He embarked on a speech which he has often made before and which, I venture to suggest, does not make matters easier at a time when we are trying to reach a satisfactory arrangement in Egypt. We already know very well what his views are; they can be argued, and it is an arguable case, but what I think is not arguable is to go on making the same speech on the same point over and over again at the present time.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Eye (Colonel J. H. Harrison) asked whether we are satisfied that we are getting value for the large number of civilians of which the Army is partly composed at present. The best assurance I can give him is in the remarks made by my right hon. Friend when he pointed out that no fewer than three committees or working parties are at present engaged in examining these sorts of problems. I have no doubt that they will even turn their eyes to the comparatively humble occupations of the clerical and typing staff because, after all, it is there that great numbers of people are employed.
My hon. and gallant Friend also asked whether volunteers to the Territorial Army would be placed at a disadvantage, by comparison with those who had not volunteered, in connection with possible liability for the Reserve which it is proposed to introduce. I can tell him that they will not suffer any disadvantage and that their time as volunteers with the Territorial Army will count towards their liability.
Now I come to the speech of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, East (Mr. Blenkinsop). He was concerned mainly with the question of education in the Army, a subject in which I have taken quite a bit of interest. I certainly think, as he said, that it is very important. He wanted to know whether it is being carried on as effectively as possible. He asked questions about children's education. He said that the primary education was


good, but was a bit doubtful about the secondary education, and then he asked about the National Service men having opportunities to take further education courses, and so on.
On the latter point, I have seen such classes; I have been to these classes of National Service men and other soldiers and I have seen them at their work, and, indeed, there is no barrier put in their way if they desire to study. So much to the contrary is the case that their star pay depends on their educational standard. So does their promotion. I cannot devise at the moment any system more calculated to urge them to pass an educational standard than that.

Mr. Blenkinsop: Would the hon. Gentleman not agree that it is a serious thing that there are about three-quarters of the Army who have not taken their third-class certificate? Is that not an alarming position?

Mr. Hutchison: I do not think the hon. Gentleman is right there. I was just going to give some figures thereon. I have had the following figures supplied to me. For the period April, 1951, to March, 1952, there were 27,670 third-class certificates awarded; 13,639 second-class; 3,850 first-class; and 10,519 candidates gained passes in one, two, three, or four subjects. I think that if he examines those figures—and I am prepared to go into them with him after the debate—he will find that that is not an unsatisfactory proportion to have achieved.
Then the hon. Gentleman put the question about illiteracy, which has been rather occupying the public eye. The greatest compliment there that could have been paid to us was paid by his hon. Friend the Member for Fulham, East (Mr. M. Stewart) who said he regarded us as being authorities on this, and could he send—his wife, I think he said—along to see how it was carried out? We are extremely anxious to go ahead with this work. We have a number of these preliminary education centres. I agree that they cater only for the moment for the Regular soldier because we have not been able to expand them sufficiently to go further, but I think the hon. Gentleman will agree that we must first of all look after the Regulars; but I hope in course of time, with more funds, we shall

be able to expand the Service so as to take more.
Then there was the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Windsor (Mr. Mott-Radclyffe) in which he emphasised something with which I fully agree —that the Army has been built on tradition, and largely regimental tradition. I think he said also regional tradition—a sort of territorial conception. It is true we have introduced a group system which divides the infantry up into groups of battalions which have some territorial connection. Within a group soldiers can be transferred; outside the group they can be transferred only with much greater difficulty. The group system is a half way house between a complete return to the old regimental conception and the corps conception for which the hon. Gentleman the Member for Dudley was asking.
Then there came the speech of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons), which I had the greatest difficulty in following because there were parts with which I agreed wholeheartedly and parts with which I disagreed most violently. But there were some things in his speech tonight with which I found myself in complete agreement. He started by saying our National Service men and other soldiers in Korea were absolutely first-class.
He then said, and it was also true, that we have a serious responsibility in voting the Estimates, and in examining them. I would point out that we would have a more serious responsibility if we did not vote them, but left the situation in a vacuum. He also said that we must win the war of ideals. With that I agree. We believe that in the end truth will defeat the lie; but one has to defend the fountain of truth until that truth has overcome the lie. That is why we must have the shores of these islands, and the frontiers of our allies, protected.
He then spoiled what was otherwise a good speech by talking about the Army's endless appetite for men, the modem Moloch. I think it has been made clear that we only want National Service men within the limits of what is necessary after we have got a Regular Army. Another hon. Member asked whether we have departed from the conception that the ideal would be a complete Regular Army. No, we have not departed from that ideal; if we could face


our commitments with a Regular Army we would like to do that.
Then there was the speech of the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. T. T. Paget). In it there were points on which I must join issue with him. He kept talking as if we had abandoned the defence programme. He has only to look at the amount of money voted every year in the Estimates to see that each year the amount has been growing. What has happened is that the cadence of it has been altered. There has been a greater time lag.

Mr. Paget: At first, it was said that the defence programme would be spread over a longer time. Then cancellation took place. About one-third of the equipment was cut; contracts were cancelled, and armament firms were left unemployed.

Mr. Hutchison: It may be so, in certain instances, as weapons change, or the conception of the need for them changes. But the general rearmament programme is going on from year to year at an increased rate of expenditure.

Mr. Paget: The Defence White Paper itself says that it is to be held to a lower total; in fact, to almost exactly what was proposed by the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan). It is precisely what he said.

Mr. Hutchison: It is going on as quickly as your hon. friends at that time decided. It is exaggeration to say that a programme which has been altered or extended has been abandoned. It would be undesirable that it should reach any of our allies that what we were going to do has been abandoned. We are bearing a great burden, and a greater expenditure in every one of the Estimates presented to the House.
The hon. and learned Member raised the question of larger bodies of men within these shores, and ridiculed the mobile columns. It is always easy to bring ridicule to bear by attaching a spurious name to them. But the columns are serious fighting units. I have seen some of them, and they are not all composed of cooks from the kitchen. The whole intake to Eaton Hall and to Mons Officer Cadet Schools goes to swell these mobile units.
The hon. Member for Harrow, East (Mr. Ian Harvey) complimented us on improvements in publicity and asked what was being done about ground defence in this country. I think it is important that the conception should not go out that there is no need for anti-aircraft weapons.
To begin with, he mentioned searchlights. Until radar equipment is more effective than it is now, searchlights will be necessary for low-flying aircraft. Light and medium anti-aircraft guns are still very necessary in present circumstances. It is true that guided missiles are being developed and may be a force that in the long term will alter the conception of defence, but it would be quite wrong at the present time, and a great pity, for Anti-Aircraft Command to think that the anti-aircraft gun is finished and done with.
In his speech, the hon. Member for Fulham, East referred to exercises to be held in this country on the effect of atomic weapons. It may have a great many repercussions and influences. The hon. Gentleman said he would want to have more information about this; so indeed would I. We had better wait until we have the exercises to see what the effect will be. Some of the matters in which training will take place will be how to protect oneself against blast, gamma rays, and the various other deleterious effects of atomic weapons. Let us first see what comes out of these exercises; then we shall be able to judge more clearly what the repercussions will be.
The hon. Gentleman asked about colonial troops. I wonder whether I have given him the answer he expected. It has already been supplied. He also mentioned the.280 rifle, which I have also dealt with. Then he asked me about some minor questions which I will not answer just now. I should like to go into them with him when the debate is over.
Then there was the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Horsham (Mr. Gough), in which he mentioned the strategic reserve and indicated that it should be provided for by withdrawing the Parachute Brigade and supplying air transport. The question of air transport will fall much more appropriately in the debate on Thursday. I suggest that he puts his question forward then. He also


inquired about the mobile columns, and about what happened last year. I think he said that he had seen the exercises and had made inquiries, and had come to the conclusion that the exercises and the degree of training were good. Small arms training is, naturally, a most inportant part of the training of any column which has to do fighting, and it is not lost sight of.
He went on to outline a rather visionary scheme, and I am afraid I could not support him in it, in which he mentioned the merging of the voluntary element of the Territorial Army with the Home Guard. That would alter the whole conception of the Home Guard as a part-time, living-at-home, defended-locality form of Force. The Territorial Army is intended, if the need should arise, to go abroad; the Home Guard is the very reverse.
The hon. Member for Rugby (Mr. J. Johnson) wanted larger Colonial Forces. His speech was adequately answered by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Perth and East Perthshire (Colonel Gomme-Duncan). The real trouble is that officers and n.c.o.s are required all over the world. We have been supplying a number to the units that are being used in Malaya, and that has been a biggish drain on us already. This aspect of the matter is the bottle-neck. We are as anxious as is the hon. Member to see the very valuable reservoir of military power to which he referred extended.
The hon. Member asked also whether there was any political opposition to increasing the size of the African army. The answer is that I know of none out there, and there is certainly none at home. My hon. and gallant Friend, the Member for Perth and East Perthshire, in fact left me with nothing to answer with regard to the admirable speech of the hon. Member for Rugby.
The hon. Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Central (Mr. Short) spoke—I do not see him here at the moment—on instruction. But he is an expert on instruction, and I did tell him last year, when he raised this same point, that we are doing all we can to raise the standard of instruction. There is something in the theory that those being instructed now are highly critical; they have a higher standard of education, and the higher that

standard on the part of the instructed, the higher is expected to be the standard of the instructors. We have teams of inspectors going round to see that the standard is as high as possible.
The hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) then spoke on one of his favourite themes—the officers of the Brigade of Guards—and here I really must join issue with him. It just is not possible to have thoroughly good men and thoroughly bad officers. That does not work, and if, as he says, the Guardsmen are first-class fighting material, he cannot at the same time say that their officers are bad.
My hon. Friend the Member for Hitchin (Mr. Fisher) gave us some interesting hints on how to improve recruiting figures, and they will be noted; I promise him that. He spoke about the bad condition of some barracks, and we fully recognise that some are out-of-date. In the coming year we are going to make some sort of effort to improve them, but, as we all know, finance is desperately short.
The hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler) spoke, like many others in this debate, about the two-year engagement, and wanted to be assured that we did not abandon that conception of the Army whereby the more we can increase the Regular content, then pro tanto the more can we reduce the demands on the National Service men, both in numbers and in time. But the Regular recruitment figures at present would not allow of what he wants.
There has been reference throughout the debate to tail combing. This old phrase keeps cropping up, but I would draw the attention of hon. Members to the fact that the three committees or working parties which have been set up recently by my right hon. Friend are concerned to see that we are not wasting manpower. A continuous battle is going on against that. One of my hon. Friends spoke about standardisation; but I must point out that it takes two to standardise; there are others to be persuaded and convinced that they should participate.
The hon. Member for Dudley said he considered that the Minister's speech was a confession of failure. I regard it in a very different light. We still have to


come to the acid test in regard to Regular recruiting. We shall know in a short period of time how many of the present short engagements will become longterm engagements so that we do not have a rapid run-out.
As my right hon. Friend said in his speech, he appreciates perfectly the importance of a fairly high percentage of n.c.os. having a good deal of service behind them. In fact he estimates that something like 33 per cent. of Regular recruits must stay on for six years, and of those about half will need to stay for nine. So we are at one about the purpose. It is only a question of how we are to achieve it, and no one can yet assess whether the scheme has been a success or failure. All I can say is that the first part of it has been a success.
The hon. Gentleman asked about the strength of the 16th Parachute Brigade. I cannot give him strengths. It is contrary to precedent, particularly in theatres of that kind, but we have been having difficulty in keeping these units up to strength. I cannot give him the strengths of the seven new battalions about which he was concerned, but we are not in the least disappointed. When someone said that we were making no progress at all in respect of the number of units which were battleworthy, I should like to draw attention to the total strength of the Army, as shown in the Defence White Paper in Annex 1, on 1st December, 1952, and 1st April, 1953; the total strength went up from 446,000 to 454,000. Then, if the hon. Gentleman will realise that at the same time we have cut the divisional slice—in other words, the tail of the Army—it must show that there are new battleworthy units because we cannot have both sets of circumstances and not throw up new units.

Mr. Wigg: I appreciate the difficulty of giving actual strengths, but is there one unit in the Middle East which is up to establishment and is there one single battalion of the seven which is up to strength?

Mr. Hutchison: Yes, I can say that there are some of the seven battalions which are up to strength, and I can say that all the units, with the exception of the 16th Parachute Brigade in M.E.L.F. are up to lower establishment for other

ranks and just below it for officers, so the picture is not as gloomy as the hon. Gentleman painted it.
Next came the speech of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Ports mouth, West (Brigadier Clarke). He asked first about the conditions under which a man who began a 22 years' engagement could break away. He can break away at the end of each period of three years but must not break away so as to have the effect of doing a total amount of service shorter than that for which his original contract would have made him liable. That is to say, if he signs on for seven years he cannot break before nine; if for five, he cannot break before six. So that he cannot benefit from the conditions of an existing contract by coming into the 22 years' engagement and then breaking it. But, subject to that, he can get out at the end of every three years on giving between six months' and one year's notice.
My hon. and gallant Friend said that in times of crisis the Army had the reputation of always suffering a pay cut, and that that kind of story went down from father to son. I should like everybody to try to scotch a rumour of that sort. He has only to point to what has happened. It is to the credit of both political parties that we have been through a number of periods of crisis between 1946 and 1951 and at no time was there ever any pay cut in the Army. While we are not in a crisis now, we cannot say that we are feeling extremely comfortable in the economic field, but there certainly is no question at present of a cut in the Army pay.
My hon. and gallant Friend asked about pensions, which really is a question for my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence because it concerns all three Services. His question about Purchase Tax on soldiers' and officers' motor-cars is one which he must address to my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary to the Treasury.
The hon. Member for Aston asked me a few questions that I have not yet answered. I will reply to them as quickly as possible. As regards. first, campaign pensions, these we inherited. We made no change from what has gone on for a very long time. But I remind the hon. Gentleman that these


campaign pensions, which are cut when a higher scale of pension is allowed to the pensioner, were originally intended to "keep the wolf from the door." As is said on page 167 of the Estimates, they were designed for those in need. With the more generous pensions which are available to the country in general, that desperate need is now pretty rare.
The hon. Member asked about selecting officers from a wider field. That is exactly what we aim to do in the new school at Welbeck Abbey, and in providing technical commissions via the military college at Shrivenham. We are struggling very hard to get all the entries possible into Welbeck Abbey, and I am sorry that my country—Scotland—has lagged badly behind in the applications for the first course. The applications for the first course have gone extremely well. We are having a course of 50 this year, and we have had 200 applications, but we hoped for many more from the North. The further north that we go, apparently, the more difficult it is to get entrants.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Can the hon. Gentleman explain that?

Mr. Hutchison: No, unless it is a natural insularity, which the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) has clearly overcome. He moved from Wales to Scotland, and with great facility he moved from Scotland here.

Mr. Hughes: I am by no means the first to do so. The Prime Minister was an Englishman who went to a Scottish constituency and he stayed there, but they threw him out. They have not thrown me out yet.

Mr. Hutchison: The hon. Gentleman in this matter—it is not often I can say this—has set a very good example; and I hope that others from Scotland will come and make use of the facilities that we are throwing open at Welbeck Abbey. The hon. Gentleman, however, is perhaps a little late for Welbeck Abbey. Whether it is right or wrong that the Brigade of Guards is a "closed shop"—I have always admired the Brigade of Guards enormously —why should that make other people shy of entering another unit? I simply cannot understand that, and I do not believe there is any substance in what has been said.
The hon. Member for Aston asked about cutting the War Office staff. I completely failed to follow his figures. He will see from page 64 of the Estimates that my right hon. Friend has achieved exactly what he promised to do: that was, to achieve a 10 per cent. cut in the staff of the War Office. I have looked at the figures of the higher ranks and of the lower ranks, and it seems to me that the cut is pretty equally divided.

Mr. Wyatt: I do not see why the hon. Gentleman should have failed to follow my figures, because I read them from HANSARD exactly as his right hon. Friend gave them in 1951. The Secretary of State then dwelt specifically on the fact that there were a large number of very senior officers at the War Office and said that there ought not to be anything like that large number. In the groups which he gave, the right hon. Gentleman said that the number was 259, whereas it was 247. Today, in exactly those same groups which the right hon. Gentleman criticised for being so large, there are now 271. That is the point I was making. The right hon. Gentleman was very upset that there should be all those major-generals, brigadiers, and so on, at the War Office, and said that they ought to be removed.

Mr. Hutchison: I did not have the advantage of knowing that the hon. Gentleman would quote those figures, but if he looks at Vote 3—the War Office Vote—he will find that whereas there were 7,700 at the War Office——

Mr. Wyatt: That is all ranks, and not brigadiers and major-generals.

Mr. Hutchison: If the hon. Gentleman looks through the Vote, he will find that there are reductions in the numbers of brigadiers, etc. I do not think we can argue any more over that. The figures are there for everyone to see. Our pledge was that we should reduce the War Office staff by 10 per cent. and that has been done. That is not too bad an achievement when we consider the expansion which has been going on in the Army and, indeed, with the starting of the Home Guard.
The hon. Member mentioned the size of the division. It is true that the question of transport has worried us, as it worried him. Three years ago a committee was set up to go into the question of reducing the amount of transport in


the divisional organisation. A number of reductions have been made; the trailer system has been introduced; and investigations are still going on.
The hon. Member wondered whether we could do away with corps headquarters altogether. I think he will know the conception, which started a long time ago, of how an army or similar body of men could be commanded. It is that there must be a superior officer commanding not more than three or perhaps four—for instance, the lance corporal commanding three men, the platoon commander commanding three sections; and there are not more than four companies in a battalion and three battalions in a brigade. I agree with the hon. Member if we had three or perhaps only four divisions but when we hay seven, eight, or nine divisions we must have corps headquarters.
The hon. Member asked if we should not have smaller divisions. What we have to watch is that if we have too small divisions we shall once again have an uneconomic proportion of tail to teeth because there are certain services and certain staffs we must have, however small the division. If we start reducing the firing-line component of the division too much we shall start getting too high a proportion of tail to teeth again. It is a question in which a careful balance is needed.

Mr. Wyatt: Is the hon. Gentleman going to deal with the question of equipment and arms of the reserve division, on which not only I but several hon. Members touched?

Mr. Hutchison: That flows from some delay in production. It is not an abandonment, and it is most important that the point made by the hon. and learned Member for Northampton should not be overstated. It is not a question of abandonment but it will mean a greater delay in the arrival of some of the equipment to the various parts of the Army.

Mr. Wyatt: I am sorry to press this point but it is very serious. If the hon. Gentleman is correct in what he is now saying, what does the statement in the White Paper mean where it says, in discussing the completion or otherwise of the rearmament plan of £4,700 million:

There was also good reason to doubt whether, even after the plan had been completed, the cost of maintaining the forces which would have by then have been built up and of keeping them equipped with the most up-to-date material would have been within the country's resources.
If that does not mean that we are not going to complete the original programme even if we take longer, what does it mean?

Mr. Hutchison: It means that we are going to complete the original programme although there may be weapons which may not be as modern as they otherwise would have been had they been supplied at an earlier date.
We must leave it at that point. We have ranged widely and there have been a number of points of agreement. One of the points of agreement—I am sure that every hon. Member in this House will share my views and the views of hon. Members opposite—is that the National Service man and the British soldier, whether in the Canal Zone, or Korea, or at home, is as good as ever he was, and is doing a first-class job for his country.

Mr. Burden: Before my hon. Friend sits down, may I ask about a hospital which was mentioned on 15th July last? His right hon. Friend said the project was under review, and I had hoped we might be told whether the first bricks would be laid this year.

Mr. Hutchison: I wish I could tell my hon. Friend, but I am afraid that I cannot, because I do not know one way or the other. All I can say is that this hospital—I think it is in Northern Ireland, at Lisburn—is one of the earliest priorities of all the medical requirements we have on our books. But whether the first bricks will be laid this year or not I do not know. I will let my hon. Friend know by and by.

2.30 a.m.

Mr. Richard Adams: Perhaps I should begin by saying how glad we are to have the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence with us, even though his manner appears to be rather sullen and dejected. Perhaps that is a hang-over from the Defence debate last week. Certainly his manner now is very different from the almost hysterical joie de vivre with which he tackled these Service Estimates when he sat on this side of the House.


I would say to the Leader of the House that we are glad to see him sitting with us for a while though, if I may say so, he is looking rather out of training for late nights. But the night is young, and this debate is likely to go on for some time yet. So if he cares to leave us and take a rest we shall be glad to see him back in the Chamber later.
Before getting down to the subject matter of the Estimates, I would say a word to the Government Chief Whip, who I see is anxiously manoeuvring with a view to getting——

Major Beamish: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. I simply cannot follow what all this has to do with the business which we are supposed to be discussing.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Mr. Hopkin Morris): At the moment, neither can I.

Mr. Adams: Well, like all good things, in the course of time all these points will be seen to be perfectly relevant to this important debate. Surely it is worth while drawing the attention of hon. Members on both sides of the House to the apparent anxiety of the Government Chief Whip to muster sufficient troops to secure the Closure, but I would warn him to make——

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. P. G. T. Buchan-Hepburn): Perhaps the hon. Member will allow me to say that I have no intention of moving the Closure, and that it is not usual to do so in a Service debate.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I hope that we may now return to the Motion before the House.

Mr. Adams: I was about to say that it was not in keeping with precedent, and we are glad to have that assurance from the Government Chief Whip——

Mr. Buchan-Hepburn: Get on with it.

Mr. Adams: The Chief Whip may say, "Get on with it," but I have no intention ——

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I hope that the hon. Member will now come to the Motion before the House.

Mr. Adams: Certainly, Mr. Deputy-Speaker——

Mr. Wigg: I do not wish to come between my hon. Friend and the House, but I submit that on a Motion, "That Mr. Speaker do leave the Chair," my hon. Friend was within the rules of order in what he said.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I do not think that what he said was within the rules of order or related to the Motion before the House.

Mr. Wigg: The Motion, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair" is purposely as wide as the Motion, "That this House do now adjourn." I am sure that nothing my hon. Friend has said is out of order.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The Motion may be wide, but I do not think that what the hon. Member said relates to the Motion.

Mr. Adams: If I may now proceed, I am sure I shall be within the rules of order when I say we regret the reasons for the absence of the Secretary of State for War and that we should have liked to have had him with us. We congratulate the Under-Secretary on the painstaking reply he has given to the debate so far as it has proceeded. As he said himself, "some have greatness thrust upon them," and it is not his fault that the policy of his Department is such that he found great difficulty in giving satisfactory answers to many of the points raised by my hon. Friends.
I listened with interest to the hon. Member for Hitchin (Mr. Fisher), and I thought that many of his points were forward looking. It was a great pity that in some of his more progressive observations he came into conflict with the hon. and gallant Member for Perth and East Perthshire (Colonel Gomme-Duncan). I hope that the private quarrel which started here between the Brigade of Guards and the Highland regiments will not be pursued outside between the regiments.
Like the hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr. John Hall), and some of my hon. Friends, I want to say something about the tail. There are also two other points I should like to mention. The first is the contentious question of National Service. This has been covered very fully, and I will content myself with saying that I agree wholeheartedly with what the hon. Member for Fulham, East


(Mr. M. Stewart) said. I will not say anything more about the other contentious subject of the new rifle and ammunition, except to say that after the return of the Prime Minister from America at the end of January this year there appeared in "The Times" of Friday, 6th February, an announcement from the War Office that, following the visit of the Prime Minister, there was agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States that each should retain their existing rifles, and that the development of the new ammunition would continue "at a high research priority." That was an official statement. But anyone who read "The Times" of Saturday, 7th February, with great assiduity would have found tucked away two or three lines to the effect that the agreement to which the statement referred was reached during the visit of the Prime Minister in January, 1952, and not the previous month as stated.
What follows from that is that either the public relations officers at the War Office are so stupid or behindhand that it takes them 12 months to get round to the Prime Minister's visit to the United States of a year ago, or what is more likely, that the rather cagey statement of the War Office of 6th February had to be covered up by a denial on 7th February. I leave it to the Under-Secretary to think it over and decide which was correct.
These Estimates are always interesting reading, not only for their relevance to the subjects under discussion, but also because, much as Ministers try to avoid it, they do very often cast a shadow of coming events. I think the general public would, for example, be well advised to read Vote 6, Subhead A. It is stated, in the explanatory note on the opposite page:
a large part of the provision made here is for the purchase of suitable foodstuffs from the Ministry of Food.
Later it is stated:
Home Service ration scales are kept under review in order to maintain as far as possible general equality in food consumption between the soldier and the comparable civilian.
In other words it is established that the bulk of the money spent on food by the Army is for the purchase of suitable foodstuffs from the Ministry of Food, and that

the ration scale is designed to keep the soldier roughly in line with the civilian. If we turn to the figures, we find that the food and ration allowance in the coming year is going up by more than £5 million. The Minister said today that it costs £67 a year to maintain a soldier and £67·3 to maintain a sailor or an airman. He explained that the slight difference was due to the greater period spent overseas by the other two Services.
The Minister should have given us further enlightenment, however, for the figures show that more than £5 million extra will be spent in the coming year on 554,000 soldiers, which works out at nearly £10 per head per annum or no less than 4s. a week. Since this is comparable with the expenditure for a civilian, it means that in the coming year, through the machinations of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Minister of Food, the average family of four will be called on to spend another 16s. a week on their food.

Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison: That is stretching it a long way.

Mr. Adams: The facts are there for everyone to read. If it is to cost another £10 a year to feed a soldier, then it will cost another £10, or about that sum, to feed a civilian outside the Service.
Tempting as it is to pursue other interesting aspects of the Estimates, because of the lateness of the hour I will confine myself to Vote 4, dealing with pay and allowances of civilians. The Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for War and their colleagues have always claimed that there has been a large tail to the Army, a situation which they would remedy when they took office. What are the facts disclosed by Vote 4?
Incidentally, may I suggest that it is high time that Vote 4, which shows the number of civilians employed by the War Department, was accounted for in the same way as Vote A? It is the practice of Secretaries of State for War to mesmerise hon. Members and the public by placing before them the magic figure of Vote A, which must be approved by the House before the Army can take action. This year there are 554,000 men on the strength. Last year it was 555,000 and a few years ago it was 467,000.


But nowadays there is a considerable civilian content in the Army, and reference has scarcely been made to it. What is the good of talking about the uniformed content which must be provided by the House when, afterwards, the War Office can alter the number of civilians up or down and thereby affect the total number of people employed by the War Department? The total number employed this year is no less than 739,117. How many hon. Members or members of the public realise that that is the highest total figure for the last four years? The total number of uniformed men and civilians in 1950–51 was 675,490; in 1951–52 it was 718,272; in 1952–53 it was 724,526; and this year the figure has leaped up to 739,117.
We on this side of the House, of course, agree with the policy of civilianising—if I may use the horrible word—the Army, and make no objection to the number of civilians employed——

Mr. Hutchison: Is the hon. Gentleman saying he finds that the civilians employed by the Army total 739,000 this year?

Mr. Adams: What I am saying is that in these modern times there is no significance in having only Vote A, which is the total of the uniformed strength. What we should have is the total of the civilian strength as well, and the two totals should be added together——

Mr. Hutchison: I see.

Mr. Adams: —because the civilian strength is complementary and supplementary to the uniformed strength. In other words, if the uniformed strength increases, more pay clerks, chaplains, and so on, will be required. Similarly, if we replace the uniformed men in R.O.A.C., R.A.S.C., R.E.M.E., by older men in civilian clothing, then we are supplementing the fighting strength. That is a policy with which we agree, but what I say is that the time has come, instead of hiding that civilian element, to state what it is.

Mr. Hutchison: The total is there. The hon. Gentleman has been able to work out the figures from the figures given. The figures are given under each heading.

Mr. Adams: Yes, but one has to make complicated additions.

Mr. Hutchison: Yes, one has to add up.

Mr. Adams: I have dug out the figures and added them, and checked them with a comptometer to make sure that my figures are right, but I am not sure my figures are 100 per cent. accurate even now. But if we have 554,000 on the uniformed strength and 185,117 civilians, there are 739,117 altogether. I wonder how many Members of the House or members of the public have gone to the trouble of making that calculation, and have made a similar calculation, as I have, for the previous four years. How astounded they would have been to have found that the total strength this year is higher than last year or the year before or the year before that. It is a fact that is not easily apparent.
Before the Under-Secretary of State interrupted me, I had got to the point of talking about this reduction of the tail that the Prime Minister himself talked about. He came to the House and said we had got to have more teeth and less tail. He was echoed by the Secretary of State for War. What are the true facts in relation to this tail? The Under-Secretary of State will surely agree with me that the hard core of this tail is the civilian element.

Mr. Hutchison: The hon. Gentleman is being very anatomical.

Mr. Adams: We have been anatomical for a good part of this debate. It was not I who started the phrase "combing the tail," which I think is an ugly phrase altogether; but we have started talking about the tail, following the Prime Minister, and so I suppose we must keep on with that nomenclature. However, I think the hon. Gentleman will agree that a large part of the tail is civilian. If a uniformed man is working in a mill he can be given a rifle and sent off to fight the enemy if the enemy has broken through, but we cannot do the same with a civilian working as a mess steward, or a girl typist in a headquarters. So the basic tail must necessarily consist of this civilian element.
The Prime Minister always criticised the Labour Administration for having too big a tail in the Army. He gave us to understand, when he was in Opposition, that when he come to office he would


do something about it. The Secretary of State for War echoed his words. What are the facts? I have gone to the trouble of making this investigation. We find that in 1950 and 1951 there were 208,490 civilians employed by the War Department; in the following year, 1951–1952, that figure had been reduced to 191,272; in the following year, 1952–1953, what happened?
I break off to point out that the Secretary of State and the Under-Secretary of State put their names to these Estimates in February, 1952. The hon. Gentleman will, however, agree with me that the figures were worked out during 1951 and were, therefore, reached under a Labour Administration. Since they came to power only in the October there was little they could do about it. The Labour Administration reduced the figures from 208,000 to 191,000 and then reduced them to 69,526 for 1952–53. Year by year the Labour Administration consistently reduced the civilian element which formed the tail of the Army, and about which there had been complaint.
What happened this year? One might expect that work to have continued, but one finds instead that the civilian element jumped from 169,000 to 185,117. In other words, without comment from the Minister this afternoon, or from the Under-Secretary tonight, there has been an increase of 9·5 per cent. in numbers in the civilian element. The cost of that element has gone up by 17·5 per cent. If any director of a business had to announce a 17·5 per cent increase in labour costs there would be a row; but the War Office gets by without mentioning it.

Mr. Hutchison: The whole of the hon. Member's argument is based upon a fallacy, which I cannot accept, that the signatures in February, 1952, were put to figures imposed upon us. There were not. They were for the Estimates 1952–53, the first full year.

Mr. Adams: I do not mind which way the hon. Gentleman takes it. He is claiming credit for 1952–53 although he had only three months in which to get the Estimates arranged. These figures are being worked on throughout the year, and it was the Labour Administration who were helping to reduce the figures

in the Estimates which were being prepared. There was little which the Conservative Administration could do about them when it took over.
Let us, however, take the hon. Gentleman's argument, that his Administration were responsible for reducing the figure to 169,500 in 1952–53. In 1950–51, there were 476,000 men in uniform, and there was a civilian element of 208,490 to minister to the needs of the Army. In the following year there were only 191,272 civilians to minister to the needs of 527,000 in uniform. The uniformed strength had risen by 60,000, yet there were fewer civilians. For the year in dispute, 1952–53, although the Armed strength went up from 527,000 to 555,000, the civilian element was reduced from 191,000 to 169,000.
This year, under a Conservative Government, when the uniformed element is reduced by a nominal 1,000, the civilian element leaps up 9·5 per cent. That needs a little explanation. The Secretary of State said this afternoon that various eminent gentlemen were being appointed to make investigations. These figures show already that there is something wrong in the make-up of the Estimates.
I turn to a much more serious feature, a statement made by the Secretary of State in his otherwise excellent Memorandum. We find there a distortion of fact and an effort to present a rather different picture to the public from the real situation. Whether it is deliberate I do not know. On page 13, we find:
By the end of 1953–54 the Army will be employing some 12,000 more civilians than it was employing in 1951–52, an increase of roughly 6 per cent.
Those figures are wrong. The difference of 12,000 is not an increase in the civilian strength but the difference between the increases in the total strength. If the Minister cares to check the figures, he will find that the total strength in 1951–52 was 718,000 whereas in 1953–54 it will be 739,000, which is roughly a difference of 12,000.
For his own information, I would point out that the difference between the strength of the civilian staffs in 1951–52 and in 1953–54 will be the difference between 191,272 for 1951–52 and 185,117 for 1953–54. In other words, there will


not be an increase in the civilian strength but a reduction of something like 6,000.

Mr. Hutchison: I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman is taking the total Vote A calculation when he is doing his additions and subtractions. Of course, it is not the strength. It is the maximum strength that one might have in that year. The actual strength might vary considerably from the 555,000 or the 554,000.

Mr. Adams: I grant the Under-Secretary that it is possible on some occasions for the War Office not to go up to the maximum permitted strength. If we cannot take these figures, we can take those of the civilian strength. Does he agree that in 1951–52 it was 191,272?

Mr. Hutchison: I have only the hon. Member's word for it. I have not the figures here.

Mr. Adams: Perhaps we can adjourn, so that the Minister can get the figures. We have a Memorandum published over the signature of the Secretary of State for War, and I am suggesting that his figures are wrong.

Mr. Hutchison: I am suggesting that the hon. Gentleman is making his calculations wrongly. Without the Estimates over a number of past years it is difficult to sort this out. If the hon. Gentleman is using the Vote A total he will be badly misled, and the figures of my right hon. Friend are probably correct.

Mr. Adams: I was only using the totals included in Vote A, to help the Under-Secretary out of his trouble. I will repeat once again that in the Memorandum, on page 13, it says:
The Army will be employing some 12,000 more civilians than it was employing in 1951–52, an increase of roughly 6 per cent.
The figure of civilians for 1951–52 was 191,272, and the civilian element estimated for 1953–54 is 185,117. That is not an increase in the number of civilians by 12,000 but, in fact, a reduction of some 6,000. That is the point which I want the Under-Secretary to grasp. His figures are wrong, and I hope they will be put right.
Can I ask why the Government should take 1951–52 and compare it with 1953–54 and say there is then an increase of about 6 per cent.? That suggests to the

public that there has been only a modest increase. Why not take 1953–54, with 185,000 odd, and compare that with last year, with 169,000 odd, which represents an increase of 9·5 per cent. in the number of civilians in his Department?

Major Beamish: Surely the figures for 1953–54 represent the maximum permitted strength? In that case, the hon. Member is arguing a complete fallacy, and simply wasting the time of the House. Those are not actual figures, but the maximum permitted.

Mr. Adams: If I am arguing on figures which are fallacious, then why does the Minister include them in his Memorandum? The right hon. Gentleman is no more entitled to the supposition than I.

Major Beamish: In the Middle East——

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I must remind the hon. and gallant Gentleman that we are not now in Committee. He may wish to make his own speech, but he must await the opportunity.

Mr. Wigg: I do not for a moment challenge your Ruling, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, but could you indicate the Standing Order on which you base your intervention, because the Motion before the House—" That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair "—is sufficiently wide to allow an hon. Member to decide how he raises a matter. If you now give as your Ruling that it is within the competency of the Chair to express views on the merits of a case, we are opening the door very wide.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I am not expressing views on the merits of a case. One hon. Member has the Floor of the House, and another hon. Member must await his opportunity to make his speech.

Mr. Wigg: Further to that point of order; you intervened a few minutes ago, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, on the subject of the content of my hon. Friend's speech, but, with respect, I think he was strictly within the rules of order. I was going to raise the question when my hon. Friend had finished speaking, but I thought that the motion, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair" was sufficiently wide to permit an hon. Member to decide how a point should be raised.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I cannot re-open that matter now.

Mr. Adams: I had almost finished my remarks, but what I was trying to say was that while the Labour Administration are under severe criticism from the present Prime Minister and some of his colleagues for having, as was said, an enormous tail to the Army, the figures show conclusively that the Labour Administration were reducing the civilian element which must form the core of the tail. That was so, but the Conservative Administration, during their first full year in office, have increased that content by 9·5 per cent. We want some answer to that.
Finally, in the Memorandum there has been a complete mishandling of the figures, unintentionally to my mind, but it goes near the border of what is permissible deliberately to chose 1951–1952 to compare with 1953–1954, and to give the impression that there has been only a gradual increase when, in fact, if the coming year had been compared with the past year, a more remarkable increase would be shown.
We must leave the matter there. I do not propose to go into a more detailed analysis of the figures under the various subheads except to point out that there has been a remarkable increase in the number of civilians employed at regimental unit level, and, of course, considerable increases in the R.A.O.C., R.E.M.E. and R.A.S.C. I submit, therefore, that Vote 4 should be more fully considered than it has been this year, and I suggest to the hon. Gentleman that in future years the total of Vote 4 should be shown side by side with the total of Vote A. Only in that way can we make a proper appreciation of the manpower being diverted into the War Department and the amount of money required to pay for the services of the men so employed.

3.7 a.m.

Mr. Cyril Bence: I intervene in this debate not because I am an expert on military affairs, about which I know little, but because I am concerned about the defence of this country should we unfortunately be brought into another war. I represent a constituency in which there is a very large shipyard, to which young lads are apprenticed at great sacrifice on the part of their

parents. The Under-Secretary knows that is true because he has the same experience in Scotstoun.

Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison: indicated assent.

Mr. Bence: The management of that shipyard are having their apprentices taken away at the age of 21 or 22, which is a serious handicap to them at present. They know that, should we be brought to war, those boys could not be taken from the shipyard because merchant ships are practically our first line of defence.
Tonight I heard the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer) challenging my hon. Friend the Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt) about the.280 rifle which, he said, was a matter of production. I am an engineer by profession, and I say that if we can get the raw materials, the technical problem for a British engineer is simple. However, we have to import those raw materials, and that means ships, and if we are at war again our shipping services from abroad may be very difficult. But even if we do not get the raw materials, we have to import the rifles, so it seems to me quite a practical proposition to produce the rifle here.
It is beyond my comprehension how that argument can be used against its production here. What about jet engines and the millions of units of tanks and all the armaments of war that we have to produce here and which, if we do not produce, we shall have to import either in the form of the manufactured product, the semi-finished product or the raw material? I see no reason why we should not go ahead with the production of this rifle, which is an excellent one.
I have mentioned the apprentices in the shipyards who, I think, should not be called up. The other point which I want to raise is the item in Vote 1: "War Gratuities and Post-War Credits." Last year the amount was£1,500; this year it is nil. A lot of people come to see me about post-war credits. They include mothers, and sometimes widows, whose husbands were labourers on very low wages, who have apprenticed their sons at very great sacrifice.
In one case the two boys, having completed their apprenticeship, are serving in the Army, and the mother wants to know whether I can get her the post-war credit.


I have told her that I am afraid not, because the Chancellor of the Exchequer will not pay it out. I see in the explanatory note, however, that
Provision is made under Vote 9, subhead N, to cover any payments which may be specially approved.
Could the Under-Secretary for War impress upon his right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer that it might be helpful, when the sons— especially the only son—of a widow are called into the Forces, to pay the post-war credit to her?
I presume that these post-war credits relate to ex-Service men who have been credited with them during their service. It may be that the sons of an ex-Service man are in the Army. I do not know the expectation of life of a soldier, but when my son was at the Mons School at Aldershot, he was told that the expectation of life of a subaltern in war was two hours.
If the post-war credit is not to be repaid until a soldier reaches the age of 65, it is quite possible that if his children take the Army as a career they will never reach that age, and the Treasury will still be holding the post-war credits of soldiers in the year 2253. If a claimant cannot claim post-war credits until he is 65, the Treasury can hold them in perpetuity and never pay them out.
There is another aspect which worries me. If my hon. Friend the Member for Loughborough (Mr. Follick) is successful with the Simplified Spelling Bill which he is bringing before the House, a claimant to post-war credits in the year 2253 might be involved in considerable and expensive litigation to prove that he, Mr. Pew of 2253, is the legitimate claimant and son of Mr. Pugh of 1953. Considerable complication may result, and I ask the Under-Secretary of State to impress upon the Chancellor of the Exchequer that he should obviate even that difficulty by getting the post-war credits paid, wherever possible, to widows whose sons, having completed their apprenticeships, at great sacrifice to their mothers, are now in the Forces.
I want to mention only one other point, of which I was reminded when my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Central (Mr. Short) spoke rather disparagingly of officers passed out from the officer cadet schools. I have been

told—I should like the Under-Secretary to say whether it is true —that if an officer is driving a car in the course of his duties and it gets smashed up, he can be made to pay for it. If, on the other hand, a soldier is driving a car and smashes it up, he is merely reprimanded. When my hon. Friend spoke disparagingly of some of the officers I wondered whether he was justified, because if what I have said is true it would seem that the War Office are of opinion that an officer with a car is not as trustworthy as a ranker.

Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison: Neither the officer nor the man is entitled to drive the car, unless he is an R.A.S.C. driver. Both would be contravening the regulations and might be called upon to contribute payment for the damage done.

Mr. Bence: I am sorry, I was not correctly informed.
I am surprised that when we are speaking of the defence of our country so little attention seems to be paid by hon. Members. All the money we are spending here is on aggressive weapons. What about the people at home if we are suddenly plunged into war? Here we are, probably the most vulnerable base in Europe—what defence is there for the people of this country? We have nothing to defend us. Jet aeroplanes will not defend us; we want deep shelters and defence for the people of this country.
I believe it was the hon. and gallant Member for the Isle of Ely (Major Legge-Bourke) who said that Cyprus was hopeless as a base. It was an island and liable to attack because it was an island. What about our own island, where we have huge American bases and our own huge armament industry? We are liable to be annihilated in the first fortnight. What defences have we against a sudden attack of that nature? Who knows, after Pearl Harbour, that we may not have to wait for the traditional declaration of war. It may happen at any time. What are we doing in case we should be subjected to sudden attack, as Pearl Harbour was? That is what the common people are asking.
I ask the Under-Secretary to inform us what his Department are doing to provide not only for the equipment of the troops but for the protection of the popu-


lation, as far as is humanly possible, from the dangers of a sudden atomic attack.

3.17 a.m.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: My hon. Friend the Member for Dunbartonshire, East (Mr. Bence) asked a very penetrating question in the last part of his speech. I listened to nearly every speech in the defence debate, and all the speeches which have been delivered today, in order to find out, after spending £526 millions on the Army, what real protection the citizens of this country are to have in the event of what my hon. Friend the Member for Dunbartonshire, East describes as a sudden attack. In many speeches we have had reference to the fact that 80 per cent. of our Regular soldiers are abroad; and no one seems to have given an answer which would satisfy us that if such an attack were to develop suddenly we are getting value for the £526 million. I would say of the £526 million we are passing in this Estimate that never was so much spent for so little.
I want to state the point of view of some of us who have a rather different view of National Service from that which has been expressed from the Opposition Front Bench. The Opposition Front Bench take the view that the time has come for a review of our commitments. The right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) argued that we were in favour of a reduction of the period of National Service from two years to one year. I am against National Service at all. I believe that it is against the Declaration of Human Rights.
I do not believe that our young people have any human rights so long as National Service exists in its present form. I believe that that view is widely held among Socialists in this country. The view that we want to see National Service abolished altogether should be expressed as clearly as possible in this debate. Keir Hardie said, "Conscription is the badge of a slave." It is just as much a badge if it extends for one year as for two. A young man who is called up may become a casualty in the first year, and the reducing of conscription from two years to one will give no satisfaction either to the relatives of such people or to those of us who believe

there should be no conscription or forced labour in a democratic society.
The Prime Minister argued during the debate on defence that our National Service period justified us in appealing to the French Government to extend their period of National Service from 18 months to two years. We have heard much the same thing during speeches in this debate. I do not think we are entitled to ask the French people to increase the burden of their conscription by another six months. It is argued that we must have a force to defend us against Communism. I was in France when the present period of National Service was increased from 12 to 18 months, and I know of nothing which played more into the hands of the French Communists than the increase in the term of military service. If it could be said in France that a decision to increase the period from 18 months to two years came as a result of the request of the Socialists of Great Britain, there would be an inevitable increase in power among the French Communists. I protest against any lengthening of the period of service for those reasons.
The Secretary of State has talked about the war in Korea, and it is true that in the Memorandum to these Estimates we have been given a very graphic and detailed description of the war. I want to point out how heavily it rests on the conscripts, especially those who are casualties—those who are called up in February, who are on the way to Korea in July, and in the casualty list in October. I raised this during Question time the other day, and tried to get some information about the percentage of National Service casualties. When the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence attempted to answer, the Prime Minister told him to sit down. That is no answer.
I believe there is strong indignation about the way these young men of 19. who have never voted and who are not responsible for any of the international disturbances, are taken into the Army in this way, and before they have been in 12 months are being killed or wounded on the battlefield. The former Secretary for State for War advanced very strong conclusions, with which I agree, why we should withdraw our Forces from the Middle East. but I also want to have


some consideration for our soldiers in Korea.
The right hon. Gentleman who spoke for the Labour Opposition last Thursday argued that the war in Korea and our casualties there were justified on the ground of what was called collective security. There is a school in the Labour Party that has abandoned, as the former Secretary of State for War has abandoned, the theory that we have to maintain our Forces in different parts of the world on the grounds of Imperial policy; it is justified now by that very curious and deceptive phrase "collective security." I do not believe that anyone looking at Korea at present can say that that war has brought collective security to anyone.
What are the conditions under which National Service men are serving on the Korean front? In the current issue, of 9th March, of the American paper "Time" we get certain figures which should be read in conjunction with what the Secretary of State has written in his Memorandum. This is the background in which our men are called upon to serve:
Of the 22 million people in South Korea about a quarter are homeless. After nearly three years of war there is not much left of Korea, nor of the 38th parallel. The devastation is immense. The United Nations intelligence estimates that bombing and strafing have destroyed 40 per cent. of all habitation of any kind. United Nations bombers no longer have profitable targets.
Can we call that collective security for anyone? I hope that now we have a change of mood in the Labour Party we are going to have a look at this phrase "collective security" again. When we talk about defending the free world I deny we are bringing a freedom of any kind to Korea, especially when we are told that on our side of Korea:
the civil population has diminished from eight million to perhaps four million, killed in the bombing, death from malnutrition, from cold, or have fled to the south from the enemy. Destruction is widespread, the capital city of Seoul is 80 per cent. uninhabitable, public buildings everywhere are in ruins, public utilities are make-shifts and two-thirds of the schools are unusable. The economy is shot to pieces.
With that picture of Korea, what is the use of talking about defending the free world? We are destroying a part of the Far East. We have no right to delude ourselves with this specious phrase, nor has the Labour Party.
In the debate last year I quoted from "Collier's Magazine," in which a large number of British and American military men had written a special supplement trying to visualise what kind of war the next war would be, It was a very revealing magazine. Now a well-known British military expert, who is frequently quoted in these debates, has written an article which has been syndicated to the world Press entitled, "What I would do if I were Russia's Chief of Staff." The first thing that Captain Liddell Hart would do if he were the Russian Chief of Staff would be to send waves of paratroops to this country—and we have heard it argued over and over again, authoritatively, by hon. Members that, after spending hundred of millions on armaments, we could not defend this country if paratroops were sent here.

Mr. Wigg: If my hon. Friend is basing his remarks on the views of Captain Liddell Hart, it is only fair to point out that he said certain things before 1939 about the power of defence which were subsequently proved to be completely wrong.

Mr. Hughes: I do not want to go back into past history, but although he said a lot of things which were wrong, he also said a lot of things which were right. He was recognised as a great military expert.

Major Legge-Bourke: Only by himself.

Mr. Hughes: Because the hon. and gallant Gentleman does not agree with a man's arguments, that is no reason to depreciate his reputation as a military historian and military strategist. If hon. Members read this article they will find in it sufficient to make them wonder how far we have travelled on the road to defending this country. And if we cannot defend this country, what is our defence for? Despite our enormous expenditure, we are now told that we have only a comparatively small, under-armed division in this country in order to face what might be a menacing attack.
The Secretary of State told us several other interesting things. We were told in our last debate that one of our greatest assets was the Centurion tank; the Prime Minister stressed the importance of the Centurion, which is an expensive tank, costing £63,000, and which he said would be a valuable export. Indeed, some have


been exported to Egypt. But this afternoon the Secretary of State told us that the anti-tank weapon had developed to such an extent that by this time next year our Centurion tanks may be worth only the price of the scrap metal.
There has been talk of guided missiles. Nobody has yet told us how the modern anti-aircraft weapons are to bring down rockets. We have been told a little about guided missiles, but anybody who has taken any interest in some of the technical articles written on this subject must feel thoroughly alarmed at the complacency of the Government and the fact that we, in this little island, with its enormously congested industrial population, in spite of the fact we have so little real defence, should have become America's main base in Europe and liable to what the Prime Minister told us would be the most appalling attack in our history.
In face of that we have had the incongruous trifles in the speech of the Secretary of State for War. He told us about the kind of armoured coat that is being worn in Korea. We cannot find armour for our tanks but are vesting our hopes in some kind of medieval armour which the Secretary of State thinks will comfort us. We are even going back to swords. I saw a report that the Minister of Supply had ordered a considerable quantity of swords, and I put down a Question to him about those swords, and I got the answer that it was not in the interest of national security to answer it. Perhaps, the Under-Secretary of State for War can reveal what the Minister of Supply has not revealed—or the Secretary of State. Now that we are spending money on armour, are we going back to swords, and when shall we be going back to bows and arrows?
The hon. Member for Hitchin (Mr. Fisher) made a very interesting speech in which he made a point that I have frequently made and that a number of hon. Gentleman on the other side would have made just as frequently if they had not wished not to be associated with me. That was the point about the call-up of the agricultural workers. They are needed on the land. The Prime Minister made a statement—a very eloquent statement—to the National Farmers' Union about the target of food production necessary in a possible war. We cannot hit

that target of food production if the potential workers are taken away from the land and put into the Army and sent to places such as the Suez Canal.
I do not think there is any virtue in the Secretary of State telling us he got so many hundreds of thousands of recruits this year. He is taking them from essential industry. The economic potential of this country is getting steadily weaker, and this grandiose Army is absorbing men badly needed on other fronts. I am very glad to know I have at least the support of the hon. Member who spoke for the Guards, and that he has stressed the same point in this debate.
I am comforted also by the fact that the National Farmers' Union in my constituency has passed a very strong resolution against this call-up of farm workers, and the chairman has recently made a strong declaration—and, naturally, I shall do my best to carry out his instructions on the Floor of this House. If we are to have full food production, and if we are to realise the full economic potential of this country, we cannot afford to go on draining people away into the Army.
I was interested in the argument of the hon. Member for Hitchin that economies could be made, and that there was no need to spend money on unnecessary work in connection with War Office activities. I was glad to hear the Under-Secretary stress that we are still in a desperate financial situation. While we are in this situation, the statement was made at a Press conference, and it was also stated in reply to a Question which I put to the Secretary of State for War, that £450,000 is being spent on War Office movements for the Coronation. I suggest that we are on a trap door, and that this immense organisation of human effort at present is unnecessary.

Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison: I did not say that we were in a desperate situation. I said that though days of crisis were no longer present the financial situation was not what I would call comfortable.

Mr. Hughes: I am an old journalist, and I noted the word "desperate." I am sorry if I made a mistake. If the situation is not desperate, we are not really on a trap door after all. At the Press conference it was stated that there are


to be 27 military bands in the procession and 20 bands at different points on Coronation Day. That means 47 military bands concentrated on London. This is unnecessary. There are good civilian bands. There is the Scottish Co-operative Societies Band in Glasgow, and there is a Salvation Army band. There are good bands which could be used in the Coronation. When we are asked by the War Office to spend £450,000 on one day's ceremonial, at a time of financial stringency, these are some of the items about which I think we ought to protest.
The Estimates ask for £526 million this year. I do not know what it is going to be next year. We are imposing on the people an immense financial burden which is not giving us our money's worth. The bill is becoming so huge that I hope that the next time the Army Estimates come along there will be more determined action on these benches to oppose them.
Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," put, and agreed to.
Supply accordingly considered in Committee.

[Sir CHARLES MACANDREW in the Chair]

Orders of the Day — ARMY ESTIMATES, 1953–54

VOTE A. NUMBER OF LAND FORCES

Motion made, and Question proposed,
That a number of Land Forces, not exceeding 554,000, all ranks, be maintained for the safety of the United Kingdom and the defence of the possessions of Her Majesty's Crown, during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1954.

3.45 a.m.

Mr. Simmons: There are one or two points I want to raise. I shall not quote so many figures as did my hon. Friend the Member for Wandsworth, Central (Mr. Adams), but I have one figure for the Under-Secretary of State. I do not think that his figure of 554,000 officers and men is accurate. He is out by 508. In the Vote there is constant reference to retired officers. They were not in last year's Estimates in six Votes out of 10.
Can the Minister explain the function of these retired officers who are being brought into so much greater use as civilians? Are they really civilians, or are they officers who have been retired

into civilian jobs in the Army for the purpose of making it look better, so far as the tail is concerned? Can they be classed as "civilians" instead of as "soldiers of the line"?
We are dealing with the number of men and how they will be used. I want to raise a point on page 10 of the Estimates, relating to the Household Cavalry, where it is stated that they consist of
a number of armoured car regiments with the addition of two mounted squadrons for State and other ceremonial duties.
The other relates to the Royal Regiment of Artillery, where it states:
The Royal Horse Artillery carries out State and other ceremonial duties.
Why is so much of the strength of the Army diminished by these ceremonial duties? Cannot these duties be spread around the Army instead of having these people set on one side for this purpose?
I have one point of commendation and one of condemnation. On page 12 of the Estimates, under the heading "Military Provost Staff Corps," it is stated:
An important part of its duties is the training and rehabilitation of soldiers under sentence.
When I was in the Army we had the "glasshouse," although I never got there. Its name was a by-word in the Army.
In my days, we did not have all this trick-cyclist business, or rehabilitation and training. It is a very good idea. We had some bad cases for which the training would have done a great deal of good. Is this just window-dressing or is it a fact that men sentenced under military discipline get rehabilitation to make them into human beings? If so, it shows a very great improvement upon the days when I used to be in Her Majesty's Forces.
We cannot help wondering about it when we read, as we did in the Press this morning, what happened at Bordon, in Hampshire. I think that this is a new departure in the Army. We are told that some of the serjeants in the married quarters had to carry kit a mile before they could lay it out. But what worries me is the last paragraph of this report, because it states that the adjutant was asked if officers would have a kit check. He replied that they could be so ordered, but added, "Of course, it isn't done."
If it is not done for the officers, then why is it done for the serjeants and


w.o.s? Why this class distinction? I have spoken before on the Estimates on this very subject, for class distinction is one of the more serious things which we shall have to alter if we are to get the recruits that are wanted. We are living in 1953, not 1873, and this class distinction no longer applies in the factories and workshops because the lads just would not have it. We must not have it in the Army; if we do, we shall suffer.
I notice that we lump together in this Vote garrisons in Europe, including the United Kingdom. Why cannot we have the United Kingdom figures shown separately? It would give a fairer picture of the distribution of the Forces. Those are the points I wished to raise, and I thank hon. Members for bearing with me.

3.52 a.m.

Mr. Swingler: I wish to enter a protest on this Vote, and I hope that I may have guidance if I have taken the wrong occasion for raising my point. Perhaps the best way is if I call attention to what I said on precisely the same subject five years ago. In 1948, I said,
I rise on this point because I do not think that we should let this Vote pass without a brief recapitulation of some of the points made 12 months ago. The Committee no doubt will approve of the sum of money which is to be voted under this heading, but I must point out that, of course, we do not know what we are doing. Up to 18 months ago, and in previous peace-time years, the Army, like other Services, provided an analysis together with this Vote to show the precise way in which the money was to be used. I do not blame my right hon. Friend and the War Office; it is something which has happened since the creation of the Ministry of Defence about 18 months ago. The curtain of concealment has come down and we have not got, together with this Vote, an analysis of the composition of the Army. Therefore, some protest must be lodged.
Twelve months ago the question was put to the Minister on this Vote as to why the analysis of the composition of the Army and the percentages in the various Corps, arms and branches of the Service could not be given. The argument that there were 'reasons of security' was given, but that has been said over and over again. It is quite obvious in this case that a simple analysis of the composition of the Army by percentages in each arm of the Service could not possibly give anything away that is not already in the possession of the Intelligence Services of foreign Powers.
When an hon. Friend of mine, whose lips are unfortunately sealed tonight, raised this question 12 months ago, we were told that

there would be serious consideration about giving some more facts. While we have been grateful this year for the additional facts and information produced by the Ministry of Defence and the War Office, unfortunately we are not grateful for the lack of information on this Vote. That practically makes it meaningless.
I must emphasise that the Committee is bound to pass the Vote almost blind. I want to lodge my protest about that matter and again to ask that the consideration of the Secretary of State for War and all the Ministers of the Service Departments be given to letting us have the necessary information so that members of the Committee can understand just what we are asked to pay for in this respect."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 9th March, 1948; Vol. 448, c. 1193–94]
All that was said then, and had been said in previous years, with regard to the analysis of Vote A still remains true. Ever since 1947 we have been awaiting explanations from the Service Departments, and particularly from the War Office, as to why they departed then from the analysis that had always previously been given about the composition of the Army. All that was said then, when this cloak of concealment was dropped in 1947, was, if hon. Members like to consult the record, some vague reference to documents which had been captured during the war. It was alleged that those documents, which had been taken from the Germans, proved that the kind of analysis that had been given previously as to what percentage of the Army was in the Royal Artillery, what was in the Royal Engineers and so on, and the distribution of the intake into the Services, had given away information to foreign Powers and that it would be ended.
No evidence has been produced since 1947. This question has been brought up repeatedly because it is quite clear now that Vote A is meaningless, and also the next Vote that goes with it. We have to vote blindly these large sums of money without knowing the purposes for which they are being voted. We cannot find out the distribution of the annual intake as between different arms and branches of the Service, and it enables the Minister to get away with it year after year. There are many questions that go unanswered in all these debates because this simple information, which is quite general and was given previously, has been denied to us since that time.
I am sorry that I failed to give notice to the Under-Secretary that I would raise


this point, but I ask that the matter shall be looked at again. It has been allowed to lapse, but I ask why this decision was taken to suppress the analysis of the composition of the branches and arms of the Service which had been given with the Army Estimates every year between the wars and up to 1947. Either something should be done to provide more information under Vote A or else some proper explanation should be given of the reasons for the change in the form of this Vote and the ambiguity which now surrounds it.
I do not know whether it is proper also to turn to another point about which my hon. Friend the Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt) spoke, namely, the question of the educational qualifications of those at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. I should like to elicit a further reply from the Under-Secretary on a point about which some of us have been concerned during the past year. My hon. Friend gave figures. I looked up some Parliamentary Questions asked on this subject last July, which show that of those cadets training to be officers at Sandhurst at the moment 67 per cent. come from public schools, 22 per cent. from grammar schools,.4 per cent. from secondary schools and the balance from Army schools.
I am not asking that the Under-Secretary should go into this matter himself, but I ask that he should give an undertaking that he will take urgent action to draw the attention of the Minister of Education to these facts. If we are to get better opportunities for young men generally from all types of school to become cadets and officers in the Army, and if there is to be a proper ladder of promotion, it all depends upon the spread of equal opportunities in education for the country as a whole.
Unfortunately, however, one of the Under-Secretary's colleagues in the Government—the Minister of Education —has embarked upon a policy of reducing the chances of equality of opportunity in the educational system and of widening the span between a privileged education and an unprivileged education. One of the results of the policy of the Minister of Education in this Government, by slowing down the school building programme and by the educational economies, is to widen the span between the opportunities

of those who have privileged education, which they buy, and those who have unprivileged education; and, therefore, to make it much more difficult for anyone educated at a secondary modern school to get to the R.M.C., Sandhurst; and, consequently, to make the situation worse.
Therefore, I ask for an undertaking from the Ministers of the Service Departments, who assert their keenness that there should be equal opportunities, which depend upon the education of men from all classes and sections of the community, and with all kinds of education, to become officers in the Army. I ask that they should draw the attention of the Minister of Education to this situation and to the fact that the Army at the moment draws its officers from a very small section of the community that mostly gets privileged education and that, therefore, they object to her policy of widening the span and of reducing the development of equal opportunities in the educational system.

4.3 a.m.

Mr. George Wigg: Historically there is no more important Vote than the one we are now being asked to consider, because the conflict in the 17th century between King and Parliament hinged upon the attempts of the King irregularly to raise an army. Therefore, we ought to be given the maximum information. My hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler) has recalled that in 1947 many hon. Members on this side of the House protested about the paucity of information.
At that time we did not get a terrible lot of support from hon. Gentlemen opposite, but I think that in the next year we did. They thought it was a useful thing to do, and from 1948 onwards hon. Members on both sides of the House pressed my right hon. Friends that we should be given as much information as possible. Finally, a little belatedly, the Prime Minister joined in the hunt. Possibly he was seized of the importance of the point which we had begun to make in 1947, but perhaps also he thought it was a useful political argument.
He did, however, lay down a principle, and if the Under-Secretary of State refers


to HANSARD he will see that on 16th March, 1950, his right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said:
It is not right, for instance, that the House of Commons should be so much worse informed about our defences than the Soviet Government."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th March, 1950; Vol. 472, c. 1282.]
One entirely agrees with the right hon. Gentleman. As his complaints were couched in the most bitter terms about the lack of information that was given by my right hon. Friends, we thought that after a year in which to cogitate and ruminate on what had been done in the past, we should get much more information than had been given by my right hon. Friends.
We find today, however, that the Estimates are in precisely the same form, and obviously no attempt whatever has been made to increase the information that has been given to us. It may well be that the Soviet intelligence service is not as competent as it ought to be, or as competent as our own—unfortunately, it has one or two marked achievements to its credit—but surely one must expect that it knows the strength of our Forces in Germany. If it does know them—accepting the dictum of the Prime Minister—I should think there could be no argument at all, except a desire to conceal the strength in Europe from the House of Commons, why we should not know what it is.
Again, I should not think it would be giving away much to give more detailed information about colonial troops, but the form in which it is presented seems intended to conceal information. I have no access to secret information—nothing like the information of the Secretary of State for War, when he was on the Opposition benches—no information official or semi-official, but simply the information one gets by correspondence and reading the public Press. Yet I can break down the figures and get the total of 80,700. Of that I think the hon. Gentleman will find that 13,000 are serving with British units. Therefore, the actual numbers of colonial troops, including the Gurkhas, is about 67,000.
I got this information in the course of correspondence with the Ministry of Defence, and I am sure that the Ministry would not give me secret information. If I am given that information, why is

the House not given it? I asked the Ministry of Defence the figure of officers and n.c.o.s serving with colonial troops —a very important figure if we are to understand the change of front on the part of the Government—and I was told 14,700. If I can be told that why should we have to wait until Vote A before we can even scratch the surface?
I am not going to press the point because we have many more topics to raise before we conclude our business. I must again express regret that there is no representative of the Ministry of Defence here—

Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison: The Parliamentary Secretary was here——

Mr. Wigg: He ought to be here now. The Minister of Defence is not in this House and we should insist on having a representative here. The hon. Gentleman should go to his noble Friend and tell him that the House of Commons is not going to accept this sort of stuff when we have complaint made by the Prime Minister after a most bitter attack on the withholding of information by the Labour Government. Next year we want all the information that can be given and not to be treated like little children about the way in which the Estimates are presented. There is no change in form at all from the improvements which were effected between 1947 and 1948 as a result of pressure by my hon. Friends.
I hope that the Under-Secretary will be good enough to deal with these points. It is quite extraordinary that neither he nor his right hon. Friend said a single word about the proposed colonial defence conference which was exclusively referred to in the "Sunday Times" yesterday. The "Sunday Times" has ready access to Ministers and is given all sorts of information which is denied to the House of Commons. It can announce a most important step, which is at least an indication that the Government are having second thoughts and intend to investigate the policies which they laid down when in Opposition. It refers to a forthcoming defence conference between representatives of the West African and British Governments on colonial defence.
The right hon. Gentleman—than whom there was no more voluble advocate of a colonial army when he thought it would embarrass the Labour Government—at


least had the grace to admit a year ago what he had been up to. This year we do not find a reference at all, either in the Memorandum or in the speeches. I consider that this Committee has been treated in a very cavalier fashion. It has been treated with less respect than the "Sunday Times," and that is not good enough. If the position had been reversed, if the information had appeared in "Reynolds News" or the "Daily Herald," without the Government spokesman saying a word about it, there would have been protests.
On the one day of the year when we should have the maximum information, I think the withholding of any statement about this proposed conference has a sinister ring, in view of the failure of the Government to carry out the policy laid down by the Prime Minister. It would appear that the Army Estimates are now used to conceal information rather than to give it. If I am wrong I shall be glad to admit it, but in that case I hope that the Under-Secretary will be much more forthcoming about this matter.

Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison: I am afraid that I cannot be more forthcoming, because I do not know any more about it than the hon. Gentleman. If this is a question of a colonial defence conference he should address his remarks either to the Minister of Defence or the Colonial Office.

Mr. Wigg: Surely I am not expected to take the hon. Gentleman seriously, Here is an announcement in a newspaper which certainly has the ear of Ministers and of the Conservative Central Office. I do not say that in any unkind way. Everyone knows that the "Sunday Times" is an authoritative organ, and that a great deal of what appears in it is based on the proper contacts which exist between it and the Government. Here is a statement about a defence conference between West African representatives and the Government, and the Government spokesman says he knows nothing about it. Can we take it that this statement in the "Sunday Times" is inaccurate?

4.13 a.m.

Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison: The hon. Member can take exactly what I said, that I know nothing of such a conference. I will go into the matter and discover whether it is

a thing which comes within the cognisance of the War Office, and if so I will inform the hon. Member. But I am no more in a position to give him information now than he is to give me information. That is the answer to that one.

Mr. Swingler: Surely the hon. Gentleman is not going to treat the matter like that——

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Order. Whether or not the Minister proposes to give an answer does not come within Vote A.

Mr. Swingler: But surely——

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: It does not come within the Vote.

Mr. Swingler: On a point of order. Is not this matter to do with manpower which comes under Vote A? This question has to do with the manpower of the colonial troops. I should have thought this was a matter which could be discussed in connection with manpower.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: If the question of manpower were treated in that way we should have a very wide debate, but it is only numbers that we are dealing with here.

Mr. Swingler: Will not this affect the numbers?

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Can the Under-Secretary give the House any information about the character of the colonial troops? Does the number include the Dyaks from Borneo who are operating in Malaya? We have had a confession from the Secretary of State for the Colonies that the Dyaks, the head-hunters of Borneo, are operating in Malaya. A photograph appeared in a Communist paper. It was said to be a fake, and there were heated arguments about it. Then, to our great surprise, the Secretary of State for the Colonies admitted that this head-hunting business had been carried under the auspices of the British Army in Malaya. I would ask if the Dyaks are still there and if those operations are still continuing?

Mr. M. Stewart: Mr. M. Stewartrose——

Mr. Hutchison: I am a little lost about the way this debate has gone. I was trying to answer the point of the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), and I thought that when the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler) inter-s


vend it was to add to the same point. It seems yet another speech is to be made. I do not want to curtail the discussion, but I had started to answer the points of the hon. Member for Dudley. I have answered him on the question of a colonial defence conference.
Now I will answer the point that he and the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme brought up about information. Here again, I cannot answer "off the cuff," but I think he answered it himself. He disclosed that it had been discovered in 1948 that the system and method of publishing Vote A at that time had been discovered in some German Intelligence papers, and that they had been able to get information which otherwise they would not be able to get.
On the point the hon. Gentleman made about being able to get the strength of our forces, he said he thought no doubt the strength of our forces in Germany would be known. It is one of the fundamentals of security not only that one hides certain points and factors, but also that one does not make it easy for an enemy to get information that otherwise they would not get. The more we publish and tabulate things which an enemy might want the easier we make it for him.
The hon. Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons) asked me whether retired officers of classes I, II, and III, were camouflaged civilians. No, they are not. They are pukka civilians brought in because there were certain staff tasks they could obviously do which ordinary civilians could not do. But it is a straightforward civilian appointment, and they are not officers on the Active List in any category or form.
The hon. Member then brought up the question of the Household Cavalry. The ceremonial duties carried out by them and the King's Troop, Royal Horse Artillery, are only part of their duties. The same men do not stay there throughout their military career. They take part in

training, and in the wars take their part in active fighting.
His other point related to rehabilitation. At one of the military establishments at least, Shepton Mallet, great attention is paid to rehabilitation, to bringing the men back to a better attitude of mind, with the idea of reforming rather than of punishing.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: I wanted to know about the Dyaks employed in Malaya.

Mr. Hutchison: I do not think that they are being employed by us. Such Dyaks as were employed would come under the Colonial Office.

Mr. M. Stewart: This Vote does contain a reference to the brigade of Gurkhas. I think the Government of India, and to a lesser extent the Government of Nepal, are increasingly averse to the recruitment of Gurkhas from Nepal by this country. Sooner or later that development was bound to end. The very unusual, and I think now unique, arrangement whereby the subjects of one State are recruited for special service in the Armed Forces of another is not one likely to survive far into this century. Can the hon. Gentleman say whether this changed attitude has produced any marked effect on the character of recruiting and what consideration the War Office has given to the problem?

Mr. Hutchison: We have given a great deal of consideration to it, but I hope I shall not be pressed too hard on that question, which is a delicate matter at present under consideration.

Question put, and agreed to.

Resolved,
That a number of Land Forces, not exceeding 554,000, all ranks, be maintained for the safety of the United Kingdom and the defence of the possessions of Her Majesty's Crown, during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1954.

To report Resolution, and ask leave to sit again.—[Mr. Oakshott.]

Report to be received this day.

Committee to sit again this day.

Orders of the Day — HIGHLANDS DEVELOPMENT

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—
[Sir H. Butcher.]

4.22 a.m.

Lord Malcolm Douglas-Hamilton: I want to take this opportunity to put forward a picture of the needs and opportunities of development in the Highlands of Scotland. Nothing more or less than the revival of the economy of an entire country is at stake here—a revival which could be of immense benefit to the entire United Kingdom.
The Highland area comprises more than half Scotland. The seven crofting counties alone are 47 per cent., and cover territory as large as the countries of Belgium and Holland combined, but wrongful political and economic decisions have caused tragic depopulation, which is still continuing, until today this area has only 284,000 inhabitants.
It is obvious that no one single measure can achieve re-population and revive the Highland economy, damaged as it is by 200 years of neglect and by-passed by the Industrial Revolution.
Highland economic rehabilitation must be a combination of many factors and endeavours, one complementing the other. It must be a combination of private enterprise and individual initiative, coupled with Government assistance where appropriate. It must be a combination of vigorous expansion in agriculture, industry and tourism; in forestry and fishing, and the development of natural resources. One thing is clear—that present measures, whether Government or private, are insufficient to hold even the present population, much less attract back those who have left.
If the economy is to be revived and the area made an asset to the United Kingdom instead of a liability, we can no longer afford to neglect the use of modern industrial, scientific and agricultural techniques which have worked such wonders in other areas. Agriculture is, of course, one of the chief categories in which real development can take place. The greatest potential increase in food production possible in the United Kingdom lies in the Highlands. My hon. Friend the Member for East

Aberdeenshire (Mr. Boothby) has estimated that Britain could produce 50 per cent. more beef, mutton and pigmeat. I think that if anything he is under-estimating the potential.
Mr. W. A. Stewart, a Member of the Northamptonshire Institute of Agriculture, goes even further. He points out that we have 16 million acres of rough grazing in the United Kingdom, the bulk of which is in the Highlands, and he estimates that an extra 660,000 head of cattle could be made available for slaughter each year through the use of this land. If this were achieved, Britain could be independent of the Argentine.
The key is, of course, winter feeding. I submit that this could be supplied in the Highlands in three ways: first, from the low ground of hill farms through reclamation; second, through reclamation of the many thousands of acres of land in large and small areas throughout Scotland; and, third, by subsidised freight on feedingstuffs from the lower-lying and better productive lands. We have before us in the Highlands several outstanding successful examples of pioneer efforts by individuals demonstrating how sizeable parcels of land can be reclaimed by the use of modern methods and livestock population largely increased.
We have seen, for example, how it is possible to develop a herd of 700 head of cattle on 5,000 acres of rough ground —ground which reclamation has enabled to produce all the winter feed for this herd. Pilot schemes point the way for others to do likewise, but to achieve the greatest overall increase in the area and to produce the largest number of cattle for the nation, the crofter and small farmer is bound to play the major part. He needs more help and assurance, however, than he is getting at present. He should receive, for example, more subsidy for ploughing in new lands, often consisting entirely of heather and bent, than does the farmer who ploughs up old loam. For such marginal lands, I submit, a ploughing subsidy of £10 an acre is not too much.
Further working capital is essential to any substantial increase in livestock rearing in the Highlands. Certainly, the Scottish banks help farmers, if they are established and credit-worthy and have some collateral security with the banks.


I am informed that Scottish farmers are now overdrawn to the extent of £20 million, but many who wish to enter the field today lack the capital to enable them to start, or to increase their stock. Generous subsidies are paid for livestock rearing, and the £15 cow and calf subsidy is undoubtedly bearing results; hill cattle are increasing; but very much more remains to be done.
It is true, too, that the Land and Mortgage Corporation provides funds to acquire land, and the Scottish Land Improvement Corporation will lend money to improve the land after it has been acquired; but there are plenty of landowners who would gladly lease grazing lands to a likely tenant, and there are plenty of young and energetic men throughout Scotland who could and would put stock on the ground if only they could get the necessary finance to start them off. There are many suitable places for cattle rearing in the north-west Highlands and Islands, but if meat is to be produced there the Government have the responsibility to make things right so that more farmers can establish themselves and expand production. Increased credit facilities are essential in the crofting counties if we are to achieve the immense increase in food production of which the area is capable.
Only to touch, in the brief time at my disposal, on the fishing industry, I would say that probably the most important consideration there is the long-term one of conservation of our fishing grounds. Our waters should be protected in the same way as Norway and Iceland have protected theirs. International agreements should be secured to this end.
I now turn to industry. I wish specifically to reject the concept that the Highlands should have an entirely pastoral economy. That is a counsel of defeat and containment that is an anachronism in our day and age. Industry is essential for development and repopulation. The Highland area urgently needs the widespread establishment and extension of industries, both large and small. These industries should be based on the needs of the population and on the basic natural resources of the area. To mention only a few of the latter, industrial development can be based on dolomite, peat, mica, silica sand, water power and

wool, as well as such subsidiaries as cement and bricks.
All existing industries should be strengthened, and new markets developed for them. Imagination and a knowledge of the tastes and requirements of world markets should be harnessed to native abilities and crafts. We must think, too, in terms of developing quite new industries; for example, those which involve the use of forest products, the raw materials of which should become increasingly available as the Forestry Commission trees mature.
We must think big, and we must think imaginatively. Britain is badly balanced in the matter of distribution of industries, with the overwhelming bulk concentrated in the South, and the North comparatively barren of industrial development, but there is no reason why this situation should continue indefinitely. I am sometimes told that Highland development can be based only on indigenous resources. But what indigenous resources has London, which has the largest population of any city in the world?
London has facilities for ships in a safe harbour, and from this and her geographical position has grown immense trade. The North-West of Scotland has as good natural harbours as any part of the world, and is considerably nearer the American continent than is London. It is important that hydro-electric power should be used to a great extent in the development of new industries in the Highlands. Industrial expansion will bring in its wake new labour, involving, we hope, the return of many Highlanders who have been forced south to seek opportunity.
About the most serious obstacle in the path of development in the Highlands is the present burden of freight charges, an obstacle which only the Government can remove. For years the Highlands have been in crying need of freight charges reduction. The continuance of high freight charges handicaps all aspects of development and endeavour. I should like to say categorically for myself—and I think this goes for my colleagues who represent Highland seats—that until something real is done for remote areas in this respect, I do not intend to support any further increase in freight charges, fares or petrol tax.


The potential of tourism to the Highlands can hardly be over-estimated. Sir Alexander Maxwell has stated that the earnings to the United Kingdom from overseas visitors were £115 million in foreign currency in 1952. How much of this did Scotland contribute? Nothing like the Goschen formula of 11 per cent. By far the bulk of overseas visitors remain in the South, although, thanks largely to the Edinburgh Festival, many now get as far as there.
Yet only a fraction of American visitors go to Scotland, and an even smaller fraction go to the Highlands. No one can deny that the scenery of the Highlands, and their historic interest, are unsurpassed. This area could well be the great new tourist attraction of the United Kingdom for discriminating overseas visitors, and so account for a further important increase in tourist earnings.
We badly need, however, to increase our tourist accommodation and facilities. Hotel proprietors are greatly handicapped by the Catering Wages Act, and by capital restriction and many regulations entirely inappropriate for remote areas. To open up this great potentiality, which could immensely improve our balance of payments position, the Government ought to be prepared to sponsor long-term loans to any hotel proprietor who conforms to suitable standards, and who wishes to increase and improve his accommodation. They ought to encourage and assist the provision of tourist amenities by every possible means. A major and thorough economic development in the Highlands must make full use of private enterprise and personal initiative. But there are certain prerequisites which must be undertaken by the Government.
I therefore ask the Government to begin to open the way for real Highland development by undertaking that at least £1 million more a year shall be spent on the roads. In this connection it is noteworthy that Britain is the only European country that has not embarked on a road reconstruction plan since the war. I would ask also that there should be a realistic effort to reduce freight charges and fares and to provide a more efficient and cheaper transport system. Also, that there should be speedier improvement of essential social amenities, such as the laying on of water supplies, postal and telephone communications, community halls,

etc., bearing in mind that conditions in many Highland communities are about 100 years behind the rest of the country.
With a view to increasing the nation's supply of food the Government should create a north of Scotland food production and marketing board, with the same financial facilities as are enjoyed by the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board. The possibilities should be examined at once of such a body performing, as one of its functions, that of an agriculture finance corporation, with Government backing in the first instance, so as to liberalise credit facilities in the north of Scotland, and to provide working capital for farmers.

Mr. Speaker: A lot of the hon. Member's proposals involve legislation. That is out of order on the Motion for the Adjournment.

Lord Malcolm Douglas-Hamilton: I requested the Treasury to reply to this debate tonight, and I had a note from the Financial Secretary stating that he would study the debate with care.

Mr. Speaker: Even if the Treasury did reply tonight, the Treasury would need to initiate legislation to give effect to the hon. Member's desires. The rest of the speech is innocuous.

Lord Malcolm Douglas-Hamilton: I should like to reinforce the request made by my hon. Friend the Member for Caithness and Sutherland (Sir D. Robertson) for the creation of small development areas in two towns or large villages in each of the mainland counties, with one in Orkney, one in Shetland and one in the Hebrides. With the above purpose in view, I ask the Government to embark on a 3-year plan to spend £10 million more than they are intending to spend. My hon. Friend made a similar request in a letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer last December, and sent a copy to the Secretary of State for Scotland. He is still waiting for a reply.
I was hoping that the Treasury would reply to me today because the pith of what I am saying concerns them most of all. I have a letter from the Financial Secretary to the Treasury in which he states that he will do his best to help the Scottish Minister to reply on points which may concern the Treasury, and that


he will study the debate with care; so we must hope for the best.
I ask again that the International Bank, of which Great Britain is the second largest supporter, be used for foreign currency when required and to purchase from abroad material in short supply. Why should Britain be the only European Member country not to receive a loan for internal development when there is so much to be done? Many people who are interested in the Highlands and who believe in the potentialities there are doing their best to attract enterprise and new life of all kinds into the area.
I am convinced that we can succeed, as we intend to spread our message throughout the world; but our work will be a great deal easier if the Government give a real demonstration that they, too, are in earnest about Highland development and accept it as the challenge it is to the British nation. The United Kingdom, battling to regain its rightful position of world eminence, needs a strong and healthy Highland area, as much as the Highlands need the United Kingdom. In brief, I ask for belief, and for this to be shown not only in words but in action.

4.37 a.m.

Mr. H. R. Spence: I would call attention to another Highlands area, the north-east corner of Scotland round by Aberdeen, where the problem of unemployment is rather different. There was full employment, mainly based on fishing, but the type of fishing has changed and the markets have altered. It was stated in the Board of Trade Journal of 28th February that there are 2,500 unemployed in the area. That shows the scope for industrial development by the old remedy of trying to attract industries there. Has the Joint Under-Secretary thought what might be done by developing industries already there or in neighbouring areas?
I have a proposal to put to him. He knows my interest in the North and in textiles; we might be able to transfer 50 or 100 workpeople perhaps 25 miles and find them full employment. Some inland towns have the problem of finding enough suitable labour while there is this pocket of unemployment on the coast. It is along those lines that I hope the Minister will examine the points I put

before him. Would it be possible to provide hostels, or some form of transport to take these people to and from their work? I think the hostels to be the answer. In the development of existing industries that are there lies the way to absorb these pockets of unemployment, enable our people to work and bring back prosperity to coastal towns, while increasing the prosperity of the inland towns.

The Joint Under-Secretary of State for-Scotland (Mr. Henderson Stewart): My noble Friend has given us a very vigorous address upon a favourite topic, and I think we must all admit admiration for the loyalty he shows to his own country and to his own subject. I wish we could do all he asks of us. We would all like it; there is no doubt whatever about that, for the Government want the Highlands developed to the largest extent and at the quickest possible pace. But, as he knows, the Highlands form part of the United Kingdom, and the United Kingdom today is going through a difficult period economically.
As we all know perfectly well, we are in straitened circumstances. We are not able to do the hundred and one things we should like to do and, indeed, which ought to be done; and until we are able to afford that, I am afraid that the Highlands of Scotland will have to bear up, like other parts of the United Kingdom, as best they can. If we could increase the productivity of the country; if we were to move into a phase of more secure world conditions, and thereby reduce expenditure on armaments, and in other directions restore the general economy and improve our prospects, we should be infinitely nearer the era of development for which my noble Friend has pleaded tonight.
It would not be right to assume, however, that all is ill with the Highlands; that nothing substantial is being done, or that there are no bright spots in that part of the country. My hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeenshire, West (Mr. Spence) has done us all a service in giving an example of these bright lights to be found in the Highlands. He has said that in some of the towns a little off the North-East Coast there is no unemployment, but, in fact, a shortage of labour; an acute shortage of labour, as I know in one or two cases.


His suggestion that we should consider some scheme by which the unemployed male and female labour of the coastal area might be moved into the inland area not so many miles away through the establishment of hostels, was a very constructive one. I undertake to see that that shall be immediately examined, and I hope that we may count on his assistance in any investigations we make, because we know his experience in these matters.
It would be wrong to claim that nothing has been done. It is as well that we should record some of the things being done; and some of the things which this Government are doing. I think the country should realise how much money we are putting at the disposal of the Highlands in the form of many services at this time. May I give some details? The Department of Agriculture is spending over £2 million in the Highlands, the Department of Health nearly £4 million, the Home Department nearly £3 million, and the Scottish Education Department £2 million—a gross total of about £l1 million a year in the Highlands crofting counties. More than £1 million is being spent by the Forestry Commission.
There are grants under the Development Commission, and there are grants in the case of road transport amounting to another £1 million. If one adds a proportion of the total expenditure which the Hydro-Electric Board is undertaking, covering the crofting counties, which may be in the neighbourhood of £6 million or £7 million, more than £20 million a year is now being spent by the Government in the recognised Highland areas. That does not seem to indicate neglect.
As my noble Friend admitted, some of the measures in regard to agriculture and the rearing of livestock have been successful. The £15 subsidy for calves which he mentioned has shown remarkably good results. The hill farming and livestock rearing schemes have been taken up vigorously by the crofters in the Highland area. Up to December last 516 hill farming and livestock rearing schemes had been submitted in the seven Highland counties at an estimated cost of a little less than £2½ million.
By this means over two million acres are being dealt with now and £153,539 has been paid in grant as compared with £569,100 paid to the whole of Scotland.

No one can say that the Highlands are not getting a fair share. The total amounts of grants and subsidies paid in the Highland counties each year in that direction is well over £1 million. The tillage area is rising, the number of livestock is showing an encouraging tendency to rise in all directions, and I would say that the actions which we have been able to take in the last year, considering all the difficulties under which we labour, are not negligible.
I want to address myself to the challenge about credit, a point which my noble Friend has raised many times. I was delighted to hear him stress the importance of development by individuals because without that there would be no hope for the Highlands. The Highlanders must take the initiative. The Government will help, but it is the men and women themselves who will save the Highlands. However, my noble Friend seemed to think that they were inhibited from doing all they would like to do because of the shortage of credit. I beg leave to disagree with him. We have not evidence of that. If he has evidence, perhaps he will let me have it?

Lord Malcolm Douglas-Hamilton: I will produce it.

Mr. Stewart: I shall be glad to have it.
There is certain very striking evidence in the contrary sense. As my noble Friend will remember, the Chancellor of the Exchequer some considerable time ago made it clear to the banks that in applying their policy of advancing money, they should give full weight to the importance of agricultural production, especially where increases in tillage area and in fat stock were concerned. That the banks are co-operating fully to carry out the Government's policy is illustrated by the quarterly analysis of bank advances, which show that advances to agriculture during 1952 were higher than in any previous year.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: So was the rate of interest.

Mr. Stewart: That is an important point, but even with the higher rate of interest we had bigger bank advances to agriculture last year than ever before. That does not show that there is a great shortage of credit


I confess to having played about in my youth with the idea of an agricultural bank, but after a good deal of experience I have come to the conclusion that it is not a sound idea. Given a revival of trade, for which we are all anxious. and given men of the right integrity and character, the present Scottish banking system is perfectly capable of carrying all the development that the country requires.
We shall be talking in two days' time about hydro-electricity, and I need not say much tonight except that it is making a substantial contribution. I was pleased to hear from my hon. Friend of the part that electricity is playing in the development of the Highlands, and I look for his support on Wednesday night.
In industrial expansion we are, I admit, up against difficulties. We have created

an industrial development area round about Inverness. It has not attracted industry as we had hoped. We cannot force industry to go there. If industrialists do not choose to go, there is not much that we can do about it. We have tried a different method in the North-East, to which my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeenshire, West referred. I hope that that may be more attractive. We will do whatever is possible to provide the conditions, but it remains true, as I said earlier, that the development of the Highlands, like that of Scotland, depends upon the initiative of Scotsmen and Highlanders.
Question put, and agreed to.
Adjourned accordingly at Nine Minutes to Five o'Clock a.m.